🚀 go-pugleaf

"Quito Quito" <qquito@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:98d60386.0405090040.96c8fdc@posting.google.com...
> Dear All:
>
> I am wondering what the modern answers to the following questions are.
>
> Suppose I can instantly make an identical copy of an adult person. The
> copy is  physically exactly the same as the original at molecular as
> well as atomic and all subatomic levels. The copy and the original are
> then put in exactly the same environment.
>
> Now does the copy have all the knowledge, such as in physics, history,
> etc., as the original does? Is the personality of the copy the same as
> the original? Is the copy equally intelligent as the original? More
> importantly, does the copy have the memory of the past as experienced
> by the original?
>
> My own answers are all YES.
>
> Roland


Wouldnt they still be different...and be in different locations, since there
is more than one...?

Hi

I'm studying Cognitive Science @ Osnabr�ck/Germany and my fields of
interest are neurobiology / neurobiopsychology / neurocomputing,
Meaning : sticking electrodes in brains tells me more about the brain
than quiet pondering.

So my opinion :

I consider myself a eliminative materialist... a physicalist.
If two things are in the same physical state they are identical.
Therefore I tacitly assume that mind-states supervene on
physical-states. ( See the philosophy part below ).

Now for the questions :
The copy of this person would have the same memories, emotional
reactions and quality of conscious perception ( experience the same
"qualia" ).  Why ?

1.Memory is usually associated with synaptic plasticity mechanisms, so
you can explain, simulate and manipulate it.
2.Same holds for emotions. 
3.Conscious perception may be due to binding of features by fast
oscillating spike trains between distinct brain areas and by
attentional mechanisms.
4.For the tricky topic of qualia : I believe that the quality of our
perception is completely described by the way our percepts change
while we act in our environment. A straight line is straight because
its projection on our retinae does not change as we move our gaze
along it. (Sensorimotor contingencies, see O Regan, A. Noe , very
funky)


All of this might be disputed by some persons, mainly those that
favour a dualistic view of the mind  but also by philosophers that
have reasonable objections... but you have to keep in mind that these
are only reasonable as you accept a certain framework of assumptions
to be true. For practical considerations... well.

I think neuroscience is a really productive field as long as we stick
to the right tools. I'm talking Neurobiology, Physiology,
Neuropsychology, Systems Science,  Bayesian Statistics and Mathematics
(perhaps Computer simulations) here.

So : YES, These two persons would be the same. But keep in mind that
if the two persons are in the same state, they have to be in the same
time (same entropy = time ) as well as in the same environment (same
sensory input and environmental forces)... so there is not much space
left for  them being any different


Here some answers from Philosophy of mind if you're into such
stuff.(These debates are still ongoing) :

What do we assume when we watch a star-trek movie where people get
beamed around.. de- and re-constructed according to their physical
state before beaming ? We assume that these persons are still the same
ones as before.

So we assume a that mind states and physical states "supervene"
(A set of properties or facts M supervenes on a set of properties or
facts P if and only if there can be no changes or differences in M
without there being changes or differences in P.)
ergo :

     (1) No two objects can differ in their mental properties without
     differing in their physical properties.

     (2) A single object cannot change its mental properties without
     changing its physical properties.

     (3) If, at a given time t, a single object has two different
     subsets of mental properties, it must have two different subsets
     of physical properties.

These are some of the basic assumptions you have to make when you
consider yourself a physicalist.


"Life2Death[SBC]" <hypercube33@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<2g7npoF5gdenU1@uni-berlin.de>...
> "Quito Quito" <qquito@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:98d60386.0405090040.96c8fdc@posting.google.com...
> > Dear All:
> >
> > I am wondering what the modern answers to the following questions are.
> >
> > Suppose I can instantly make an identical copy of an adult person. The
> > copy is  physically exactly the same as the original at molecular as
> > well as atomic and all subatomic levels. The copy and the original are
> > then put in exactly the same environment.
> >
> > Now does the copy have all the knowledge, such as in physics, history,
> > etc., as the original does? Is the personality of the copy the same as
> > the original? Is the copy equally intelligent as the original? More
> > importantly, does the copy have the memory of the past as experienced
> > by the original?
> >
> > My own answers are all YES.
> >
> > Roland
> 
> 
> Wouldnt they still be different...and be in different locations, since there
> is more than one...?

> Wouldnt they still be different...and be in different locations, since there
> is more than one...?

In Philosophy of mind these kind of thought experiments are usually
conducted by the assumption that there exists a "twin earth" or a
"twin universe".

The you may ponder about :
if you have a substance called "twin water" which looks like, smells
like, tastes like, behaves (chemically,physically) like, real water...
but IS NOT REAL WATER... do you refer to the same thing as I do when I
say "water" ?
(I hope I got this right)

You may judge for yourself whether this is productive or not... but
back then when I took Philosophy of Mind classes it sure was funky.

regards 
Robert

Robert, thank you for your informative reply. I definitely agree with
you. Are there many people in the neurobiology/neurobiopsychology
field who disagree with
this materialistic philosophical view of the world?

robertmaertin@gmx.de (Robert M?rtin) wrote in message news:<85d56b27.0405100245.1ab603c0@posting.google.com>...
> ......
> I consider myself a eliminative materialist... a physicalist.
> If two things are in the same physical state they are identical.
> ......

No. To be "in the field" usually entails that you support the basic
assumptions of physicalism. This notion extends beyond empirical
science... if you want to participate in contemporary debates about
philosophy of mind, you have to be a physicalist and be open to
advances in science.
But a modern philosopher should be able to deal with these
prerequisites.

Creationism and dualism are no real threat to neuroscience or the
image of ns in the public.
Strange half-scientific psychological theories (not only
Psychotheraphy) that are both easy to understand and catchy are the
real problem of neuroscience... (my opinion)

regards
Robert

qquito@hotmail.com (Quito Quito) wrote in message news:<98d60386.0405101756.1c1dfd75@posting.google.com>...
> Robert, thank you for your informative reply. I definitely agree with
> you. Are there many people in the neurobiology/neurobiopsychology
> field who disagree with
> this materialistic philosophical view of the world?

In article <85d56b27.0405110449.3f7e1ffc@posting.google.com>, Robert 
M?rtin <robertmaertin@gmx.de> writes
>No. To be "in the field" usually entails that you support the basic
>assumptions of physicalism. This notion extends beyond empirical
>science... if you want to participate in contemporary debates about
>philosophy of mind, you have to be a physicalist and be open to
>advances in science.
>But a modern philosopher should be able to deal with these
>prerequisites.
>
>Creationism and dualism are no real threat to neuroscience or the
>image of ns in the public.
>Strange half-scientific psychological theories (not only
>Psychotheraphy) that are both easy to understand and catchy are the
>real problem of neuroscience... (my opinion)
>
>regards
>Robert
>
>qquito@hotmail.com (Quito Quito) wrote in message 
>news:<98d60386.0405101756.1c1dfd75@posting.google.com>...
>> Robert, thank you for your informative reply. I definitely agree with
>> you. Are there many people in the neurobiology/neurobiopsychology
>> field who disagree with
>> this materialistic philosophical view of the world?

I think you'll find that the problems lie much deeper than you make out. 
It is one thing to assert that one's a physicalist, it's a lot harder to 
practice that. In some areas of neuroscience the problems just don't 
arise. They manifest themselves in much more subtle and insidious ways 
elsewhere.
-- 
David Longley

> I think you'll find that the problems lie much deeper than you make out. 
> It is one thing to assert that one's a physicalist, it's a lot harder to 
> practice that. In some areas of neuroscience the problems just don't 
> arise. They manifest themselves in much more subtle and insidious ways 
> elsewhere.


I can remember that Folk Psychology and Intentionality cannot be
reduced to physical terms and that there is a struggle determinism vs.
indeterminism.
But... this never bothered me. 

What are you thinking of ? 
Do you know a situation where I might get into serious inner conflicts
? Or an assumption I have to make as a scientist that really would be
an outrage for certain philosophers ?

regards
Robert

In message <85d56b27.0405120043.5ea05a37@posting.google.com>, Robert 
M?rtin <robertmaertin@gmx.de> writes
>> I think you'll find that the problems lie much deeper than you make out.
>> It is one thing to assert that one's a physicalist, it's a lot harder to
>> practice that. In some areas of neuroscience the problems just don't
>> arise. They manifest themselves in much more subtle and insidious ways
>> elsewhere.
>
>
>I can remember that Folk Psychology and Intentionality cannot be
>reduced to physical terms and that there is a struggle determinism vs.
>indeterminism.
>But... this never bothered me.
>
>What are you thinking of ?
>Do you know a situation where I might get into serious inner conflicts
>? Or an assumption I have to make as a scientist that really would be
>an outrage for certain philosophers ?
>
>regards
>Robert

The conflict arises when one has to read other peoples'  papers and 
decipher what lots of them are *really doing* (as opposed to what they 
say they're doing). Sadly, the methods sections are not always as clear 
as one might expect. Having to skim so many introductions and 
discussions, and critically read the methods and result tends to make 
one a bit punch drunk! Getting down to the work oneself isn't all that 
easy either. Folk insist on talking rather eccentrically and ask what 
one is *really* doing <g>
-- 
David Longley
http://www.longley.demon.co.uk/Frag.htm

