🚀 go-pugleaf

>In article <2885@sfsup.UUCP>, glg@sfsup.UUCP (G.Gleason) writes:
> 
> So, I ask you, what is reality, and who defines it?

Reality is the totality of what exists.

For an individual person, reality is the totality of what exists for him.  Thus
different people have different realities, though realities may intersect
to form consensual or interpersonal realities.

Whether there is an "objective reality" that exists outside of the reality of
individuals is an unprovable question and should therefore be ignored.
-- 
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

In article <343@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
>>In article <2885@sfsup.UUCP>, glg@sfsup.UUCP (G.Gleason) writes:
>> 
>> So, I ask you, what is reality, and who defines it?
>
>Reality is the totality of what exists.

>For an individual person, reality is the totality of what exists for him.  Thus
>different people have different realities, though realities may intersect
>to form consensual or interpersonal realities.

Does this mean that someone who thinks he's Napoleon has as 'valid' a reality
as I (or you?) or are we assuming some sort of "majority rules" principal?
Then again, I'd hate to think that my reality achieves ligitimacy by the
same process that selected Reagan for president.  But what I think you're
really saying is that the validity of everyone else's reality depends on whether
it corresponds to yours; i.e the answer to G. Gleason's question is that *you*
define reality (though you might qualify that as *your* reality).  Or maybe
you're saying whatever a person believes is what she believes, which is a
tautology which makes it both unfalsifyable and contentless.  And, therefore,
as you put it below, should be ignored.

But the interesting question is why do these realities, which *may* intersect,
seem to have so much in common?  Or is this merely a feature of *my* reality?

>Whether there is an "objective reality" that exists outside of the reality of
>individuals is an unprovable question and should therefore be ignored.

This is the same kind of "unprovable" as the heavily debated question of what
is conciousness as distinguished from its behavioral manifestations.  Turing's
point was that the question of machine intelegence is only a meaningful question
on the behavioral level.


>-- 
>"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."
>
>Sarge Gerbode
-- 
	Absloute knowledge means never having to change your .signature

				jim (uunet!actnyc!jsb)

For some of us, reality is paraphrasing Wittgenstein.

"Reality -- what a concept!"  -- Mork.

In article <732@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes:

>In article <343@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:

>>Reality is the totality of what exists.

>>For an individual person, reality is the totality of what exists for him. Thus
>>different people have different realities, though realities may intersect
>>to form consensual or interpersonal realities.

>Does this mean that someone who thinks he's Napoleon has as 'valid' a reality
>as I (or you?) or are we assuming some sort of "majority rules" principal?

I wasn't talking about "validity".  I was only pointing out that reality is
what exists for a person.  I think what we normally think of as "validity" is
really "credibility", and it refers to the possibility of getting others to
agree, not to a standard of correspondence with some absolute standard.  A
person with a very credible reality would have an easier time getting
agreement from others than one with a less credible reality.  A major aspect
of credibility is conformity to what others already believe.  Another is
logical consistency.  Another is aesthetics.  But I think it is relatively
meaningless to speak of the "validity" of a reality.

>But what I think you're
>really saying is that the validity of everyone else's reality depends on whether
>it corresponds to yours; i.e the answer to G. Gleason's question is that *you*
>define reality (though you might qualify that as *your* reality).

I think people naturally tend to apply, as a first shot, the criterion of
whether a presented reality corresponds to theirs, and they tend to reject
those that don't.  But the saving grace is that if a credible reality is well
presented, people can change their minds and have a different reality.  But the
viewpoint that *my* reality is in some sense an *absolute* reality is a form of
ideological imperialism.  I think anyone who asserts an absolute reality is
being such an imperialist.  It is really only *his* reality, but in asserting
it as absolute, he is trying to enforce it on others.

>Or maybe you're saying whatever a person believes is what she believes, which
>is a tautology which makes it both unfalsifyable and contentless.

