Thread View: sci.crypt
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Started by Marc.Ringuette
Mon, 17 Aug 1992 20:50
Re: Cryptographic voting
Author: Marc.Ringuette
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 1992 20:50
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 1992 20:50
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ken@ipa.com (Ken Pizzini) writes (in personal mail), > Sorry I don't have time right now to do the comparison myself, but > check out "A Cryptographic Scheme for Computereized General Elections" > by Kenneth Iverson in the Crypto '91 Proceedings (page 405). Thanks for the pointer, Ken. His scheme looks good. Here's a sketch: The election takes place between voters and k candidates, at least one of whom is assumed honest. Each voter communicates with all of the candidates in order to register and vote. The voter obtains an "eligibility token", prior to election day, signed by all the candidates. On election day, the voter submits a vote to each candidate using a zero-knowledge protocol so that they can verify the validity of the vote but not its contents. To tally results, the candidates must sign and publish their sub-tallies, and (I think) only then can the results be computed. Correctness and privacy is assured as long as one of the candidates is honest. This method of cryptographically masking the votes until an aggregate is computed seems like a good idea, and probably is superior to my anonymity-based method. I don't quite understand how it works, though. One concern I have with Iverson's method is that the protocol stalls whenever any of the candidates is unresponsive. Of course, "candidate" may be a misnomer -- perhaps the parties involved should be mutually independent watchdog agencies. M.
Re: Cryptographic voting
Author: Paul Colley
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 02:32
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 02:32
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In article <9208172116.AA20035@news.cis.ohio-state.edu> Marc.Ringuette@daisy.learning.cs.cmu.edu writes: >Thanks for the pointer, Ken. His scheme looks good. Here's a sketch: > > The election takes place between voters and k candidates, at least > one of whom is assumed honest. Each voter communicates with all of > the candidates in order to register and vote. [...] Ah, if only we could find an honest politician! - Paul Colley University: colley@qucis.queensu.ca Home: pacolley@ember.uucp watmath!ember!pacolley +1 613 545 3807 "Every now and then, an honest man is sent to the legistlature" (unknown)
Re: Cryptographic voting
Author: W.A.Simon
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 22:43
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 1992 22:43
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In <10370@ember.UUCP> pacolley@ember.UUCP (Paul Colley) says: > In article <9208172116.AA20035@news.cis.ohio-state.edu> > Marc.Ringuette@daisy.learning.cs.cmu.edu writes: > >Thanks for the pointer, Ken. His scheme looks good. Here's a sketch: > > The election takes place between voters and k candidates, at least > > one of whom is assumed honest. Each voter communicates with all of > > the candidates in order to register and vote. [...] > Ah, if only we could find an honest politician! Whyever for? Party pooper! Graft, loot, spoils, are what politics is all about. Politics is the art of managing conflicts of interest. Any system that posits honest politicians is bound to fail. We should build all system (legal, electoral or otherwise) with the premises that human beings are not equally honest and that politics will appeal to those who are the least honest. Dishonesty is not a requirement, but it is a big motivation for entering politics, as well as a large part of the art of surviving in it. A public key system has the benefit of not relying on honesty on anyone's part. -- The Vacuum Cleaner Man (reality sucks)
Re: Cryptographic voting
Author: Gordon Burditt
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 1992 05:33
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 1992 05:33
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>Thanks for the pointer, Ken. His scheme looks good. Here's a sketch: > > The election takes place between voters and k candidates, at least > one of whom is assumed honest. Each voter communicates with all of One voter or one candidate? I don't know of any election for an actual government elected office (student council doesn't count) in which I would trust any of the candidates with tallying the election results. > the candidates in order to register and vote. The voter obtains > an "eligibility token", prior to election day, signed by all the In other words, the candidates get to decide who votes (in this case it appears that one blackball by one candidate denies a voter the right to vote), by refusing to communicate with them. The White Supremacy Party would find it easy to not communicate with certain neighborhoods. > candidates. On election day, the voter submits a vote to each > candidate using a zero-knowledge protocol so that they can verify > the validity of the vote but not its contents. To tally results, > the candidates must sign and publish their sub-tallies, and (I think) > only then can the results be computed. Correctness and privacy is > assured as long as one of the candidates is honest. This also doesn't seem to address problems with voters double-registering, voters pretending to be other people who don't usually vote in addition to themselves, voters using the token of other voters who died between registration and the election, and external denial-of-service attacks on the voting system. >One concern I have with Iverson's method is that the protocol stalls >whenever any of the candidates is unresponsive. Of course, "candidate" >may be a misnomer -- perhaps the parties involved should be mutually >independent watchdog agencies. Better. Gordon L. Burditt sneaky.lonestar.org!gordon
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