Article View: sci.logic
Article #292Re: Impredicativity - was: Russell's Paradox
From: Randall Holmes
Date: Thu, 05 Nov 1992 16:42
Date: Thu, 05 Nov 1992 16:42
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In article <1992Nov4.073717.22625@CSD-NewsHost.Stanford.EDU> pratt@Sunburn.Stanford.EDU (Vaughan R. Pratt) writes:
>In article <Bx693z.H37@cantua.canterbury.ac.nz> wft@math.canterbury.ac.nz (Bill Taylor) writes:
>>Indeed, ZF intrinsically suggests it
>>*without* the bother of a foundation axiom, by limiting the set formation
>>possibilities so that self-membership is at least not immediately achieved
>
>What is the reasoning here? That a theory T "intrinsically suggests"
>not-P for any P not in T? If neither P nor not-P are in T, which of
>not-P or not-not-P (= P) does T "intrinsically suggest?"
>
>>The slick form of AF, that every nonempty set has a member disjoint from it,
>
>Where is this form given? And why doesn't it rule out Omega = {Omega}?
>(Just asking, I'm not expert on this stuff.)
Thomas Jech, _Set Theory_, first page. It does rule out Omega =
{Omega}; it is a form of the axiom of foundation (AF, not AFA).
>
>>But I'm open on well-foundedness: for all I know, there may well be sets like
>>A = { 1 , { 2 , { 3 , { 4 , {.....}}}}} . Such a set seems very well defined on
>>the face of it, so it *could* exist, for all I know. No self-membership there.
>>
>>REQUEST: If someone can produce a way of getting a self-membered set from the
>>set A above, using the other ZF constructions, I would *love* to see it !!!!
>
>If you are comfortable with A, you should not mind
>B = { 1 , { 1 , { 1 , { 1 , {.....}}}}} .
>
>But by AFA, B = {1, B}, making B a member of itself.
This uses a very strong extensionality property which follows from
AFA; there is no reason why there cannot be a sequence of distinct
sets xi such that xi = {1,x[i+1]} in ZFC without Foundation. Of
course, this makes the symbol above ambiguous (the original expression
with 1,2,3,4... also fails to specify a unique set in ZFC- -- there
could be many such sets).
>
>As soon as you weaken FA to AFA, the possibility of self-membership
>arises.
You do not "weaken" FA to AFA; ZFC- + FA and ZFC- + AFA are both
stronger than ZFC-, but neither is stronger than the other.
>
>>That is another reason I went to the trouble of posting my first article; it
>>seems to me to make a very clear criterion for locating the essential
>>impredicativity of Russell, which shows up most clearly in the *set* form:
>> { x | P(x) } ,
>>the essential impredicativity comes from the bad range of x, not the form of P.
>>
>>Doesn't *anyone* else think so ? :-(
>
>I do. But I forgot to say in my earlier message that the main point of
>my positive reformulation of Russell's paradox was to remove this
>impredicativity from the argument. Witness Y was constructed as the
>set of all *elements of X* not members of themselves. This established
>a positive result without any impredicativity. Russell's theorem is
>not so much a corollary of this theorem as an interpretation of it, in
>that "there is no set of all sets" formalizes as "every set is
>nonuniversal", or "every set has a nonmember".
>
>>That's partly why I don't think that Aczel's
>>set theory is really basic, delightful though it is. It can't look like
>>fundamental set theory if a convincing show of consistency has to route
>>through ZF's consistency.
It doesn't; its consistency can be proven in ZFC- (or ZF-) (just like
that of full ZFC). Foundation or the lack thereof has nothing to do
with consistency strength.
>
>ZF+FA is even stronger than ZF+AFA. So by that reasoning ZF+FA can't
>look like like a fundamental set theory either. Yet you seem to prefer
>ZF+FA to ZF+AFA.
No, it isn't. They have exactly the same strength (and both describe
hierarchically structured universes).
>
>>I hope you are taking your own rubbishing
>>(concerning Z vs ZF) like a man ! It's a tough life on the net !
>
>Being mistaken at the top of your voice does have its drawbacks.
>Yesterday definitely wasn't my day, I got something really wrong on
>sci.math involving measure theory, much more wrong than Z vs. ZF, which
>I maintain is a highly debatable matter, the near-universal acceptance
>of the cumulative hierarchy as a model of ZF notwithstanding.
>--
>Vaughan Pratt There's no truth in logic, son.
--
The opinions expressed | --Sincerely,
above are not the "official" | M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person | Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution. | holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
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Newsgroups: sci.logic Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!pmafire!mica.inel.gov!guinness!garnet.idbsu.edu!holmes From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) Subject: Re: Impredicativity - was: Russell's Paradox Message-ID: <1992Nov5.164251.29649@guinness.idbsu.edu> Sender: usenet@guinness.idbsu.edu (Usenet News mail) Nntp-Posting-Host: garnet Organization: Boise State University References: <Bx693z.H37@cantua.canterbury.ac.nz> <1992Nov4.073717.22625@CSD-NewsHost.Stanford.EDU> Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 16:42:51 GMT Lines: 98