🚀 go-pugleaf

>The problem is much trickier than might appear at first sight.  In
>addition to privacy, two important requirements in a practical voting
>scheme are verifiability and robustness.  Verifiability means that all
>voters can verify that the votes were counted correctly.  Robustness
>means that no small group of participants can invalidate the election,
>disenfranchise valid voters, or otherwise have greater influence over
>the outcome than their alloted votes would allow.  

Another property of the current voting system (except for absentee
ballots) is that voter A cannot conspire with candidate B to
have A prove to B how A voted.  In the current system, B can bribe
A to vote for him, but B can't get a guarantee that A didn't cheat
and vote for someone else (except in the unlikely event that B
doesn't get ANY votes).  It's probably impossible to do this
with electronic voting, since A will voluntarily let B listen to
*ALL* of his communications.  The only thing preventing this in
the current system is that A can't take B into the voting booth with
him.

					Gordon L. Burditt
					sneaky.lonestar.org!gordon