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infrastructures are
established. The report concludes "The deployment of a global key-recovery-
based encryption infrastructure to meet law enforcement's stated specifications
will result in substantial sacrifices in security and greatly increased costs
to the end-user."


http://www.crypto.com/key_study/report.shtml

                   The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow,
                    and Trusted Third-Party Encryption
 
                                Hal Abelson[1]
                               Ross Anderson[2]
                            Steven M. Bellovin[3]
                               Josh Benaloh[4]
                                Matt Blaze[5]
                             Whitfield Diffie[6]
                               John Gilmore[7]
                             Peter G. Neumann[8]
                             Ronald L. Rivest[9]
                           Jeffrey I. Schiller[10]
                             Bruce Schneier[11]
 
                     Final Report -- 27 May 1997[12]
 
Executive Summary
 
A variety of ``key recovery,'' ``key escrow,'' and ``trusted third-party''
encryption requirements have been suggested in recent years by government
agencies seeking to conduct covert surveillance within the changing environ-
ments brought about by new technologies. This report examines the fundamental
properties of these requirements and attempts to outline the technical risks,
costs, and implications of deploying systems that provide government access to
encryption keys.
 
The deployment of key-recovery-based encryption infrastructures to meet law
enforcement's stated specifications will result in substantial sacrifices in
security and greatly increased costs to the end-user. Building the secure
computer-communication infrastructures necessary to provide adequate
technological underpinnings demanded by these requirements would be enormously
complex and is far beyond the experience and current compe