In message <85d56b27.0405120043.5ea05a37@posting.google.com>, Robert 
M?rtin <robertmaertin@gmx.de> writes
>> I think you'll find that the problems lie much deeper than you make out.
>> It is one thing to assert that one's a physicalist, it's a lot harder to
>> practice that. In some areas of neuroscience the problems just don't
>> arise. They manifest themselves in much more subtle and insidious ways
>> elsewhere.
>
>
>I can remember that Folk Psychology and Intentionality cannot be
>reduced to physical terms and that there is a struggle determinism vs.
>indeterminism.
>But... this never bothered me.
>
>What are you thinking of ?
>Do you know a situation where I might get into serious inner conflicts
>? Or an assumption I have to make as a scientist that really would be
>an outrage for certain philosophers ?
>
>regards
>Robert

The conflict arises when one has to read other peoples'  papers and 
decipher what lots of them are *really doing* (as opposed to what they 
say they're doing). Sadly, the methods sections are not always as clear 
as one might expect. Having to skim so many introductions and 
discussions, and critically read the methods and results sections tends 
to make one a bit punch drunk! Getting down to the work oneself isn't 
all that easy either. Folk insist on talking rather eccentrically and 
ask what one is *really* doing. We are all creatures of our environments 
<g>
-- 
David Longley
http://www.longley.demon.co.uk/Frag.htm

David Longley <David@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote in message news:<wXO3qYDd4foAFwNF@longley.demon.co.uk>...
> In message <85d56b27.0405120043.5ea05a37@posting.google.com>, Robert 
> M?rtin <robertmaertin@gmx.de> writes
> >> I think you'll find that the problems lie much deeper than you make out.
> >> It is one thing to assert that one's a physicalist, it's a lot harder to
> >> practice that. In some areas of neuroscience the problems just don't
> >> arise. They manifest themselves in much more subtle and insidious ways
> >> elsewhere.
> >
> >
> >I can remember that Folk Psychology and Intentionality cannot be
> >reduced to physical terms and that there is a struggle determinism vs.
> >indeterminism.
> >But... this never bothered me.
> >
> >What are you thinking of ?
> >Do you know a situation where I might get into serious inner conflicts
> >? Or an assumption I have to make as a scientist that really would be
> >an outrage for certain philosophers ?
> >
> >regards
> >Robert
> 
> The conflict arises when one has to read other peoples'  papers and 
> decipher what lots of them are *really doing* (as opposed to what they 
> say they're doing). Sadly, the methods sections are not always as clear 
> as one might expect. Having to skim so many introductions and 
> discussions, and critically read the methods and results sections tends 
> to make one a bit punch drunk! Getting down to the work oneself isn't 
> all that easy either. Folk insist on talking rather eccentrically and 
> ask what one is *really* doing. We are all creatures of our environments 
> <g>

Hi
I agree with you that especially in the field of cognitive psychology
big words are drawn from poor experiments. I'm thinking of fMRI
studies where a neural correlate of some higher cognitive function
(e.g. Language) is to be found. The localizations are coarse, the
underlying model often is distgustingly GOFL - AI like... assuming
that there are central executive regions...

But fortunately our professors teach us to critically evaluate
contemporary neurobiological and neuropsychological papers. "Do you
buy it ?" "Whould you do an other experiment ?", "Are the numerical
methods okay ?".
And there is an emphasis on clean behavioural and electrophysiological
experiments as well as numerical training at our institute.
Furthermore there are people whose papers I can read without turning
the methods section upside down because I know that I can trust these
guys.

RM: I agree with you that especially in the field of cognitive psychology
big words are drawn from poor experiments.



GS: But the real problem with cognitive "science" is that its conceptual
foundation is laughable. But only a very small minority of scientists are
laughing.



RM: I'm thinking of fMRI
studies where a neural correlate of some higher cognitive function
(e.g. Language) is to be found.



GS: Yeah, that's a good place to start...just what is a "cognitive process?"
As to any kind of imaging, and even lesion experiments - what do they tell
you exactly? Of course, these facts will be important, but we are not even
close to having some big picture of the physiological mediation of
behavioral function. And, as you seem to agree below, many times we are not
asking the right questions - "executive regions," the "binding problem,"
etc. etc. It is animism.



RM: The localizations are coarse, the
underlying model often is distgustingly GOFL - AI like... assuming
that there are central executive regions...

But fortunately our professors teach us to critically evaluate
contemporary neurobiological and neuropsychological papers. "Do you
buy it ?" "Whould you do an other experiment ?", "Are the numerical
methods okay ?".
And there is an emphasis on clean behavioural and electrophysiological
experiments as well as numerical training at our institute.
Furthermore there are people whose papers I can read without turning
the methods section upside down because I know that I can trust these
guys.



GS: Well, it goes a little deeper than just trying to figure out what was
actually manipulated and measured, though this is certainly a problem. The
red flags should go up when one realizes psychology manipulates and measures
one set of things, but claims they're actually measuring something else.
Something which, itself, is not usually assigned dimensions. This is part of
the conceptual BS of cognitive "science," and it has infected a great deal
of behavioral neurobiology. Errr...sorry..cognitive neurobiology.





"Robert M?rtin" <robertmaertin@gmx.de> wrote in message
news:85d56b27.0405122306.5465d202@posting.google.com...
> David Longley <David@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:<wXO3qYDd4foAFwNF@longley.demon.co.uk>...
> > In message <85d56b27.0405120043.5ea05a37@posting.google.com>, Robert
> > M?rtin <robertmaertin@gmx.de> writes
> > >> I think you'll find that the problems lie much deeper than you make
out.
> > >> It is one thing to assert that one's a physicalist, it's a lot harder
to
> > >> practice that. In some areas of neuroscience the problems just don't
> > >> arise. They manifest themselves in much more subtle and insidious
ways
> > >> elsewhere.
> > >
> > >
> > >I can remember that Folk Psychology and Intentionality cannot be
> > >reduced to physical terms and that there is a struggle determinism vs.
> > >indeterminism.
> > >But... this never bothered me.
> > >
> > >What are you thinking of ?
> > >Do you know a situation where I might get into serious inner conflicts
> > >? Or an assumption I have to make as a scientist that really would be
> > >an outrage for certain philosophers ?
> > >
> > >regards
> > >Robert
> >
> > The conflict arises when one has to read other peoples'  papers and
> > decipher what lots of them are *really doing* (as opposed to what they
> > say they're doing). Sadly, the methods sections are not always as clear
> > as one might expect. Having to skim so many introductions and
> > discussions, and critically read the methods and results sections tends
> > to make one a bit punch drunk! Getting down to the work oneself isn't
> > all that easy either. Folk insist on talking rather eccentrically and
> > ask what one is *really* doing. We are all creatures of our environments
> > <g>
>
> Hi
> I agree with you that especially in the field of cognitive psychology
> big words are drawn from poor experiments. I'm thinking of fMRI
> studies where a neural correlate of some higher cognitive function
> (e.g. Language) is to be found. The localizations are coarse, the
> underlying model often is distgustingly GOFL - AI like... assuming
> that there are central executive regions...
>
> But fortunately our professors teach us to critically evaluate
> contemporary neurobiological and neuropsychological papers. "Do you
> buy it ?" "Whould you do an other experiment ?", "Are the numerical
> methods okay ?".
> And there is an emphasis on clean behavioural and electrophysiological
> experiments as well as numerical training at our institute.
> Furthermore there are people whose papers I can read without turning
> the methods section upside down because I know that I can trust these
> guys.

On Thu, 13 May 2004 12:27:58 GMT, "Glen M. Sizemore"
<gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> in sci.cognitive wrote:

>RM: I agree with you that especially in the field of cognitive psychology
>big words are drawn from poor experiments.
>
>
>
>GS: But the real problem with cognitive "science" is that its conceptual
>foundation is laughable. But only a very small minority of scientists are
>laughing.
>
I think we can take it as given that you consider cognitive science's
conceptual foundation laughable. The only issue worth considering is
why and whether your laughter constitutes a judgment of any scientific
merit? If only a small minority of scientists are laughing does that
of itself imply that you're right and they're wrong?

If laughter is a relevant metric of scientific merit, I find that many
more professionals in behavior analysis laugh at the naive materialism
of behaviorism's conceptual foundations than laugh at what you term
the naive animism of cognitive science.

An issue of more relevance I think would be what it would take to make
you stop laughing? Is there any criterion of scientific merit that
would make you consider that you are wrong? Or is it just so much
philosophical pretention at the conceptual foundations of behaviorism
that makes you think you're right? Just so much scientific prejudice?
It's time to get past Glen's laughter and get down to the root of the
laughter of other professionals in behavior analysis. At least that
would explain why they're laughing at behaviorism and you're not.

Regards - Lester

RM: I agree with you that especially in the field of cognitive psychology
>big words are drawn from poor experiments.
>
>
>
>GS: But the real problem with cognitive "science" is that its conceptual
>foundation is laughable. But only a very small minority of scientists are
>laughing.
>
LZ: I think we can take it as given that you consider cognitive science's
conceptual foundation laughable.



GS: A safe conclusion.



LZ: The only issue worth considering is
why and whether your laughter constitutes a judgment of any scientific
merit?



