🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <MARTINC.92Nov1181255@grover.cs.unc.edu> martinc@grover.cs.unc.edu (Charles R. Martin) writes:
>In article <1992Oct30.235244.463@black.ox.ac.uk> microsoc@black.ox.ac.uk (Microsoc) writes:
>
>   As we seem to be on about Popper can anyone answer me this;
>   How can you falsify (even in principle) a probabilistic theory, eg QM..?
>
>At the risk of sounding facetious, the answer is "Probabilistically".
>That is, the theory predicts a certain probability distribution; if
>experiment shows a different distribution, it's a falsification.  Looked
>at the other way, an experiment that establishes a particular
>distribution eliminates the whole class of theories that predict another distribution.
>--

Ah yes, BUT... it really depends on what you mean by probability here. A 
common definition (not _necessarily_ a good one, though) is the limit of
relative frequency as the number of observations --> infinity. Any finite
number of observations _could_ just be a fluke: we have no a priori way
of counting them as a definitive falsification. And the definitive is import-
ant here. If we have to look at an infinite series to disprove someting ,
or if we only say that our experiments "lend support" to our proababilistic
theory, then we are right back to the position that Popper put his theory
forawrd in order to escape from... The point is that probabilistic theories
aren't subject to the sort of "once and for all" disproofs that Popper needs.

Sorry if I've misunderstood you, though - perhaos you would clarify your
position...?

Marc Read

PS Please don't flame typos -- how would _you_ like it if your BackSpace and
Del keys had packed up....            M.