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Article #740Re: Growth of mcrypt due to packets
From: Terry Ritter
Date: Sun, 16 Aug 1992 17:19
Date: Sun, 16 Aug 1992 17:19
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2833 bytes
My thanks to those who remind me that each byte has eight bits. The values should be 95^1024 keys, controlling 2^8192 possible cipherings. But I'm not sure it matters much. Now that I think about it, Mass Encryption is odd in that the User Key is so closely connected to the internal key. Of course, any cipher can be insecure with a short key, but the difference here is that the User Key is so directly related to the ciphering process itself. Whereas a short key in other ciphers may select in a well-distributed fashion from a small number of choices hidden among all the possible cipherings (and even this is weak), in this cipher a short key means that only a small portion of the cipher is really unique. The rest of the cipher is functionally derived from the unique portion which is exposed to attack. Whereas in other ciphers a User Key selects a particular ciphering as a unit, in this cipher *each character* in the User Key *independently* selects a portion of the cipher, a known particular byte. This means that individual characters of the User Key can be isolated and attacked separately. This is unusual and very weak. Indeed, each User Key character may control *several* particular bytes, due to the key expansion formulas; such bytes could be anagrammed in an attempt to find a single solution for the associated key character, independent of the rest of the key. When selections are poorly distributed, the number of possible cipherings tells the wrong story. For example, Simple Substitution on 26 letters should select from 26! (that's about 2^88) possible cipherings. Nevertheless, people somehow manage to solve these ciphers virtually by examination. Trial-and-error occurs, but it is not a *random* sort of trial-and-error; it is instead directed by probable words and probable adjacent characters. For solution purposes, each letter of the substitution key can be worked on separately, most of the time. Evaluating the number of possible cipherings is useful only to the extent that other attacks have been eliminated, and brute force remains as the only available attack. But that is not the case in Simple Substitution, and that is not the case in Mass Encryption either. --- Terry Ritter ritter@cactus.org
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Newsgroups: sci.crypt Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!europa.asd.contel.com!darwin.sura.net!wupost!cs.utexas.edu!milano!cactus.org!ritter From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter) Subject: Re: Growth of mcrypt due to packets Message-ID: <1992Aug16.171913.13994@cactus.org> Summary: Corrections and Comments Keywords: mcrypt Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx References: <1992Aug15.162947.688@mintaka.lcs.mit.edu> Date: Sun, 16 Aug 1992 17:19:13 GMT Lines: 49