Definitions are always unfalsifiable and contentless (I think).  I was just
giving a definition of the term, "reality".  Naturally, by making the
appropriate substitution, you can turn any definition into a tautology.

>But the interesting question is why do these realities, which *may* intersect,
>seem to have so much in common?  Or is this merely a feature of *my* reality?

I think it is because *people* have so much in common.  There are certain rules
that most people follow in organizing their worlds -- such as that of logical
consistency, the pleasure principle, trying to create a simplicity and an ease
of operation, much as one would try to do in designing the front end of a
computer program.  So they will tend to agree of things that promote these
characteristics in their worlds.  Nelson Goodman goes into this notion in his
excellent book, "Ways of World-Making".

>>Whether there is an "objective reality" that exists outside of the reality of
>>individuals is an unprovable question and should therefore be ignored.

>This is the same kind of "unprovable" as the heavily debated question of what
>is conciousness as distinguished from its behavioral manifestations.

Consciousness in oneself does not require proof, since it can be *experienced*
and, in fact, is a necessary condition for having any experience at all.
Consciousness in others, similar to what we experience, cannot be directly
experienced (absent telepathy) and therefore must be proved -- e.,g., by
behavioral means.

>Turing's point was that the question of machine intelligence is only a
>meaningful question on the behavioral level.

Certain logical positivists notwithstanding, something can be *meaningful*
without being *provable*.  I can get an idea of what it would mean for a
machine to be intelligent without being able to prove it.
-- 
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

	"Reality is what doesn't go away when you stop believing in it."
                                      -- Philip K. Dick --

-- 
	Rick Crownover				1-919-684-8279 
	Duke University Dept. of Physics	crown@dukempd.uucp
	Durham, N.C.      27706			mcnc!duke!dukempd!crown

In article <356@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
]In article <732@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes:
]
]>In article <343@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
]
]>>Reality is the totality of what exists.
]
]>>For an individual person, reality is the totality of what exists for him. Thus
]>>different people have different realities, though realities may intersect
]>>to form consensual or interpersonal realities.
]
]>Does this mean that someone who thinks he's Napoleon has as 'valid' a reality
]>as I (or you?) or are we assuming some sort of "majority rules" principal?
]
]I wasn't talking about "validity".  I was only pointing out that reality is
]what exists for a person.  I think what we normally think of as "validity" is
]really "credibility", and it refers to the possibility of getting others to
]agree, not to a standard of correspondence with some absolute standard.  A
]person with a very credible reality would have an easier time getting
]agreement from others than one with a less credible reality.  A major aspect
]of credibility is conformity to what others already believe.  Another is
]logical consistency.  Another is aesthetics.  But I think it is relatively
]meaningless to speak of the "validity" of a reality.

At the risk of sounding like the 'ordinary language' folks, I have to say that
this is not the way we use the word "reality".  We can talk about someone being
out of touch with reality.  We don't mean merely that we don't agree with her
reality.  I can even entertain the idea that I am out of touch with reality.
This does not mean that I believe that the "totality of what exists for me"
doesn't exist for me.  Regardless of what I may like to philosophise about, I
believe in my ordinary life (and I suspect so do you) that reality is "out 
there" and that my senses give me a workable picture of it, sufficient, at 
least, to cross the street without getting run over.  I further believe that
others have access to that same "out there" reality.  In other words, reality
is (at least partially) independant of what "exists for me" and if (ignoring
life after death issues) I were to cease to exist, there would still be a "you"
(gentle reader) out there in reality.  (Not very 'New Age' of me, I know)
]
]I think people naturally tend to apply, as a first shot, the criterion of
]whether a presented reality corresponds to theirs, and they tend to reject
]those that don't.  But the saving grace is that if a credible reality is well
]presented, people can change their minds and have a different reality.  But the
]viewpoint that *my* reality is in some sense an *absolute* reality is a form of
]ideological imperialism.  I think anyone who asserts an absolute reality is
]being such an imperialist.  It is really only *his* reality, but in asserting
]it as absolute, he is trying to enforce it on others.