GS: Is that really an issue worth considering, Lester?



LZ: If only a small minority of scientists are laughing does that
of itself imply that you're right and they're wrong?



GS: Neither.

LZ: If laughter is a relevant metric of scientific merit, I find that many
more professionals in behavior analysis laugh at the naive materialism
of behaviorism's conceptual foundations than laugh at what you term
the naive animism of cognitive science.



GS: Well, you are not using terms correctly. The term "behavior analysis" is
the modern name for the experimental analysis of behavior, which is a field
founded by Skinner, who also founded radical behaviorism. So..most
".professionals in behavior analysis." are behavioristic, although it is not
necessary.

LZ: An issue of more relevance I think would be what it would take to make
you stop laughing?



GS: Cognitive psychology stripped of its prestige, money etc.



LZ: Is there any criterion of scientific merit that
would make you consider that you are wrong?



GS: Which criteria did you have in mind? If we can't agree on what these
are, how can the question be answered. But I would say, again, that I
consider conceptual analyses to be an important part of science, and this is
the level at which I criticize cognitive "science" the most, and it was, of
course, the subject of my post to RM. Since I hold conceptual analysis to be
important, and I hold that the concepts of cognitive psychology are shit,
you might guess that I consider it (cognitive "science") to have failed in
an important way.



LZ:  Or is it just so much
philosophical pretention at the conceptual foundations of behaviorism
that makes you think you're right?



GS: I think I'm right because the conceptual framework of the experimental
analysis of behavior can withstand scrutiny, and this has led to a science
that directly demonstrates the reliability and generality of the processes
over which it has experimental control.



LZ: Just so much scientific prejudice?



GS: No. The concepts of the EAB have been scrutinized beginning with Skinner
's analysis of terms like "stimulus," "response," "reflex," "conditioning,"
etc. in the mid-1930s. That this conceptual analysis took place, and was
thorough is not a matter of prejudice. If you think it is, then you should
feel free to examine these papers (like "The Generic Nature of Stimulus and
Response") and critique thoise conceptual analyses. Unfortunately their are
no conceptual analyses in which cognitive "science" to which one may direct
one's attention. One can, however, generate such analyses.


LZ: It's time to get past Glen's laughter and get down to the root of the
laughter of other professionals in behavior analysis.



GS: You mean "other professional psychologists;" again, "behavior analysis"
implies "behaviorism" and there is a large correlation.



LZ: At least that
would explain why they're laughing at behaviorism and you're not.



GS: I don't think you can explain why behaviorism and the EAB are minority
positions. But you can't seem to stop using the argument that, because
behaviorism is a minority position, it must be wrong.





"Lester Zick" <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:40a388d6.93386395@netnews.att.net...
> On Thu, 13 May 2004 12:27:58 GMT, "Glen M. Sizemore"
> <gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> in sci.cognitive wrote:
>

"Quito Quito" <qquito@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:98d60386.0405130954.4d2ef583@posting.google.com...
> Hi, Robert:
>
> Does modern neuroscience accept the notion of "free will" as believed
> by Christians?
>
> I feel that a human being is just like a computer, only more complex.
> A human being does not have any "will", and all actions it takes is a
> result of passive reactions to external stimulations. A word or an
> idea you hear from a psychological therapist is just a stimulation.

You're on the right track here, but you should drop the notion concerning
"passive reactions to external stimulations." Not all behavior can be so
characterized. Much important behavior is not "elicited" by stimuli. It
occurs spontaneously (at least at the behavioral level) and it has effects
on the world. These effects (consequences) modify the animal's behavior.
This is very different from the S-R model you suggest.
>
> Roland
>
> robertmaertin@gmx.de (Robert M?rtin) wrote in message
news:<85d56b27.0405122306.5465d202@posting.google.com>...
> > Hi
> > I agree with you that especially in the field of cognitive psychology
> > big words are drawn from poor experiments. I'm thinking of fMRI
> > studies where a neural correlate of some higher cognitive function
> > ......

In article <98d60386.0405130954.4d2ef583@posting.google.com>, Quito 
Quito <qquito@hotmail.com> writes
>Hi, Robert:
>
>Does modern neuroscience accept the notion of "free will" as believed
>by Christians?
>
>I feel that a human being is just like a computer, only more complex.
>A human being does not have any "will", and all actions it takes is a
>result of passive reactions to external stimulations. A word or an
>idea you hear from a psychological therapist is just a stimulation.
>
>Roland
>
>robertmaertin@gmx.de (Robert M?rtin) wrote in message 
>news:<85d56b27.0405122306.5465d202@posting.google.com>...
>> Hi
>> I agree with you that especially in the field of cognitive psychology
>> big words are drawn from poor experiments. I'm thinking of fMRI
>> studies where a neural correlate of some higher cognitive function
>> ......

For "free-will" see *operant behavior" and "operant conditioning".
-- 
David Longley

On Thu, 13 May 2004 18:01:50 GMT, "Glen M. Sizemore"
<gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> in sci.cognitive wrote:

>RM: I agree with you that especially in the field of cognitive psychology
>>big words are drawn from poor experiments.
>>
>>
>>
>>GS: But the real problem with cognitive "science" is that its conceptual
>>foundation is laughable. But only a very small minority of scientists are
>>laughing.
>>
>LZ: I think we can take it as given that you consider cognitive science's
>conceptual foundation laughable.

>GS: A safe conclusion.

>LZ: The only issue worth considering is
>why and whether your laughter constitutes a judgment of any scientific
>merit?

>GS: Is that really an issue worth considering, Lester?

Hard to say. You're a mixed bag, Glen. You have obvious interest in
the conceptual foundations of science and you occasionaly produce
insights of some significance, unlike certain others I could name. But
you speak in prejudiced terms on unresolved scientific problems and
issues.

>LZ: An issue of more relevance I think would be what it would take to make
>you stop laughing?

>GS: Cognitive psychology stripped of its prestige, money etc.

Well, obviously I was asking what could convince you that behaviorism
is wrong regarding the mechanical significance of cognition and mental
effects. And just as obviously the answer is nothing. Which indicates
a bigotry and lack of scientific acumen. It's hard judge if one can't
be wrong because no standard of rightness or wrongness can apply.

>LZ: Is there any criterion of scientific merit that
>would make you consider that you are wrong?

>GS: Which criteria did you have in mind? If we can't agree on what these
>are, how can the question be answered.

That's why and what I'm asking you. You're the one with the opinion
that the conceptual foundations of cognitive science are laughable.
They may not be as detailed as EAB. But they address the mechanical
basis for so far inaccessible faculties. You seem to deny that there
can be any non EAB basis for the mechanics involved. At least that's
what I understand you to imply with your insistence on the conceptual
vacuousness of such ideas.

I see EAB as the ability to manipulate and train behavioral faculties,
not explain the mechanical basis for various behavioral faculties like
sight. You just assume they are to be explained on the same mechanical
basis as ordinary EAB. But that's mere speculation since we have no
present way to define the faculties of things like sight in mechanical
terms. EAB can only explain techniques and technologies used to train
faculties. They train sight but they don't explain sight mechanically.

So the criteria I'm asking about are just those which would cause you
to consider this approach incorrect and acknowledge that there may be
cognitive effects requiring alternative approaches to EAB. Cognitive
science doesn't attempt to deny the merit or significance of EAB as a
training discipline. And I'm uncertain why behaviorism denigrates
attempts to comprehend the mechanics underlying sentient faculties.

>                                                                    But I would say, again, that I
>consider conceptual analyses to be an important part of science, and this is
>the level at which I criticize cognitive "science" the most, and it was, of
>course, the subject of my post to RM. Since I hold conceptual analysis to be
>important, and I hold that the concepts of cognitive psychology are shit,
>you might guess that I consider it (cognitive "science") to have failed in
>an important way.

Well, the concepts of cognitive science may be unsophisticated, but
they can hardly be called shit if they're able to generate the kinds
of experimental insights recently cited by Alpha. (By the way I don't
know who RM is.) Unsophisticated and often naive, perhaps. But I still
don't see any conceptual basis for behaviorism apart from materialist
assumptions as to the mechanics of behavioral faculties which, by the
way still haven't led to the kinds of correlations cited by Alpha.

>LZ:  Or is it just so much
>philosophical pretention at the conceptual foundations of behaviorism
>that makes you think you're right?

>GS: I think I'm right because the conceptual framework of the experimental
>analysis of behavior can withstand scrutiny, and this has led to a science
>that directly demonstrates the reliability and generality of the processes
>over which it has experimental control.

No doubt, Glen. The problem is the relevance and significance of the
processes over which EAB exercises no control and which you criticize
as conceptually defective. What I'm trying to understand with respect
to your criticism is the reason you claim that behaviorism's success
with EAB in terms of training has any bearing on the laughability of
cognitive science's motivation in approaching cognition in general.
You have never answered or even responded to the criticism that the
success of behaviorism's training control justifies the impossibility
of conceptually explicable cognitive features. Your only justification
so far seems to be that if such a thing exists it will only represent
materialist behavioral interactions of the kind you study in objective
terms and I see no basis for any such conclusion in conceptual terms.

>LZ: Just so much scientific prejudice?

