🚀 go-pugleaf

In <1992Nov10.001234.18488@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

>i.  Russell's paradox does have _semantic_ consequences.  Whatever
>membership is, there is no set of all sets that are not members of
>themselves.  Certainly the mechanics of applying the paradox are
>syntactical -- so what?

I don't see that the Russell paradox of itself requires the
non-existence of this object (RP).
The most I could deduce from it is that the predicate

	RP is a member of RP

has no truth value. I.e. the function 'is a member of' is not total.

--
When soldiers form lines or hollow squares, you call it reason.
When wild geese in flight take the form of a letter V, you say instinct.
When the homogeneous atoms of a mineral arrange themselves into shapes
mathematically perfect you have nothing to say. You have not even invented a name to conceal your heroic unreason."