🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <14871.Apr904.10.5392@virtualnews.nyu.edu> brnstnd@nyu.edu (Dan Bernstein) writes:
>In tomorrow's high-speed networks it will be possible to overwhelm a
>typical listener's expected ability to record a lengthy message.
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

This is a wonderful idea.  Since the NSA isn't a typical listener (and
would probably be delighted to get the extra budget allocation to
cover the necessary intercept and recording ability), they should have
no objection to this method of operation.

So -- you end up with an algorithm labelled: "secure against IBM PC
clones with less than 800 MB of hard disk storage", for example, and you
can prove security without having to resort to complexity arguments.

Of course, all this depends on the shared function of the two streams
being secret -- or the eavesdropper could compute the function on the
fly just as the real recipients do.  If the function is secret and
shared, is this not just another private key system?