>GS: No. The concepts of the EAB have been scrutinized beginning with Skinner
>'s analysis of terms like "stimulus," "response," "reflex," "conditioning,"
>etc. in the mid-1930s. That this conceptual analysis took place, and was
>thorough is not a matter of prejudice. If you think it is, then you should
>feel free to examine these papers (like "The Generic Nature of Stimulus and
>Response") and critique thoise conceptual analyses. Unfortunately their are
>no conceptual analyses in which cognitive "science" to which one may direct
>one's attention. One can, however, generate such analyses.

OK. Here there is some confusion over what you have said in the past
regarding what I thought you were referring to as the conceptual basis
for behaviorism as a philosophical doctrine of science. I agree that I
have seen little if any conceptual basis for cognitive science apart
from my own forays on the subject of the mechanics of sentience. And I
agree that behaviorists including Skinner have been very much more
attentive to that aspect of the subject. However I do not agree that
they got the analysis anything like correct. They just used a variety
of new terms to describe EAB. So it still smells like a philosophical
prejudice to me even though it refers to and describes experimental
techniques and technology.


>LZ: It's time to get past Glen's laughter and get down to the root of the
>laughter of other professionals in behavior analysis.
>
>GS: You mean "other professional psychologists;" again, "behavior analysis"
>implies "behaviorism" and there is a large correlation.
>
Well, the phrase "other professional psychologists" is fine with me.
>
>LZ: At least that
>would explain why they're laughing at behaviorism and you're not.
>

>GS: I don't think you can explain why behaviorism and the EAB are minority
>positions. But you can't seem to stop using the argument that, because
>behaviorism is a minority position, it must be wrong.
>
I've never used that argument, Glen, ever, and I don't now. I'm just
responding to your characterization of the conceptual foundation of
cognitive science as laughable. If laughter is a gauge I would think
the number of laughing professionals of either persuasion an important
criterion. I don't and wouldn't. To me it doesn't matter in the least.

Regards - Lester

Folks, Please... This is not very productive.

The sole thing I was out to say was that the computer-metaphor is dead
to a certain degree (as is the idea that you can model anything with
classical neural networks). And as a whole lot of models in cogpsy is
based on the assumption of some Von-Neumann like computational
structure in the brain, many experimental conclusions just are a bit
awkward.

Furthermore one has recognized that every attempt to model intelligent
behaviour with GOF-AI has failed.
So : Cogscience has evolved. Its basics are overcome. This is a good
thing... Science cleans itself.
Just because the basic assumptions have changed, does it mean that we
should stop exploring or rename the whole scientific branch because
"cognitive science has become laughable"

We move on from the Computational-Metaphor and Classical Neural
Networks to embodied intelligence, to clean neuroscientific work, to
propabilistic models of intelligence. The future is Bayes, not Logic
programming. It is clean neuropsychological experiments attempting to
show in small steps how we explore the world... not that want to
explain language in one fMRI session. Human machine interfaces
(Sensory Substitution devices, EEG-BCI and neuroimplants (in
primates)) are actually WORKING and improving.

I think that's why I love this field.


And another thing. Concerning the freedom of the will: I believe in
cause and effect. I believe that the past can only influence the
future through the present. We live in a determinsistic world. There
is no freedom of the will detached from the physics of the world.
But we cannot predict the cause of the world nor can we predict
systemic properties of complex systems. So we use intentionality and
mental causation. And it works. I'm fine with that.

Btw: Chaos-Theory cannot help you... that's why it is called
deterministic chaos theory. You can phantazise about quantum processes
adding a random element to our choices like penrose did (he mixed
quite a lot of stuff up)... but do you want to be randomized ?

regards
Robert

In message <85d56b27.0405140106.75c55011@posting.google.com>, Robert 
M?rtin <robertmaertin@gmx.de> writes
>Folks, Please... This is not very productive.
>

For whom?

>The sole thing I was out to say was that the computer-metaphor is dead
>to a certain degree (as is the idea that you can model anything with
>classical neural networks). And as a whole lot of models in cogpsy is
>based on the assumption of some Von-Neumann like computational
>structure in the brain, many experimental conclusions just are a bit
>awkward.

For whom?

>
>Furthermore one has recognized that every attempt to model intelligent
>behaviour with GOF-AI has failed.
>So : Cogscience has evolved. Its basics are overcome. This is a good
>thing... Science cleans itself.

Think about how it does that.

>Just because the basic assumptions have changed, does it mean that we
>should stop exploring or rename the whole scientific branch because
>"cognitive science has become laughable"

I think you might have got that the wrong way round.

>
>We move on from the Computational-Metaphor and Classical Neural
>Networks to embodied intelligence, to clean neuroscientific work, to
>propabilistic models of intelligence. The future is Bayes, not Logic
>programming. It is clean neuropsychological experiments attempting to
>show in small steps how we explore the world... not that want to
>explain language in one fMRI session. Human machine interfaces
>(Sensory Substitution devices, EEG-BCI and neuroimplants (in
>primates)) are actually WORKING and improving.
>
>I think that's why I love this field.
>

! <g>

>
>And another thing. Concerning the freedom of the will: I believe in
>cause and effect. I believe that the past can only influence the
>future through the present. We live in a determinsistic world. There
>is no freedom of the will detached from the physics of the world.
>But we cannot predict the cause of the world nor can we predict
>systemic properties of complex systems. So we use intentionality and
>mental causation. And it works. I'm fine with that.

It works? Who told you that? It isn't even rational.

>
>Btw: Chaos-Theory cannot help you... that's why it is called
>deterministic chaos theory. You can phantazise about quantum processes
>adding a random element to our choices like penrose did (he mixed
>quite a lot of stuff up)... but do you want to be randomized ?
>
>regards
>Robert

OK, We've tried to make a few points to someone we thought might be on 
the right track. Now I'm not so sure after reading the above. You seem a 
bit confused about cause and effect too. (You must be careful about 
"mind melding" with Zick by the way).

Maybe the following will help (or at least amuse you <g>)


Albert Einstein was talking to one of his colleagues about quantum 
mechanics. The colleague kept using classical terms to discuss the 
quantum phenomema. Einstein finally said (something to the effect), "I 
can't be sure that I understand you because you are using the wrong 
words."

After Einstein had fled from Hitler's Germany, one hundred Nazi 
professors published a book condemning his theory of relativity. "If I 
were wrong," Einstein said in his defense, "one professor would have 
been enough."

Niels Bohr (1885-1962) Danish physicist On reading of a particularly 
bizarre physical theory (Dirac's theory leading to the discovery of the 
positron, to be stuffy about it) Niels Bohr proposed that it would be 
very useful as an elephant trap.
Simply put an explanation of the theory on a poster, tack it up on a 
tree in the jungle, and any elephant (a beast noted for its wisdom) that 
passed by would immediately become so engrossed trying to figure it out 
that it could be packed up and delivered to the Copenhagen zoo before it 
realized anything had happened.

...as the joint meeting of the Royal Society and the Royal Astronomical 
Society was dispersing [this was 6 November 1919, when the results of 
the eclipse expedition that confirmed Einstein's prediction of the 
bending of light by gravity were announced],Ludwig Silberstein came up 
to him and said, "Professor Eddington,you must be one of three persons 
in the world who understands general relativity." On Eddington's 
demurring to this statement, Silberstein responded, "Don't be modest, 
Eddington," and Eddington replied that, "On the contrary, I am trying to 
think who the third person is."

Niels Bohr had a propensity for thinking aloud, often using a convenient 
student or colleague as a sounding board. On one occasion, Bohr, in 
search of company after a week-long ocean voyage, entered Princeton's 
Institute for Advanced Study (IAS), corralled two colleagues (Abraham 
Pais and Wolfgang Pauli) into an office, sat them down, and proceeded to 
muse at length on quantum theory. They were finally able to interrupt - 
two hours later.

John von Neumann (1903-1957) [Hungarian/US mathematician and scientist] 
The following problem can be solved either the easy way or the hard way. 
How about the apocryphal story about the MIT student who cornered the 
famous John von Neumann in the hallway:
Student: "Er, excuse me, Professor von Neumann, could you please
help me with a calculus problem?"
John: "Okay, sonny, if it's real quick -- I'm a busy man."
Student: "I'm having trouble with this integral."
John: "Let's have a look." ( brief pause ) "Alright, sonny, the answer's 
two-pi over 5."
Student: "I know that, sir, the answer's in the back -- I'm
having trouble deriving it, though."
John: "Okay, let me see it again. "(another pause)" The answer's two-pi 
over 5."
Student (frustrated): "Uh, sir, I _know_ the answer, I just don't see 
how to derive it."
John: "Whaddya want, sonny, I worked the problem in two different ways!"