Are you asserting this view as "absolutely" true?  Does that make you a 
meta-imperialist?
]
]>Or maybe you're saying whatever a person believes is what she believes, which
]>is a tautology which makes it both unfalsifyable and contentless.
]
]Definitions are always unfalsifiable and contentless (I think).  I was just
]giving a definition of the term, "reality".  Naturally, by making the
]appropriate substitution, you can turn any definition into a tautology.

But your definition does not correspond to the way the word is normally used.

]>But the interesting question is why do these realities, which *may* intersect,
]>seem to have so much in common?  Or is this merely a feature of *my* reality?
]
]I think it is because *people* have so much in common.  There are certain rules
]that most people follow in organizing their worlds -- such as that of logical
]consistency, the pleasure principle, trying to create a simplicity and an ease
]of operation, much as one would try to do in designing the front end of a
]computer program.  So they will tend to agree of things that promote these
]characteristics in their worlds.  Nelson Goodman goes into this notion in his
]excellent book, "Ways of World-Making".

This begs the question.  Why do most people follow the same rules in organizing
their world?  Do they accidently choose the same rules?  Or are these "rules"
part of a "reality" they have in common?

]
]>>Whether there is an "objective reality" that exists outside of the reality of
]>>individuals is an unprovable question and should therefore be ignored.
]
]>This is the same kind of "unprovable" as the heavily debated question of what
]>is conciousness as distinguished from its behavioral manifestations.
]
]Consciousness in oneself does not require proof, since it can be *experienced*
]and, in fact, is a necessary condition for having any experience at all.
]Consciousness in others, similar to what we experience, cannot be directly
]experienced (absent telepathy) and therefore must be proved -- e.,g., by
]behavioral means.

How would you go about "proving" somebody (or some machine) is concious?

]
]>Turing's point was that the question of machine intelligence is only a
]>meaningful question on the behavioral level.
]
]Certain logical positivists notwithstanding, something can be *meaningful*
]without being *provable*.  I can get an idea of what it would mean for a
]machine to be intelligent without being able to prove it.

Is this 'idea' verbalizable?  Is it a judgement made on the basis of observable
evidence?  Or is it a feeling, such as we have watching the image of an actor on
the screen that this image is concious?

]-- 
]"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."
]
]Sarge Gerbode
]Institute for Research in Metapsychology
]950 Guinda St.
]Palo Alto, CA 94301
]UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

	"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your .signature"

-- 
			The check is in the e-mail

				jim (uunet!actnyc!jsb)

Once upon a time there were five blind men who encountered
an elephant and Sarge Gerbode.

The first grasped the elephant's trunk.  "Aha!" he said, "the
elephant is like a snake!"

The second grasped the elephant's leg.  "No!" he said, "the
elephant is like a tree!"

The third felt the elephant's side.  "Not at all," he said,
"the elephant is like a wall!"

The fourth felt the elephant's tail.  "You're all wrong," he
said, "the elephant is like a rope!"

The fifth blind man said, "I think, if we perform further
experiments, and reason about the results, we can construct
a fairly good idea about what an elephant is.  It may be
that we can even put this elephant to good use."

"No," said Sarge Gerbode.  "There is no objective reality.
And there is no elephant."  And he got on the elephant and
rode away into the sunset.
-- 
G Fitch	        				{uunet}!mstan\
The Big Electric Cat     {ihnp4,harvard,philabs}!cmcl2!cucard!dasys1!gf
New York City, NY, USA  (212) 879-9031          {sun}!hoptoad/

In article <741@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes:
>In article <356@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:

>]I was only pointing out that reality is
>]what exists for a person.  I think what we normally think of as "validity" is
>]really "credibility", and it refers to the possibility of getting others to
>]agree, not to a standard of correspondence with some absolute standard.  A
>]person with a very credible reality would have an easier time getting
>]agreement from others than one with a less credible reality.  A major aspect
>]of credibility is conformity to what others already believe.  Another is
>]logical consistency.  Another is aesthetics.  But I think it is relatively
>]meaningless to speak of the "validity" of a reality.

>At the risk of sounding like the 'ordinary language' folks, I have to say that
>this is not the way we use the word "reality".  We can talk about someone being
>out of touch with reality.  We don't mean merely that we don't agree with her
>reality.

Whether we *mean* that or not depends on what our definition of "reality" is.
But, empirically, I would say when we say that someone else is out of touch
with reality, we do in fact disagree with that other person.  And if we were to
say that we were ourselves out of touch with reality, that would betoken a loss
of confidence in what we believe and an inner conflict.  Can you think of
a counter-example?

>I believe in my ordinary life (and I suspect so do you) that reality is "out 
>there" and that my senses give me a workable picture of it, sufficient, at 
>least, to cross the street without getting run over.

Sure: *anyone's* reality is perceived as being "out there", in that it is
perceived, conceived, and known to be outside the person.

>I further believe that
>others have access to that same "out there" reality.  In other words, reality
>is (at least partially) independant of what "exists for me" and if (ignoring
>life after death issues) I were to cease to exist, there would still be a "you"
>(gentle reader) out there in reality.  (Not very 'New Age' of me, I know)

Well, this isn't talk.religion.newage, so you're safe!  Well, I certainly
prefer your view to the solipsistic one I sometimes run across.  My
translation of the above is to say that there is considerable *agreement*
amongst people and that that agreement will exist even when I am no longer
around.

>]I think anyone who asserts an absolute reality is being [an ideological]
>]imperialist.  It is really only *his* reality, but in asserting
>]it as absolute, he is trying to enforce it on others.

>Are you asserting this view as "absolutely" true?  Does that make you a 
>meta-imperialist?

Interesting point.  Is there no escape from imperialism?  Well, I prefer to
think that I am *offering* this reality to others as a useful one with a great
deal of credibility, one that will enhance their world-view if accepted.  So
it's more of a sales job than an enforcement.  It's not the *presentation* of a
reality that I object to.  It's the enforcement of one reality and the
invalidation of others that I object to.  It's like the difference between
conquest and acculturation.

>But your definition does not correspond to the way the word is normally used.

True, but I am offering a different conceptualization that will fit most of the
instances where the word "reality" is used, one that I think has some useful
consequences.

>]I think [realities seem to have so much in common] because *people* have so
>]much in common.  There are certain rules
>]that most people follow in organizing their worlds -- such as that of logical
>]consistency, the pleasure principle, trying to create a simplicity and an ease
>]of operation, much as one would try to do in designing the front end of a
>]computer program.  So they will tend to agree on things that promote these
>]characteristics in their worlds.

>This begs the question.  Why do most people follow the same rules in organizing
>their world?  Do they accidently choose the same rules?  Or are these "rules"
>part of a "reality" they have in common?

Interesting question.  I don't know.  All I know is that we seem to follow those
rules.  The rules don't, of course, mandate the *particular* realities people
experience, only various characteristics of those realities.  Completely
different systems, for instance, may be logically consistent internally but
quite different from each other.

My point is really a skeptical one:  there *might* be some external reality
that we share, but all each of us really knows is the reality *he* has and, to
some extent, how it has been derived from prior realities.  Maybe the
commonalities we experience are due to the presence of some external reality
that is not knowable directly, or maybe the commonalities have to do with some
higher unity of consciousness.  Maybe, as Sagan speculated in "Contact", God is
trying to communicate to us through what we perceive as the physical universe
and the discovery of truth concerning the physical universe amounts to a
correct interpretation of what God meant.  All these are fun as speculations.
But it is best to start from what we are certain of:  the existence of our own
worlds and the principles by which they are ordered.

>]Consciousness in oneself does not require proof, since it can be *experienced*
>]and, in fact, is a necessary condition for having any experience at all.
>]Consciousness in others, similar to what we experience, cannot be directly
>]experienced (absent telepathy) and therefore must be proved -- e.,g., by
>]behavioral means.

>How would you go about "proving" somebody (or some machine) is concious?

I don't think it can be proved with certainty.  I think we can only infer from
similarities (either of form or behavior) the probable presence of other
consciousnesses.  There has been a big controversy raging about Turing
machines in talk.philosophy.misc on this point.

>]Certain logical positivists notwithstanding, something can be *meaningful*
>]without being *provable*.  I can get an idea of what it would mean for a
>]machine to be intelligent without being able to prove it.

>Is this 'idea' verbalizable?  Is it a judgement made on the basis of observable
>evidence? Or is it a feeling, such as we have watching the image of an actor on
>the screen that this image is concious?

Maybe it's verbalizable, though it's difficult.  It has something to do with
having a viewpoint and having intention.  If a machine had a viewpoint and had
intention, the same way I have a viewpoint and have intention, I would say it's
intelligent (or, rather, conscious).  I don't happen to think a machine *could*
have these qualities, but if it did, it would be conscious.

I wouldn't say an idea is a feeling, though ideas are commonly *accompanied* by
feelings.  A feeling is a phenomenon, an internal or external perception.

Also, an idea is not a judgment.  An idea is something that can be *judged*, as
to its truth or falsity.  In itself, it is not an assertion, so it can't be
"proven".  It simply exists, as a possibility.
-- 
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

In article <3503@dasys1.UUCP> gf@dasys1.UUCP (G Fitch) writes:
>Once upon a time there were five blind men who encountered
>an elephant and Sarge Gerbode.
>
>The first grasped the elephant's trunk.  "Aha!" he said, "the
>elephant is like a snake!"
>
>The second grasped the elephant's leg.  "No!" he said, "the
>elephant is like a tree!"
>
>The third felt the elephant's side.  "Not at all," he said,
>"the elephant is like a wall!"
>
>The fourth felt the elephant's tail.  "You're all wrong," he
>said, "the elephant is like a rope!"
>
>The fifth blind man said, "I think, if we perform further
>experiments, and reason about the results, we can construct
>a fairly good idea about what an elephant is.  It may be
>that we can even put this elephant to good use."
>
>"No," said Sarge Gerbode.  "There is no objective reality.
>And there is no elephant."  And he got on the elephant and
>rode away into the sunset.

Wonderful!

I'm going to be hard-pressed to find a quality comeback to this one!

Actually, what I would say is:

"Perhaps if we pooled our experiences and ironed out our differences, and if
we applied the rules of logic and other rules by which we all organize our
respective worlds, we could come to an agreement about what the nature of an
elephant is."

And we all got on the elephant that we had agreed on and rode off into the
sunset.
-- 
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

In article <368@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
)
)But, empirically, I would say when we say that someone else is out of touch
)with reality, we do in fact disagree with that other person.  And if we were to
)say that we were ourselves out of touch with reality, that would betoken a loss
)of confidence in what we believe and an inner conflict.  Can you think of
)a counter-example?

Yes. I disagree with your "mapping" of reality but I don't think you are out of
touch with reality.

)Sure: *anyone's* reality is perceived as being "out there", in that it is
)perceived, conceived, and known to be outside the person.

It looks like you are making a stronger statement here than the one you wish to
avoid.  You say that the question of whether there is an external reality is
"meaningless" regardless of how we perceive it to be, yet you don't hesitate to
speculate on what goes on in the perceptions of others which we cannot directly
perceive.

me:
)>But your definition does not correspond to the way the word is normally used.
)
)True, but I am offering a different conceptualization that will fit most of the
)instances where the word "reality" is used, one that I think has some useful
)consequences.

And what meta-map can tell me how to choose between the ordinary and new map of
reality?  As for myself, I kinda like the old "out-there" reality since it is
more intuitive.  What's more, I'm willing to bet that you act in the world as if
there were an objective reality despite your claim of meaninglessness.

me:
)>This begs the question.  Why do most people follow the same rules in organizing
)>their world?  Do they accidently choose the same rules?  Or are these "rules"
)>part of a "reality" they have in common?
)
)Interesting question.  I don't know.  All I know is that we seem to follow those
)rules.  The rules don't, of course, mandate the *particular* realities people
)experience, only various characteristics of those realities.  Completely
)different systems, for instance, may be logically consistent internally but
)quite different from each other.
)
)My point is really a skeptical one:  there *might* be some external reality

But you seem to be very selectively skeptical.  You end up assuming things
more improbable.  Take the following for example:

me:
)>How would you go about "proving" somebody (or some machine) is concious?
)
)I don't think it can be proved with certainty.  I think we can only infer from
)similarities (either of form or behavior) the probable presence of other
)consciousnesses.  There has been a big controversy raging about Turing
)machines in talk.philosophy.misc on this point.

)                                            ...  It has something to do with
)having a viewpoint and having intention.  If a machine had a viewpoint and had
)intention, the same way I have a viewpoint and have intention, I would say it's
)intelligent (or, rather, conscious).  I don't happen to think a machine *could*
)have these qualities, but if it did, it would be conscious.

Does a chess playing program have the intention of winning?  Somehow I think 
your "requisites" for conciousness are harder to pin down than conciousness 
itself.

)"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."

You could always change your mind just for the fun of it...

)Sarge Gerbode

-- 
	Being an AI program means never having to say you're sorry.

				jim (uunet!actnyc!jsb)

In article <369@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
>I'm going to be hard-pressed to find a quality comeback to this one!
>
>Actually, what I would say is:
>
>"Perhaps if we pooled our experiences and ironed out our differences, and if
>we applied the rules of logic and other rules by which we all organize our
>respective worlds, we could come to an agreement about what the nature of an
>elephant is."
>
>And we all got on the elephant that we had agreed on and rode off into the
>sunset.

I don't think so.  That ``ironing out the differences'' stuff is
going to be difficult.  Methink that the elephant will die of old age.
Will that be an objectively dead elephant?  or only a subjectively
dead one?

Laura
-- 
The universe is expanding, but I still can't find a parking space.

Laura Creighton	
uunet!hoptoad!laura  utzoo!hoptoad!laura  sun!hoptoad!laura toad@toad.com

In article <4268@hoptoad.uucp> laura@hoptoad.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes:
>In article <369@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
>>"Perhaps if we pooled our experiences and ironed out our differences, and if
>>we applied the rules of logic and other rules by which we all organize our
>>respective worlds, we could come to an agreement about what the nature of an
>>elephant is."

>I don't think so.  That ``ironing out the differences'' stuff is
>going to be difficult.  Methink that the elephant will die of old age.
>Will that be an objectively dead elephant?  or only a subjectively
>dead one?

As they say, "I never promised you a rose garden."  Sure, it's hard to reach
agreements.  But by the evolution of scientific method, we have made great
inroads into the process.  The process of ironing out the differences is what
I call science, demonstration, and rational discourse.
-- 
"The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

In article <751@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes:
>In article <368@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:

>)I would say when we say that someone else is out of touch
>)with reality, we do in fact disagree with that other person.

>I disagree with your "mapping" of reality but I don't think you are out of
>touch with reality.

If you were in substantial disagreement with a large part of my reality
mapping, for instance, if I thought that worldly events were influenced by
invisible men from the dark side of the moon, wouldn't you think I was out of
touch with reality?  At points this side of such an extreme, how far you think
I am out of touch with reality would, I submit, depend on the degree and scope
of our disagreement.  I bet you think I'm at least a *little* out of reality as
things stand.  Otherwise, why do you keep invoking that horrible Zen Master
with his big stick to knock reality into my head?

>)Sure: *anyone's* reality is perceived as being "out there", in that it is
>)perceived, conceived, and known to be outside the person.

>It looks like you are making a stronger statement here than the one you wish to
>avoid.  You say that the question of whether there is an external reality is
>"meaningless" regardless of how we perceive it to be, yet you don't hesitate to
>speculate on what goes on in the perceptions of others which we cannot directly
>perceive.

I obviously did not make myself clear.  Sorry.  What I said was that the
concept of a *valid* reality was meaningless; that the correct term was
"credible".  And it may indeed be meaningless to speak of a "valid" reality, as
though only one reality were valid.  But I did not mean to say that reality is
not experienced as external to a person.  Of course it is.  There is another
confusion in the word "external", which could mean "independent of any
particular viewpoint" or, simply, "outside".  I mean it in the latter sense.

I have my own views on what others perceive, based on what they have told me
and what I have observed in their behavior.  However, I do not claim any direct
access to their experience.  It *is* part of my reality that others experience
things in a certain way.  Others may disagree with this reality; my own views
lead me to the conclusion that, upon sober reflection and full undrstanding of
terms, they will not.  I could be wrong about this, but I don't think I am.

>And what meta-map can tell me how to choose between the ordinary and new map of
>reality?  As for myself, I kinda like the old "out-there" reality since it is
>more intuitive. What's more, I'm willing to bet that you act in the world as if
>there were an objective reality despite your claim of meaninglessness.

As I said, I also have an "out-there" reality.  But I don't expect that what
is "out there" for others will be just the same as what is "out there" for
me.  What others believe with certainty is what is real for them.  For some
(perhaps you), that is an external reality that exists independent of
individual viewpoints.  I respect that reality as one that exists for them.
It is just as real for them as my reality is for me.  However, it is not my
reality.

>)                                            ...  It has something to do with
>)having a viewpoint and having intention.  If a machine had a viewpoint and had
>)intention, the same way I have a viewpoint and have intention, I would say it's
>)intelligent (or, rather, conscious).  I don't happen to think a machine *could*
>)have these qualities, but if it did, it would be conscious.

>Does a chess playing program have the intention of winning?  Somehow I think
>your "requisites" for conciousness are harder to pin down than conciousness
>itself.

I don't think my requisites for consciousness are complex or hard to pin
down.  They are easily definable by ostension.  If you have an idea of what it
is to intend something and what it is to be aware, then you will know what I
mean.  In other words, you know when *you* intend something and when you are
aware of something.  Knowledge of these things is very direct and very
primitive for a conscious being.  If you *don't know what it is to intend and
to be aware, then I will begin to suspect you of being a very clever program
of some kind.

So, in a way I am being selectively skeptical.  What I chose to be least
skeptical about are things like:

1.  My own existence.
2.  As a center of consciousness and intention.
3.  The existence of an apparent world around me.
4.  This world being composed of facts, phenomena, and concepts.
5.  The specific experience of the world that I have, as an experience.

I am much more skeptical about things inferred from the above, such as
complex, unprovable neurological theories about where consciousness comes from
and reductionist assumptions about the physicality of everything.
-- 
"The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got."

Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

In article <4268@hoptoad.uucp> laura@hoptoad.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes:
}In article <369@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
} >....
} >And we all got on the elephant that we had agreed on and rode off into the
} >sunset.
} 
} I don't think so.  That ``ironing out the differences'' stuff is
} going to be difficult.  Methink that the elephant will die of old age.
} Will that be an objectively dead elephant?  or only a subjectively
} dead one?

Ah, the elephant.  A good point, Laura.  What will the _elephant_ think
of this crew?  Possibly it will roll them up like a scroll, along with
their funny little universe, and amble away -- wherever away is.

In other words -- how do you know your map isn't mapping you right
back?  As the Invisible Man said, "It's one thing to be an idea in
the mind of God, and another to be an idea in the mind of the chair
you're sitting on!"

-- 
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