🚀 go-pugleaf

unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh) writes:

>lerman@neuron.nynexst.com (Kenneth Lerman) writes:

>>David Maddison (maddison@laurel.ocs.mq.edu.au) wrote:

>>: I wrote a letter to Steve Orlowski at the AG's Department and he wrote me a
>>: reply. He has given me permission to repost this letter to the 'Net for

>>: From STEVE.ORLOWSKI@AG.ausgovag.telememo.au Thu Aug 17 17:59 EST 1995
>...
>>Oh, and where do you suppose the keys to his house are escrowed today?
>>Or the keys to his car?  Or the combination to his gym locker?  Or to
>>his bank's vault?
>All of these can be demanded from you by a court, or the police can
>break down the door. In crypto breaking down the door is difficult, but
>he is advocating that the courts be allwed to demand that you give them
>the key.



>>: Steve Orlowski

>>Ken

>>--
>>Kenneth Lerman                     Kenneth.Lerman@lerman.nai.net
>>Systems Essentials Limited                         (203)426-4430
>>55 Main Street
>>Newtown, CT 06470
>--
>Bill Unruh
>unruh@physics.ubc.ca


  It is of course, entirely true that a Court could order a suspect to 
surrender his/her private PGP key (or decrypt the suspect messages). If 
this were the extent of the issue, there would surely be no need for 
Govts. to insist on escrowed keys, weak crypto and the like.
  The problem is that such Court orders cannot be served without the 
target being aware of them. The real issue is surreptitious surveillance. 
This is what Govts. really want (if they did not, strong crypto and Court 
orders for disclosure would suffice).
  Of source, this also opens the door to _unauthorised_ wiretapping and/or 
corrupt misuse or disclosure of such surreptitiously-acquired data. 
"But our <Govt. agency of your choice> officers would never do such a thing: 
it's strictly against regulations". So sorry: read Roger Clarke's homepage
 
  http://commerce.anu.edu.au/comm/staff/RogerC/RogersHome.html

which includes the following:

   Between 1990 and 1992, the N.S.W. Independent Commission Against
   Corruption (ICAC) conducted an investigation into allegations
   concerning widespread unauthorised access to personal data. It
   concluded that "information from a variety of State and Commonwealth
   government sources and the private sector has been freely and
   regularly sold and exchanged for many years ... A massive illicit
   trade in government information ... has been conducted with apparent
   disregard for privacy considerations, and a disturbing indifference to
   concepts of integrity and propriety ... Laws and regulations designed
   to protect confidentiality have been ignored ... [Even where criminal
   sanctions existed], information ... has been freely traded" (ICAC
   1992, pp. ix, 3, 4).

  There follows a partial list of agencies which have "misbehaved" in 
this regard. The report is unambiguous: it _has_ happened, it continues 
to happen, it is widespread. "They" are _not_ trustworthy, on the evidence 
of "their" own Commission.

-- 
David R. Brooks <daveb@perth.DIALix.oz.au>    Tel/fax. +61 9 434 4280
PGP public key via finger or keyservers
Public key fingerprint:  20 8F 95 22 96 D6 1C 0B  3D 4D C3 D4 50 A1 C4 34