Over a hundred years ago a university student found himself seated in a 
train by the side of a person who seemed to be well-to do peasant. He 
was praying the rosary and moving the beads in his fingers. "Sir, do you 
still believe in such outdated things?" asked the student of the old 
man."  "Yes, I do. Do you not?" asked the man. The student burst out 
into a laughter and said, "I do not believe in such silly things. Take 
my advice. Throw the rosary out through this window, and learn what 
science has to say about it".
"Science? I do not understand this science? Perhaps you can explain it 
to me.", the man said humbly with some tears in his eyes.
The student saw that the man was deeply moved. So to avoid further 
hurting the feelings of the man, he said: "Please give me your address 
and I will send you some literature to
help you on the matter." The man fumbled in the inside pocket of his 
coat and gave the boy his visiting card. On glancing at the card, the 
student, lowered his head in shame and became silent. On the card he 
read:
"Louis Pasteur, Director of the Institute of Scientific Research,
Paris."
-- Un-attributed story told and retold about Pasteur

A selection from: http://www.seas.upenn.edu/~srihari/anecdotes.htm
-- 
David Longley

A little bit about spontaneity. As in the debate about decay of
radioactive elements, it may be said to be spontaneous and random, but
some people believe that it is caused by some subamotic mechanisms
that are beyond our observation or detect.

A newly born baby carries causes that are working at the cellular,
molecular, atomic and all subatomic levels. These causes cause effects
which serve as new causes that cause new effects. This chain action
may be considered spontaneous. So spontaneous behavior should be
considered caused and the causes can be traced back to prenatal
causes. The external stimuli an individual receives can be called
postnatal causes as opposed to prenatal causes.

"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<738b23afd7d4762d18778330adc23fd5@news.teranews.com>...
>
> You're on the right track here, but you should drop the notion concerning
> "passive reactions to external stimulations." Not all behavior can be so
> characterized. Much important behavior is not "elicited" by stimuli. It
> occurs spontaneously (at least at the behavioral level) and it has effects
> on the world. These effects (consequences) modify the animal's behavior.
> This is very different from the S-R model you suggest.

RM: Folks, Please... This is not very productive.



GS: And what is "this?"

RM: The sole thing I was out to say was that the computer-metaphor is dead
to a certain degree (as is the idea that you can model anything with
classical neural networks).



GS: Well...it should be dead. But it isn't.





RM: And as a whole lot of models in cogpsy is
based on the assumption of some Von-Neumann like computational
structure in the brain, many experimental conclusions just are a bit
awkward.



GS: The single most important concept in cognitive "science" is that of
"representation." How does this compare to your assertion that ".a whole lot
of models in cogpsy is based on the assumption of some Von-Neumann like
computational structure in the brain?"

RM: Furthermore one has recognized that every attempt to model intelligent
behaviour with GOF-AI has failed.
So : Cogscience has evolved. Its basics are overcome. This is a good
thing... Science cleans itself.



GS: It isn't clear what you mean here, and what you are referring to as
"Cogscience." AI has certainly abandoned GOFAI, but they have,
unfortunately, retained much of the conceptual structure (i.e., storage and
retrieval of representations etc.)


RM: Just because the basic assumptions have changed, does it mean that we
should stop exploring or rename the whole scientific branch because
"cognitive science has become laughable"



GS: Again, who are you talking about? The fundamental concepts of cognitive
"science" remain representation, storage, retrieval, knowledge, belief etc.
etc. etc. etc. It is true that AI could force these notions to be abandoned
(I'm counting on AI contributing in this regard) but it hasn't happened yet.
Indeed, most AI ers insist on retaining the notion of representation despite
the fact that the notion is not easily applied to the distributed weights at
nodes.

RM: We move on from the Computational-Metaphor and Classical Neural
Networks to embodied intelligence, to clean neuroscientific work, to
propabilistic models of intelligence. The future is Bayes, not Logic
programming. It is clean neuropsychological experiments attempting to
show in small steps how we explore the world... not that want to
explain language in one fMRI session. Human machine interfaces
(Sensory Substitution devices, EEG-BCI and neuroimplants (in
primates)) are actually WORKING and improving.

I think that's why I love this field.



GS: It is not clear what you are talking about here. Behavioral neuroscience
is nowhere near to explaining how physiology mediates behavioral function,
and most of behavioral neuroscience calls itself "cognitive neuroscience"
and is still driven by the conceptual crap that characterizes cognitive
"science."

RM: And another thing. Concerning the freedom of the will: I believe in
cause and effect. I believe that the past can only influence the
future through the present. We live in a determinsistic world. There
is no freedom of the will detached from the physics of the world.
But we cannot predict the cause of the world nor can we predict
systemic properties of complex systems. So we use intentionality and
mental causation. And it works. I'm fine with that.



GS: Huh?

RM: Btw: Chaos-Theory cannot help you... that's why it is called
deterministic chaos theory. You can phantazise about quantum processes
adding a random element to our choices like penrose did (he mixed
quite a lot of stuff up)... but do you want to be randomized ?



GS: Huh?





"Robert M?rtin" <robertmaertin@gmx.de> wrote in message
news:85d56b27.0405140106.75c55011@posting.google.com...

QQ: A little bit about spontaneity. As in the debate about decay of
radioactive elements, it may be said to be spontaneous and random, but
some people believe that it is caused by some subamotic mechanisms
that are beyond our observation or detect.



GS: You mean beyond our current ability? Or in principle? In any event, this
is largely irrelevant. By "spontaneous" I mean "not elicited by stimuli."
The spontaneous behavior that I am talking about has causes, but the causes
are not stimuli in the environment. At the behavioral level, the behavior
simply occurs.

QQ: A newly born baby carries causes that are working at the cellular,
molecular, atomic and all subatomic levels. These causes cause effects
which serve as new causes that cause new effects. This chain action
may be considered spontaneous. So spontaneous behavior should be
considered caused and the causes can be traced back to prenatal
causes. The external stimuli an individual receives can be called
postnatal causes as opposed to prenatal causes.



GS: Well, this seems convoluted and confused. Babies emit behavior
spontaneously, and that behavior has consequences that alter the probability
of that response class.





"Quito Quito" <qquito@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:98d60386.0405141951.435a3f4b@posting.google.com...

@ "Glen M. Sizemore" 

I'll make my point a bit clearer. 

Part 1.

RM: Folks, Please... This is not very productive.
GS: And what is "this?"

It is the discussion about the basics of cognitive science. If you
state that
"The fundamental concepts of cognitive "science" remain
representation, storage,
 retrieval, knowledge, belief etc." (and I think GOF-AI and
Von-Neumann describe this pretty well)
then you are right. This is exactly the weakness of Cognitive Science
as seen in the Textbook.

So. I'm studying congnitive science. Everybody here is well aware of
the problems mentioned above. So
we teach these basics, discuss them and dicard them. 
What we do is this : 

We do electrophysiology (in vitro & vivo). If in Vivo, then we usually
do behavioural experiments usually of visual nature (Binocular
Rivalry, Depth Perception). We use cats/mice.

We do EEG and fMRI. We are well aware of the limitations of these
techniques and we usually hesitate to regard these data as "proof" of
anything.

We want to explain human exploratory behaviour on a bayesian basis and
couple it with parts of information theory. Does our exploratory
behaviour correspond to entropy in visual scenes ?

We try to build (physiologically exact) computational models of
certain brain regions. Thid is a valid technique to test how far you
ideas are true, as long as you don't draw to heavy conclusions from
it.

We're doing research in the field of "sensory substitution" devices
(mainly tactile interfaces)

The AI section does not only teach GOF-AI but we're building
autonomous robots. These have won the "Robocup German Open 2004" and
they are very productive.

And this sounds like science & engineering in action to me. 

Even though you are right that the textbook - description of Cognitive
Science indicates that it should be a dead field, I think our
institute is a sign that we can just go on. Cognitive Science (at
least in Germany) has uncovered its problems (mentioned above) all by
itself. Now we need to go on. And why should we change the name ? We
still want to explain human cognition !
The growing influx of physicists, mathematicians, system scienctists,
medical doctors and die hard engineers to cognitive science (and our
institute) has brought productivity and clean experimental methods and
replaced the overcome ideals of cognition as a symbol manipulation
process.

RM: Folks, Please... This is not very productive.
GS: And what is "this?"

This : The discussion about what the basics are and why cognitive
science sucks ass.
I'll be glad to participate in discussions about neurobiology or
neuropsychology,
but it's a pity for the time spent on it :) No offense.



Part 2
Citation :

 RM: And another thing. Concerning the freedom of the will: I believe
in
 cause and effect. I believe that the past can only influence the
 future through the present. We live in a determinsistic world. There
 is no freedom of the will detached from the physics of the world.
 But we cannot predict the cause of the world nor can we predict
 systemic properties of complex systems. So we use intentionality and
 mental causation. And it works. I'm fine with that.
 GS: Huh?
 RM: Btw: Chaos-Theory cannot help you... that's why it is called
 deterministic chaos theory. You can phantazise about quantum
processes
 adding a random element to our choices like penrose did (he mixed
 quite a lot of stuff up)... but do you want to be randomized ?
 GS: Huh?

to QQ :
 GS: You mean beyond our current ability? Or in principle? In any
event, this
 is largely irrelevant. By "spontaneous" I mean "not elicited by
stimuli."
 The spontaneous behavior that I am talking about has causes, but the
causes
 are not stimuli in the environment. At the behavioral level, the
behavior
 simply occurs.

Okay :) I have to admit,  my text was quite messed up. But your
response to QQ basically descibed a great deal of the things I wanted
to mention. The matter was "freedom of the will". And the idea is that
I don't believe in the idea that we are absolutely free to do whatever
we want. Our decisions are part of a causal chain. There are actions
that are not directly triggered by the current environment, but that
still are parts of this causal chain.
The last part abou quantum processes and chaos theory refers to a
habit of philosphers to include chaos theory and/or quantum processes
into theories of free will to escape determinism.

