Article View: sci.crypt
Article #470Re: Question about DES s-boxes.
From: Mike Rosing
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 1992 03:28
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 1992 03:28
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ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew.) replies:
>It is now known that the S boxes in standard DES are about the best
>that can be done. Biham and Shamir's article "Differential
>Cryptanalysis of the full DES" explains this in more detail. As far
>as I can remember, the "perfect" S boxes have other weaknesses.
I've found "Differential Cryptanalysis of DES-like Cryptosystems" by
Biham and Shamir on page 2 of Crypto '90. What they actually say is:
"the replacement of the order of the eight DES S boxes (without
changing their values) can make DES much weaker: DES with 16 rounds
with a particular replaced order is breakable in about 2^46 steps
[2^58 as is]. The replacement of the XOR operation by the more
complex addition operation makes this cryptosystem much weaker. DES
with random S boxes is shown to be very easy to break. Even a minimal
change of one entry in one of the DES S boxes can make DES easier to
break."
In Eurocrypt '91, Dawson and Tavares have an article "An expanded set
of S-box Design Criteria Based on Information Theory and its Relation
to Differential-Like Attacks". What they open the article with is:
"Biham and Shamir ... showed that DES could be broken if poor S-boxes
were used. Thge design of good S-boxes is therefore an important part
of designing a DES-like crytosystem.
In this work we present an expanded set of design criteria for
creating good S-boxes based on information theoretic concepts and show
that an S-Box that meets these criteria is immune to differential
cryptanalysis."
I don't see any incompatability here. It is unlikely that Biham and
Shamir chose good s-boxes at random and also unlikely that minimal
changes to the s-boxes in even one entry would result in an ideal
result.
Thanks to those who sent e-mail addresses. I'll try to get Webster's,
Adams', and Dawson's thesies' and attempt to coax out some perfect
s-boxes. I have to admit I still don't understand a few things. Can
anyone explain the difference between nonlinearity, Strict Avalance
Criterion, and correlation immunity? It all seems like the same thing
to me.
Patience, persistence, truth, reality: mgr@anhep2.hep.anl.gov
Dr. mike UUCP: uunet!pyramid!cdp!mrosing
IMI, P.O. BOX 2242, Darien IL 60559 bitnet: mrosing@igc.org
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Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!cs.utexas.edu!sun-barr!ames!sgi!cdp!mrosing From: Mike Rosing <mrosing@igc.org> Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: 10 Aug 92 20:28 PDT Subject: Re: Question about DES s-boxes. Sender: Notesfile to Usenet Gateway <notes@igc.org> Message-ID: <1465900003@igc.org> References: <1465900002@igc.org> Nf-ID: #R:cdp:1465900002:cdp:1465900003:000:2326 Nf-From: cdp.UUCP!mrosing Aug 10 20:28:00 1992 Lines: 48