Article View: sci.crypt
Article #682Re: Bias in ACM and IEEE articles on cryptography
From: Uri Blumenthal
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 20:44
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 20:44
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In article <9208261429.AA00938@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>, copper@WATSON.IBM.COM ("Don Coppersmith") writes:
|>
|> > There's no point in using any more key bits, because differential
|> > cryptanalysis will find the subkeys in 2**47 operations whatever
|> > the key length.
|>
|> The Biham-Shamir work requires 2**47 _chosen_plaintext_ messages,
|> not just that many operations. Running 2**47 > 10**14 messages past
|> the machine that contains the secret key is _much_ trickier than doing
|> that many operations on your own machine.
Sure. But I think they suggested the method of "converting" chosen
plaintext message attack inot *known* plaintext attack, with about
2**49 known plaintexts required... They assume, that if you have
sufficient amount of *known* plaintexts - you'd be able to choose
from it... Comments?
[BTW, I can't recall the exact amount of messages needed, sorry.]
--
Regards,
Uri. uri@watson.ibm.com
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Newsgroups: sci.crypt Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!newsgate.watson.ibm.com!yktnews!admin!aixproj!uri From: uri@watson.ibm.com (Uri Blumenthal) Subject: Re: Bias in ACM and IEEE articles on cryptography Sender: news@watson.ibm.com (NNTP News Poster) Message-ID: <1992Aug26.204406.30830@watson.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 20:44:06 GMT Distribution: usa Reply-To: uri@watson.ibm.com Disclaimer: This posting represents the poster's views, not necessarily those of IBM References: <9208261429.AA00938@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> Nntp-Posting-Host: aixproj.watson.ibm.com Organization: Could I Ask Lines: 23