Thx for reading my text.

regards
Robert

In article <85d56b27.0405160223.1885d517@posting.google.com>, Robert 
M?rtin <robertmaertin@gmx.de> writes
>Even though you are right that the textbook - description of Cognitive
>Science indicates that it should be a dead field, I think our
>institute is a sign that we can just go on. Cognitive Science (at
>least in Germany) has uncovered its problems (mentioned above) all by
>itself. Now we need to go on. And why should we change the name ? We
>still want to explain human cognition !

Because it's essentially a malapropism?. If you look into some of the 
posts in comp.ai.philosophy you might get a better grasp of just how and 
why the debacle may have come about in the first place and why it isn't 
just a trivial matter. In its current form "Cognitive Science" is not 
merely badge engineered Behaviour Analysis and technology, but a 
hopelessly incompetent misappropriation and attempted replication to 
boot (As an aside, I assume you know the history of the "Gaz" Gorky 
motor car company and the USSR's absolute "hatred" of American 
capitalism? <g>)


>The growing influx of physicists, mathematicians, system scienctists,
>medical doctors and die hard engineers to cognitive science (and our
>institute) has brought productivity and clean experimental methods and
>replaced the overcome ideals of cognition as a symbol manipulation
>process.

You mean they do engineering and dress it up with hyperbole (including 
the term "cognitive")? Why do they do that? To make it more sexy? To 
sell it more easily? Cut out all the mentalistic verbiage and what are 
you actually left with that's usable?

-- 
David Longley

RM: @ "Glen M. Sizemore"

I'll make my point a bit clearer.

Part 1.

RM(previous): Folks, Please... This is not very productive.



GS(previous): And what is "this?"

RM: It is the discussion about the basics of cognitive science. If you
state that
"The fundamental concepts of cognitive "science" remain
representation, storage,
 retrieval, knowledge, belief etc." (and I think GOF-AI and
Von-Neumann describe this pretty well)
then you are right. This is exactly the weakness of Cognitive Science
as seen in the Textbook.



GS: So far, so good.

RM: So. I'm studying congnitive science.



GS: And just what are "cognitions?" Or "cognitive processes," if you prefer?
This is not a rhetorical question.



RM: Everybody here is well aware of
the problems mentioned above. So
we teach these basics, discuss them and dicard them.
What we do is this :

We do electrophysiology (in vitro & vivo). If in Vivo, then we usually
do behavioural experiments usually of visual nature (Binocular
Rivalry, Depth Perception). We use cats/mice.



GS: Hmmmm....sounds like you're trying to get at the physiology of behavior.

RM: We do EEG and fMRI. We are well aware of the limitations of these
techniques and we usually hesitate to regard these data as "proof" of
anything.



GS: Well..I don't know what you have in mind by "limitations." These
technologies are ok, but what is really troublesome is that discovering
which areas are transiently more active when people or animals do certain
things (and defining what they ARE doing is an issue) doesn't get you
anywhere, really, at least not in isolation. The problem is that we don't
have a good idea how physiology mediates behavioral function. If you
collected fMRI data from now 'til doomsday, you still wouldn't know.

RM: We want to explain human exploratory behaviour on a bayesian basis and
couple it with parts of information theory. Does our exploratory
behaviour correspond to entropy in visual scenes ?



GS: Again, though I'm not sure exactly what you are driving at, it sounds
that you are trying to get at the physiology of visual perceptual behavior.
What, exactly, makes this "studying cognitions?"

RM: We try to build (physiologically exact) computational models of
certain brain regions. Thid is a valid technique to test how far you
ideas are true, as long as you don't draw to heavy conclusions from
it.



GS: Let's see...so far you have talked about behavior, and you have talked
about physiology..nope...I don't see any cognitions, do you?

RM: We're doing research in the field of "sensory substitution" devices
(mainly tactile interfaces)



GS: Now this is really interesting stuff. Do you know of O'Regan and Noe?
They're behaviorists only they don't know it.

RM: The AI section does not only teach GOF-AI but we're building
autonomous robots. These have won the "Robocup German Open 2004" and
they are very productive.

And this sounds like science & engineering in action to me.



GS: Well, I would have to agree. But it isn't "cognitive science;" not
unless you can tell me what "cognitions" are.

RM: Even though you are right that the textbook - description of Cognitive
Science indicates that it should be a dead field, I think our
institute is a sign that we can just go on. Cognitive Science (at
least in Germany) has uncovered its problems (mentioned above) all by
itself. Now we need to go on. And why should we change the name ? We
still want to explain human cognition !



GS: And what, exactly, is human cognition? Does it have anything to do with
"human behavior?"



RM: The growing influx of physicists, mathematicians, system scienctists,
medical doctors and die hard engineers to cognitive science (and our
institute) has brought productivity and clean experimental methods and
replaced the overcome ideals of cognition as a symbol manipulation
process.



GS: Let me ask you this: Do we see the world, or do we see a copy (of
whatever sort) of the world "in our brain?" Do you talk about storage and
retrieval at all?

RM: Folks, Please... This is not very productive.



GS: And what is "this?"

RM: This : The discussion about what the basics are and why cognitive
science sucks ass.
I'll be glad to participate in discussions about neurobiology or
neuropsychology,
but it's a pity for the time spent on it :) No offense.



GS: In my opinion, the cognitive "science" movement is the worst thing that
ever happened to psychology, philosophy, AI, behavioral neurobiology,
anthropology etc. I think it might have also been responsible for disco.



Part 2
Citation :

 RM (previous): And another thing. Concerning the freedom of the will: I
believe
in
 cause and effect. I believe that the past can only influence the
 future through the present. We live in a determinsistic world. There
 is no freedom of the will detached from the physics of the world.
 But we cannot predict the cause of the world nor can we predict
 systemic properties of complex systems. So we use intentionality and
 mental causation. And it works. I'm fine with that.



 GS (previous): Huh?



 RM (previous): Btw: Chaos-Theory cannot help you... that's why it is called
 deterministic chaos theory. You can phantazise about quantum
processes
 adding a random element to our choices like penrose did (he mixed
 quite a lot of stuff up)... but do you want to be randomized ?


GS (previous): Huh?

to QQ :
 GS: You mean beyond our current ability? Or in principle? In any
event, this
 is largely irrelevant. By "spontaneous" I mean "not elicited by
stimuli."
 The spontaneous behavior that I am talking about has causes, but the
causes
 are not stimuli in the environment. At the behavioral level, the
behavior
 simply occurs.

RM: Okay :) I have to admit,  my text was quite messed up. But your
response to QQ basically descibed a great deal of the things I wanted
to mention. The matter was "freedom of the will". And the idea is that
I don't believe in the idea that we are absolutely free to do whatever
we want. Our decisions are part of a causal chain. There are actions
that are not directly triggered by the current environment, but that
still are parts of this causal chain.
The last part abou quantum processes and chaos theory refers to a
habit of philosphers to include chaos theory and/or quantum processes
into theories of free will to escape determinism.



GS: Basically, we are in agreement here. I would say, however, that the
first step in understanding the physiology of behavior is to study
behavioral function with temporal gaps - i.e., a person's past explains
their behavior (in conjunction with a host of current variables), and the
relation between a person's past and their behavior can be directly
investigated. These are the facts that must be explained. Such facts are
largely the domain of the experimental analysis of behavior.

RM: Thx for reading my text.



GS: You're welcome. BTW, do you know the German word that translates to "the
soul of the nervous system?" It starts with "R" - something like
"reuchmarchsteele?"





"Robert M?rtin" <robertmaertin@gmx.de> wrote in message
news:85d56b27.0405160223.1885d517@posting.google.com...
> @ "Glen M. Sizemore"

@GS
GS: Well..I don't know what you have in mind by "limitations." These
technologies are ok, but what is really troublesome is that
discovering
which areas are transiently more active when people or animals do
certain
things (and defining what they ARE doing is an issue) doesn't get you
anywhere, really, at least not in isolation. The problem is that we
don't
have a good idea how physiology mediates behavioral function. If you
collected fMRI data from now 'til doomsday, you still wouldn't know.

Okay. The problem about functional imaging techniques like fMRI or PET
is that they measure metabolic activity indirectly and with a huge
delay. They have a nice spatial and a poor temporal resolution. As you
cannot do electrophysiology in humans, you have to rely on these
coarse mesurements. If you are trying to correlate higher cognitive
functions like speech processing with these data, then you are
throwing around with big words and make big assumptions without solid
ground. Those studies are generally regarded to be suspicious.
We don't know how physiology mediates behaviour... If you had read
what we're researching on... well what everybody is working on : this
is it.



GS: Now this is really interesting stuff. Do you know of O'Regan and
Noe?
They're behaviorists only they don't know it.
YES. I'm familiar with their works. I'm also familiar with the
successful works of Paul Bach-y-Rita. I like both. Of course tehy are
behaviourists, too. But at least their theories work and Bach-y-Ritas
devices work as well.

GS: Well, I would have to agree. But it isn't "cognitive science;" not
unless you can tell me what "cognitions" are.
GS: And what, exactly, is human cognition?

My God. I am interested in attentional mechanisms, conscious
perception, binding, exploratory motor behaviour, visual processing,
attention for action, response selection, emotions... I think whatever
definition I look up on the internet... this would be quite a good
share of "cognition". And if this does not suffice in your eyes...


GS: Let's see...so far you have talked about behavior, and you have
talked
about physiology..nope...I don't see any cognitions, do you?

GS: Does it have anything to do with
"human behavior?"

Sure thing. You can't regard the brain detached from the body.
External physiological reactions go hand in hand with certain tasks.
E.g. saccades, nystagmus, ANS activity. We act therefore we are. Of
course you have to have a look inside the black box and predict and
explain what you see.



GS: Let me ask you this: Do we see the world, or do we see a copy (of
whatever sort) of the world "in our brain?" Do you talk about storage
and
retrieval at all?

There are retinotopic mappings of various forms to be found in the
brain. However, I think that the world acts as an outside memory. I
think you know the discussions. This is my opinion. No, I don't talk
about storage and retrieval at all. These terms are very biased
towards the good old computational metaphor of mind. But it might also
be due to the fact that I'm not working on memory processes right now.




GS: In my opinion, the cognitive "science" movement is the worst thing
that
ever happened to psychology, philosophy, AI, behavioral neurobiology,
anthropology etc. I think it might have also been responsible for
disco.

Do you remember the part about "not productive". This is heading
nowhere. Sry.



GS: You're welcome. BTW, do you know the German word that translates
to "the
soul of the nervous system?" It starts with "R" - something like
"reuchmarchsteele?"

Sorry. Sounds funny... but I never heard it before and can't think of
a single word describing "the
soul of the nervous system". BTW: reumarch... sounds like a dutch word
:)



. . . . . .. 
To make it short. You want to an explanation and a definition of
cognition. You want it without behavioural experiments. These are
futile because we "don't know how physiology mediates behaviour".
You want cognitions... NOW ! Well... why isn't there anybody looking
for cognitions ?
There are people looking for attentional effects, for conscious
perception, action selection, cortical plasticity, memory processes,
emotions. And then they use electrophysiology, imaging techniques and
behavioural paradigms to find out "how physiology mediates
behaviour"...
And you ask : Where is the cognition in there ?
If terms like, attention, conscious awareness, action selection not
comensurable with your big picture of human cognition... well these
tiny little terms we try to explain are exciting enough for me.
And if contemporary methods in neuroscience contain too much
behaviourism for you... well, so be it.

Here are short replies to the last posting... but I don't think we're
heading for a solution here.
I think we should discontinue this discussion. Please :)
regards 
Robert

In article <85d56b27.0405161400.1eac5c3a@posting.google.com>, Robert 
M?rtin <robertmaertin@gmx.de> writes
>@GS
>GS: Well..I don't know what you have in mind by "limitations." These
>technologies are ok, but what is really troublesome is that
>discovering
>which areas are transiently more active when people or animals do
>certain
>things (and defining what they ARE doing is an issue) doesn't get you
>anywhere, really, at least not in isolation. The problem is that we
>don't
>have a good idea how physiology mediates behavioral function. If you
>collected fMRI data from now 'til doomsday, you still wouldn't know.
>
>Okay. The problem about functional imaging techniques like fMRI or PET
>is that they measure metabolic activity indirectly and with a huge
>delay. They have a nice spatial and a poor temporal resolution. As you
>cannot do electrophysiology in humans, you have to rely on these
>coarse mesurements. If you are trying to correlate higher cognitive
>functions like speech processing with these data, then you are
>throwing around with big words and make big assumptions without solid
>ground. Those studies are generally regarded to be suspicious.
>We don't know how physiology mediates behaviour... If you had read
>what we're researching on... well what everybody is working on : this
>is it.
>
>
>
>GS: Now this is really interesting stuff. Do you know of O'Regan and
>Noe?
>They're behaviorists only they don't know it.
>YES. I'm familiar with their works. I'm also familiar with the
>successful works of Paul Bach-y-Rita. I like both. Of course tehy are
>behaviourists, too. But at least their theories work and Bach-y-Ritas
>devices work as well.
>
>GS: Well, I would have to agree. But it isn't "cognitive science;" not
>unless you can tell me what "cognitions" are.
>GS: And what, exactly, is human cognition?
>
>My God. I am interested in attentional mechanisms, conscious
>perception, binding, exploratory motor behaviour, visual processing,
>attention for action, response selection, emotions... I think whatever
>definition I look up on the internet... this would be quite a good
>share of "cognition". And if this does not suffice in your eyes...
>
>
>GS: Let's see...so far you have talked about behavior, and you have
>talked
>about physiology..nope...I don't see any cognitions, do you?
>
>GS: Does it have anything to do with
>"human behavior?"
>
>Sure thing. You can't regard the brain detached from the body.
>External physiological reactions go hand in hand with certain tasks.
>E.g. saccades, nystagmus, ANS activity. We act therefore we are. Of
>course you have to have a look inside the black box and predict and
>explain what you see.
>
>
>
>GS: Let me ask you this: Do we see the world, or do we see a copy (of
>whatever sort) of the world "in our brain?" Do you talk about storage
>and
>retrieval at all?
>
>There are retinotopic mappings of various forms to be found in the
>brain. However, I think that the world acts as an outside memory. I
>think you know the discussions. This is my opinion. No, I don't talk
>about storage and retrieval at all. These terms are very biased
>towards the good old computational metaphor of mind. But it might also
>be due to the fact that I'm not working on memory processes right now.
>
>
>
>
>GS: In my opinion, the cognitive "science" movement is the worst thing
>that
>ever happened to psychology, philosophy, AI, behavioral neurobiology,
>anthropology etc. I think it might have also been responsible for
>disco.
>
>Do you remember the part about "not productive". This is heading
>nowhere. Sry.
>
>
>
>GS: You're welcome. BTW, do you know the German word that translates
>to "the
>soul of the nervous system?" It starts with "R" - something like
>"reuchmarchsteele?"
>
>Sorry. Sounds funny... but I never heard it before and can't think of
>a single word describing "the
>soul of the nervous system". BTW: reumarch... sounds like a dutch word
>:)
>
>
>
>. . . . . ..
>To make it short. You want to an explanation and a definition of
>cognition. You want it without behavioural experiments. These are
>futile because we "don't know how physiology mediates behaviour".
>You want cognitions... NOW ! Well... why isn't there anybody looking
>for cognitions ?
>There are people looking for attentional effects, for conscious
>perception, action selection, cortical plasticity, memory processes,
>emotions. And then they use electrophysiology, imaging techniques and
>behavioural paradigms to find out "how physiology mediates
>behaviour"...
>And you ask : Where is the cognition in there ?
>If terms like, attention, conscious awareness, action selection not
>comensurable with your big picture of human cognition... well these
>tiny little terms we try to explain are exciting enough for me.
>And if contemporary methods in neuroscience contain too much
>behaviourism for you... well, so be it.
>
>Here are short replies to the last posting... but I don't think we're
>heading for a solution here.
>I think we should discontinue this discussion. Please :)
>regards
>Robert

Is this a language problem here Robert ;-)? Reading this exchange I kept 
asking myself what was going on. You began (a few posts back) by 
asserting that you were a hard nosed eliminative materialist. I saw Glen 
(who, as a radical behaviorist, is at least a "kissing cousin" in this 
respect) probing just how deep that eliminativism actually went. There 
are far too many fakes around in "cognitive neuroscience" who 
appropriate anything that looks socially desirable and just end up 
espousing a hideous pseudo-intellectual eclecticism which amounts, in my 
view,  to something far worse (logically incoherent and empirically 
unfalsifiable) than honest (but misguided) mentalism. At times (in just 
some of your responses), you seem to come close to doing just this, and 
your pleas for Glen to stop probing make it look like you just don't 
want to have your weakness exposed <g>.


-- 
David Longley

@GS
GS (previous): Well..I don't know what you have in mind by "limitations."
These
technologies are ok, but what is really troublesome is that
discovering
which areas are transiently more active when people or animals do
certain
things (and defining what they ARE doing is an issue) doesn't get you
anywhere, really, at least not in isolation. The problem is that we
don't
have a good idea how physiology mediates behavioral function. If you
collected fMRI data from now 'til doomsday, you still wouldn't know.

RM: Okay. The problem about functional imaging techniques like fMRI or PET
is that they measure metabolic activity indirectly and with a huge
delay. They have a nice spatial and a poor temporal resolution. As you
cannot do electrophysiology in humans, you have to rely on these
coarse mesurements. If you are trying to correlate higher cognitive
functions like speech processing with these data, then you are
throwing around with big words and make big assumptions without solid
ground. Those studies are generally regarded to be suspicious.
We don't know how physiology mediates behaviour... If you had read
what we're researching on... well what everybody is working on : this
is it.



GS: I follow, as well as contribute to, behavioral neuroscience (and much of
what I have published may be criticized in some of the same ways I criticize
the work of others - but at least there is little or no mentalism in what I
have published).



GS (previous): Now this is really interesting stuff. Do you know of O'Regan
and
Noe?
They're behaviorists only they don't know it.





