🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <BvpECx.41I@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
[...]
>
>Well, I'm still trying to get a grip on what this means -- particularly
>since I thought you were holding a realist or Platonist position arrayed
>against the sort of anti-realist position I have espoused.  At this point,
>I'm having trouble distinguishing your position from my own.
>
>
>
>-- 
>Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
>SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
>sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm

Probably the point is that I am not really a "possible worlds realist"
in the sense you are describing.  I think that there is only one
actual total (logical) universe.

Where I do find talk of possible worlds reasonable is in the
discussion of the physical world that we live in.  Since I think that
the physical world is a subset of the logical universe, I find it
reasonable to suppose that alternate physical worlds (all possible
ones) _actually exist_ (in exactly the same sense that ours does).
Such worlds provide an actual model for Kripke's semantics for modal
logic, for discussions restricted to the physical world; in the
internal language of this model, they are "possible worlds".  It is
probably an abuse of terminology to call them "possible worlds"
without reference to this model.  I don't think that one of them is
especially worthy of notice, except for the fact that I (and all of
_us_) are in it.

In an absolute sense (relative to the _logical_ universe) I am _not_ a
possible worlds realist; I think that there is one actual logical
universe.  However, there are various ways to describe the actual
universe, and it is also possible to "model" alternate logical
universes (in some suitable sense) within the actual one; in this
sense, it is possible to talk about counterfactual "possible logical
universes", but I do not ascribe reality to these (only to their
models).

My working logic is classical logic (not modal logic) and I am a
mathematical realist; thus, I think that there are models of the
Kripke semantics for modal logic.  In relation to the physical world,
I think that there are models of various versions of Kripke semantics
for talk of the physical world in which the other "possible worlds"
have the same status as our own.  In this context, I am a realist with
respect to possible worlds.  In the case of the entire logical
universe, I am not.
-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu