🚀 go-pugleaf

[This is a followup to a discussion of Canadian versus US
cryptographic devices and standards, which is probably of direct
interest to the crytographic community worldwide --dave c-b]

  Unfortunately, the new LSI-based COMSEC standard appears to have
the trap door mandated by Congress for international traffic built
in to it. While it's admirable for the U.S. to propose a standard
for its allies which will (hopefully) uniformly deny the enemy
access to our secrets, it's not in the interest of those same allies
to have their nearest and dearest independent secrets subject to
perusal by NSA.  

  The actual algorithms for the type I modules are being treated
like the crown jewels and are NOT open for scrutiny by engineers
designing product around them.  Moreover, design-in sessions
necessary to those using these black boxes in a product are being
held ONLY in the U.S. with access denied to non-U.S. citizens.  The
result is that the only "Canadian" companies able to actually
participate are the American headquarters of Canadian branch plants.
We're well aware of the catch-22 syndromes involved because of our
partial development of data encryption for commercial cellular
telephone nets. 

   We strongly believe that for sensitive Canadian secrets, a
proprietary Canadian algorithm should be embedded into LSI, and the
details shared with no one outside Canada.  Failure to do this makes
a mockery of our already limited sovereignty. If we wish as
Canadians to have our world views taken seriously by our allies, we
must make the necessary expenditures not to be dependent.

--
 Max Southall,               {mnetor yunexus utgpu}!geac!lethe!max
 Micro/Access,               voice: 488-1799, 463-9535
 1425 Bayview Ave.,
 Toronto, Ontario.
 CANADA, M4G 3A9