Article View: sci.crypt
Article #713Re: Are DES restriction even logically sound?
From: Grady Ward grady
Date: Sun, 06 Sep 1992 17:12
Date: Sun, 06 Sep 1992 17:12
91 lines
4693 bytes
4693 bytes
markh@csd4.csd.uwm.edu (Mark) writes:
"Supposing I have a complete description of DES in text
form, and I split it into 8 parts, with file N containing every 8th
character modulo N. I"
[a scheme to evade the U.S. export prohibitions on crypto
technology]
--------------------
The group would undoubtedly be charged with criminal conspiracy
in addition to violating the Munitions and Foreign Armaments
act, in addition to whatever other trumped-up charges could be
applied. I would guess, looking at the typical punishment
meted out in the U.S. Code you would be threatened with 20-30
years in prison and a half-a-million dollar fine, each.
Consider this the U.S. government's contribution to your
academic freedom and creative state-of-mind. :-)
However, take heart, the Internet is already the most immediate
and powerful voice of free technical international exchange on
the planet. Given that the people in all countries linked by
it are at least as smart on average as U.S. and Canadian crypto
researchers, and that crypto research in general requires no
vast infrastructure (unlike the superconducting supercollider,
for example), just sharing our thoughts on sci.crypt and
international conferences such as EuroCrypt, will soon
guarantee that the crypto sophistication outside North America
will surpass that on the inside.
The NSA will slowly become just a poor technical arm of the
FBI, since only citizens in _this_ country will be stuck with
crypto/telephony systems that can be broken...
(Stuck on citizens and industry that don't have the technical
expertise to read and understand sci.crypt, that is. ;-))
For all you crackers out there -- this is a dream manifesto:
the "official NSA/FBI approved" industrial crypto and digital
telephony systems will be delayed and use less effective crypto
systems than available in the E.C. or the Pacific Rim world.
That undoubtedly will mean there will be holes that can be
exploited by the crackers, while the cracker _themselves_ can
use wholly effective cryptographic means picked up at any
international souk to conspire and pool their computational and
analytic skills.
What can you do to resolve these issues?
I've already internationally posted DES and RSA source to this
group; I'm writing a new short article describing a disciplined
approach to combining conventional crypto systems in a way that
each "hide" each others canonical weaknesses: a method that I'm
calling "laminated" cryptography.
By all of us amateurs and private industry professionals
working as hard as we can to create and disseminate crypto
information, I hope that we can stimulate the immune systems of
our FBI/NSA to become innovative on their own and figure out
how to fulfill their statutory missions without stifling
cryptographic/information-theoretic research. But I'm not
optimistic.
Demanding innovation from any bureaucracy with its built in
"smoothing function" is always difficult, but with the NSA/FBI
it is going to be exponentially hard because of the lack of
effective oversight by the citizens they serve.
I'd have posted this to sci.crypt.politics, but, alas, the
technical and political issues seem utterly conflated. :-(
(* Grady Ward Public Key, Mathematica format
338 decimal digit modulus]*)
e=13278340892377147290021581995910566265630745404772050295976\
531169652074968462728692947088224740474086880014187741018\
827679282936360488374332586621372969992125015540674307926\
963403599898215432920593460759568145460543791116449305640\
269575860706334126070662560984930042322363643567821283666\
166102594784564767603179111052467026453547876550953;
n=20601487053579422679033128126836668550296101243048136963408\
859700715907596530150758174233318688216293109628630361192\
968088290065732167528721908401881409490304922316321979613\
722426616580603195157882720031084346896241421285868732184\
267763239722864343244932750154734013576761572454860859591\
356619745333866669144310472787794900107034134707229;
to send me a private message, e-mail me PowerMod[message,e,n]
Technical Details
Message-ID:
<7914@public.BTR.COM>Path:
arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!haven.umd.edu!darwin.sura.net!sgiblab!btr!gradyReferences:
<1992Sep5.164646.21443@uwm.edu> <1992Sep5.154822.10863@jarvis.csri.toronto.edu>Show Full Headers
Complete Article Headers
Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!haven.umd.edu!darwin.sura.net!sgiblab!btr!grady From: grady@btr.BTR.COM (Grady Ward grady@btr.com) Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk Subject: Re: Are DES restriction even logically sound? Message-ID: <7914@public.BTR.COM> Date: 6 Sep 92 17:12:46 GMT References: <1992Sep5.164646.21443@uwm.edu> <1992Sep5.154822.10863@jarvis.csri.toronto.edu> Followup-To: sci.crypt Organization: BTR Public Access UNIX, MtnView CA. Contact: Customer Service cs@BTR.COM Lines: 94