🚀 go-pugleaf

Hi,

"Newberry" <newberryxy@gmail.com> skrev i melding 
news:c0de92d1-557e-40a5-8ced-2d4cb5c9b303@x19g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
On May 4, 7:47 am, Newberry <newberr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> We will utilize the following three definitions.


....

"
The problem is that "the present King of France is wise" seems
meaningful to most people, but it can be neither verified nor
fasified, so it is neither true nor false It is also clear why it is
meaningfull - because it represents a possible state of affairs. ..."

Which again would assume a reference theory of meaning, which just doesn't 
work for language in general.
It might work in part for some declaratory sentences, but language is much 
wider than that.

"So we
have a meaningful sentence, which is neither true nor false just as
Strawson argued. It is also clear why it is neither true nor false -
because the present King of France does not exist - the prsupposition
is false.
"
That example is a result of the jumble Russell made of Frege's discussion of 
the use of the definite article. For Frege it is very simple: such a 
singular term must  be introduced according to some rule that guarantees 
that it has a referent; which Russell didn't.

"But some sentences are meaningless" ...

... and what kind of sentence would that be?
And why would you call it a sentence?

"... so you could also argue that logic
should be trivalent anyway. I am not sure why neither Wittgenstein not
the Neopositivists considered such possibility."

Because then they couldn't have snubbed "metaphysicians" ....

T