Article View: sci.crypt
Article #415Re: RSA Public Key Generations.
From: Robert D. Silverman
Date: Sun, 02 Aug 1992 14:55
Date: Sun, 02 Aug 1992 14:55
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In article <skyhawk.712690763@milton> skyhawk@u.washington.edu writes: :In some recent message, mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu (Mark Riordan) writes: :>avalon@coombs.anu.edu.au (Darren Reed) writes: :>: Hi, I've been looking at implementing RSA encrpytion and have found that :>: generating the initial keys is a somewhat tricky. :> :>The principal challenge is in finding the two prime numbers that :>constitute (most of) the private key. Though there are restrictive :>guidelines for choosing these if you're really concerned about security, :>choosing random primes will work. I have posted repeatedly that the restrictions are not necessary. :Okay, I'll bite. What are the restrictive guidelines? All I could find was: : p-1 and q-1 should have large prime factors This will be true for arbitrary large primes p & q. : gcd(p-1,q-1) should be small This reduces the number of stationary points. : p and q should differ in length by a few decimal digits OK, but not really necessary. : I used: p = 2xy + 1 (x and y are pseudoprimes) : :Pick two psuedoprimes, crank out a candidate for p, and test for primality. You are misusing the term 'pseudoprime'. What you mean is 'probable prime'. A 'pseudoprime' is actually a probable prime that is composite, e.g. a Carmichael number. It is not really necessary that x & y be prime. Further, I recommend that you make p a strong probable prime. :Loop until p is prime, repeat for q. Is this a reasonable method? Expensive. :Is there something else that should be done to get good p and q? Yes. I have repeatedly discussed the procedure for doing so. Briefly: Select an inteval(s) near the size you want, e.g. 10^100. (and say 10^102) Sieve out composites divisible by small primes. Select two strong probable primes p & q such that p-q is reasonably large (at least 10^25). [This defeats difference of squares methods]. ECM makes restrictions on p-1 and q-1 useless. -- Bob Silverman These are my opinions and not MITRE's. Mitre Corporation, Bedford, MA 01730 "You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
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Newsgroups: sci.crypt Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!snorkelwacker.mit.edu!linus!linus.mitre.org!faron!bs From: bs@faron.mitre.org (Robert D. Silverman) Subject: Re: RSA Public Key Generations. Message-ID: <1992Aug2.145532.4657@linus.mitre.org> Sender: news@linus.mitre.org (News Service) Nntp-Posting-Host: faron.mitre.org Organization: Research Computer Facility, MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA References: <avalon.712399566@coombs> <1992Jul29.214014.4507@msuinfo.cl.msu.edu> <skyhawk.712690763@milton> Date: Sun, 2 Aug 1992 14:55:32 GMT Lines: 57