🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <8469@eddie.MIT.EDU> jbs@fenchurch.MIT.EDU (Jeff Siegal) writes:

>Reasonably secure systems rely on layers of difficult-to-bypass
>barriers (e.g. fence, man-eating-dogs, armed guards, locks on building
>doors, building alarm system, video cameras, motion detectors, locks
>on computer room door(s), etc.) rather than one "impenetrable" maginot
>line.

I second this.  I had a summer job programming computers.  I have described
earlier how the computer operator left her passsword written in the log, to
which I had access (when she wasn't at her console).  With this password I
theoretically had total access to the system and all its files (note that
this was not a UNIX system, on which root can instantly read all files, but
another operating system).  I could read and modify real memory.  So, from 
one point of view I had broken the system.  By the reasoning of some of the 
articles on this subject, there should have been no more security since
it was now possible to do anything I wanted with the computer.  However, 
my employer was paranoid (but we all know that even paranoids have real 
enemies...).   The password I had was not the one which would satisfy the 
security program to allow me to access any user's files.  To get at files
for which I had no permission, I would have had to patch the operating 
system to bypass the security checks.  While this was possible, since I
had the permissions to put my own programs into the operating system, it
would have been far from easy or quick.  I didn't try this, not having any
desire to read others' files, and so the multi-level security worked.
The only person who could have easily proceeded past where I got is an
assembly language programmer (which I am) with a very good knowledge of
the details of the operating system and related programs (which I did not
have).  If I had had malicious intent (say, I got fired but was able to 
dial in from outside to get revenge) I could have casued trouble by shutting 
down or randomly rebooting the machine, but no more.  The cause of this
would have been obvious from the account logs, and the password would have
been quickly changed.

No single layer of security is "impenetrable".  Multiple layers may come 
close.









   John Carr                 "No one wants to make a terrible choice
   jfc@Athena.MIT.EDU         On the price of being free"
                                         --Neil Peart