🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Aug31.142217.14509@Informatik.TU-Muenchen.DE>, gemenis@Informatik.TU-Muenchen.DE (Theodor Gemenis) writes:
|> 
|> 
|> I am interested in logics appropriate for empirical science 
|> (or logics for knowledge), that is logics for axiomatize theories 
|> such as newtonian mechanics, electrodynamics, etc. theories also 
|> beyond mathematics. 
|> I know the work of R. Carnap, P. Suppes, J. Sneed on this field 
|> and the work of N. Nilsson in AI (logic for knowledge representation).
|> 
|> I would be thankful for any indication concerning recent work
|> in this domain. Information on implemented systems for such logics 
|> is also from interest to me.


Your phrases "logics appropriate for empirical science", "logics
for knowledge", and "logics [to] axiomatize theories ..." would
seem to cover pretty diverse ground and do not, to my mind,
necessarily share a meaning.

I haven't played with this stuff for a long time.  In addition to
the names you mention, the other one that comes to mind is Richard
Montague.  See, for example, "Deterministic Theories" in _Formal_
Philosophy_ (Yale University Press, 1974).  (His stuff may be dealt
with by Sneed, but memory fails me.)  I believe that Clark Glymour
(still at Pitt?) was drifting in this area (perhaps in conjunction
with the Pitt CS or AI departments).  You might contact Henry
Kyburg (kyburg@cs.rochester.edu) who is spending virtually all of
his time in the Cog. Sci. program there now instead of in philosophy.
He has been doing a lot of stuff in the area of non-deductive methods
in AI.
-- 
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SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
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