🚀 go-pugleaf

On May 6, 2:34 am, "Tron" <tronf...@frizurf.no> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> "Newberry" <newberr...@gmail.com> skrev i meldingnews:c0de92d1-557e-40a5-8ced-2d4cb5c9b303@x19g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
> On May 4, 7:47 am, Newberry <newberr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > We will utilize the following three definitions.
>
> ....
>
> "
> The problem is that "the present King of France is wise" seems
> meaningful to most people, but it can be neither verified nor
> fasified, so it is neither true nor false It is also clear why it is
> meaningfull - because it represents a possible state of affairs. ..."
>
> Which again would assume a reference theory of meaning, which just doesn't
> work for language in general.
> It might work in part for some declaratory sentences, but language is much
> wider than that.
>
> "So we
> have a meaningful sentence, which is neither true nor false just as
> Strawson argued. It is also clear why it is neither true nor false -
> because the present King of France does not exist - the prsupposition
> is false.
> "
> That example is a result of the jumble Russell made of Frege's discussion of
> the use of the definite article. For Frege it is very simple: such a
> singular term must  be introduced according to some rule that guarantees
> that it has a referent;

It sounds almost like a presupposition.

> which Russell didn't.
>
> "But some sentences are meaningless" ...
>
> ... and what kind of sentence would that be?
> And why would you call it a sentence?
>
> "... so you could also argue that logic
> should be trivalent anyway. I am not sure why neither Wittgenstein not
> the Neopositivists considered such possibility."
>
> Because then they couldn't have snubbed "metaphysicians" ....
>
> T