RM: YES. I'm familiar with their works. I'm also familiar with the
successful works of Paul Bach-y-Rita. I like both. Of course tehy are
behaviourists, too. But at least their theories work and Bach-y-Ritas
devices work as well.



GS: Sorry...I don't know what you are saying here. Are you laboring under
the notion that I am against behaviorism? I am not - quite the opposite.

GS(previous): Well, I would have to agree. But it isn't "cognitive science;"
not
unless you can tell me what "cognitions" are.
GS(previous): And what, exactly, is human cognition?

RM: My God. I am interested in attentional mechanisms, conscious
perception, binding, exploratory motor behaviour, visual processing,
attention for action, response selection, emotions... I think whatever
definition I look up on the internet... this would be quite a good
share of "cognition". And if this does not suffice in your eyes...

GS: What is "attention?" What is "conscious?" What is "processed" and to
what end? Who (or what) "selects" responses? What are emotions, exactly?
See? You're not really out of the clutches of animism.





GS(previous): Let's see...so far you have talked about behavior, and you
have
talked
about physiology..nope...I don't see any cognitions, do you?

GS(previous): Does it have anything to do with
"human behavior?"

RM: Sure thing. You can't regard the brain detached from the body.
External physiological reactions go hand in hand with certain tasks.
E.g. saccades, nystagmus, ANS activity. We act therefore we are. Of
course you have to have a look inside the black box and predict and
explain what you see.



GS: Needless to say, my point is that what you are doing - if you are doing
anything useful at all - is investigating the physiology that mediates
behavioral function. But in order to do this, one must not be waylaid by
notions like "attention" or the misguided implications of the red herring of
"binding." In order to investigate the physiology that mediates behavioral
function, you first have to know how behavior functions. You first have to
know what "attention" really "is," and why "binding" is a red herring.

GS(previous): Let me ask you this: Do we see the world, or do we see a copy
(of
whatever sort) of the world "in our brain?" Do you talk about storage
and
retrieval at all?

RM: There are retinotopic mappings of various forms to be found in the
brain. However, I think that the world acts as an outside memory. I
think you know the discussions. This is my opinion. No, I don't talk
about storage and retrieval at all. These terms are very biased
towards the good old computational metaphor of mind. But it might also
be due to the fact that I'm not working on memory processes right now.



GS: Good answer for the most part. But inconsistent with some of what you
have said above and prviously. What's that? You don't see how? I know.



GS(previous): In my opinion, the cognitive "science" movement is the worst
thing
that
ever happened to psychology, philosophy, AI, behavioral neurobiology,
anthropology etc. I think it might have also been responsible for
disco.

RM: Do you remember the part about "not productive". This is heading
nowhere. Sry.



GS: At least it is heading no place that you want it to go.

GS(previous): You're welcome. BTW, do you know the German word that
translates
to "the
soul of the nervous system?" It starts with "R" - something like
"reuchmarchsteele?"

RM: Sorry. Sounds funny... but I never heard it before and can't think of
a single word describing "the
soul of the nervous system". BTW: reumarch... sounds like a dutch word
:)



GS: Hmmm..fortunately, the notion was short-lived and no one seriously
maintains that the "soul" has anything useful to say about biology. Now the
"mind" and "cognitions" - that's a whole other
story........phht.smggcckk..he....hehe..HAHAHAHAHA.

RM: . . . . . ..
To make it short. You want to an explanation and a definition of
cognition. You want it without behavioural experiments.



GS: Huh!?!?



RM: These are
futile because we "don't know how physiology mediates behaviour".
You want cognitions... NOW ! Well... why isn't there anybody looking
for cognitions ?
There are people looking for attentional effects, for conscious
perception, action selection, cortical plasticity, memory processes,
emotions. And then they use electrophysiology, imaging techniques and
behavioural paradigms to find out "how physiology mediates
behaviour"...
And you ask : Where is the cognition in there ?
If terms like, attention, conscious awareness, action selection not
comensurable with your big picture of human cognition... well these
tiny little terms we try to explain are exciting enough for me.
And if contemporary methods in neuroscience contain too much
behaviourism for you... well, so be it.



GS: !?!?!?!?!?? It should be clear that "modern neuroscience" contains too
much animism for me.

RM: Here are short replies to the last posting... but I don't think we're
heading for a solution here.
I think we should discontinue this discussion. Please :)
regards



GS: Let's hope you do science better than you read.



"Robert M?rtin" <robertmaertin@gmx.de> wrote in message
news:85d56b27.0405161400.1eac5c3a@posting.google.com...

The best was Dr. D. The upshot of his statements on why he wouldn't discuss
such issues was, apparently, that I had thought about my position.
Behavioral neuroscience has inherited from psychology the notion that it is
a waste of time to analyze the conceptual foundation of cognitive "science."
After all, if you are spending time actually thinking about such conceptual
foundations, then you can't be doing experiments. Everyone just knows that
it doesn't matter what you say in the Introduction and Discussion sections
as long as there is a Method and Results (well that is assuming that too
much of the Method and Results sections are not infiltrated by
interpretation).



"David Longley" <David@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:3u5mU9FLWHqAFwfa@longley.demon.co.uk...
> In article <85d56b27.0405161400.1eac5c3a@posting.google.com>, Robert
> M?rtin <robertmaertin@gmx.de> writes
> >@GS
> >GS: Well..I don't know what you have in mind by "limitations." These
> >technologies are ok, but what is really troublesome is that
> >discovering
> >which areas are transiently more active when people or animals do
> >certain
> >things (and defining what they ARE doing is an issue) doesn't get you
> >anywhere, really, at least not in isolation. The problem is that we
> >don't
> >have a good idea how physiology mediates behavioral function. If you
> >collected fMRI data from now 'til doomsday, you still wouldn't know.
> >
> >Okay. The problem about functional imaging techniques like fMRI or PET
> >is that they measure metabolic activity indirectly and with a huge
> >delay. They have a nice spatial and a poor temporal resolution. As you
> >cannot do electrophysiology in humans, you have to rely on these
> >coarse mesurements. If you are trying to correlate higher cognitive
> >functions like speech processing with these data, then you are
> >throwing around with big words and make big assumptions without solid
> >ground. Those studies are generally regarded to be suspicious.
> >We don't know how physiology mediates behaviour... If you had read
> >what we're researching on... well what everybody is working on : this
> >is it.
> >
> >
> >
> >GS: Now this is really interesting stuff. Do you know of O'Regan and
> >Noe?
> >They're behaviorists only they don't know it.
> >YES. I'm familiar with their works. I'm also familiar with the
> >successful works of Paul Bach-y-Rita. I like both. Of course tehy are
> >behaviourists, too. But at least their theories work and Bach-y-Ritas
> >devices work as well.
> >
> >GS: Well, I would have to agree. But it isn't "cognitive science;" not
> >unless you can tell me what "cognitions" are.
> >GS: And what, exactly, is human cognition?
> >
> >My God. I am interested in attentional mechanisms, conscious
> >perception, binding, exploratory motor behaviour, visual processing,
> >attention for action, response selection, emotions... I think whatever
> >definition I look up on the internet... this would be quite a good
> >share of "cognition". And if this does not suffice in your eyes...
> >
> >
> >GS: Let's see...so far you have talked about behavior, and you have
> >talked
> >about physiology..nope...I don't see any cognitions, do you?
> >
> >GS: Does it have anything to do with
> >"human behavior?"
> >
> >Sure thing. You can't regard the brain detached from the body.
> >External physiological reactions go hand in hand with certain tasks.
> >E.g. saccades, nystagmus, ANS activity. We act therefore we are. Of
> >course you have to have a look inside the black box and predict and
> >explain what you see.
> >
> >
> >
> >GS: Let me ask you this: Do we see the world, or do we see a copy (of
> >whatever sort) of the world "in our brain?" Do you talk about storage
> >and
> >retrieval at all?
> >
> >There are retinotopic mappings of various forms to be found in the
> >brain. However, I think that the world acts as an outside memory. I
> >think you know the discussions. This is my opinion. No, I don't talk
> >about storage and retrieval at all. These terms are very biased
> >towards the good old computational metaphor of mind. But it might also
> >be due to the fact that I'm not working on memory processes right now.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >GS: In my opinion, the cognitive "science" movement is the worst thing
> >that
> >ever happened to psychology, philosophy, AI, behavioral neurobiology,
> >anthropology etc. I think it might have also been responsible for
> >disco.
> >
> >Do you remember the part about "not productive". This is heading
> >nowhere. Sry.
> >
> >
> >
> >GS: You're welcome. BTW, do you know the German word that translates
> >to "the
> >soul of the nervous system?" It starts with "R" - something like
> >"reuchmarchsteele?"
> >
> >Sorry. Sounds funny... but I never heard it before and can't think of
> >a single word describing "the
> >soul of the nervous system". BTW: reumarch... sounds like a dutch word
> >:)
> >
> >
> >
> >. . . . . ..
> >To make it short. You want to an explanation and a definition of
> >cognition. You want it without behavioural experiments. These are
> >futile because we "don't know how physiology mediates behaviour".
> >You want cognitions... NOW ! Well... why isn't there anybody looking
> >for cognitions ?
> >There are people looking for attentional effects, for conscious
> >perception, action selection, cortical plasticity, memory processes,
> >emotions. And then they use electrophysiology, imaging techniques and
> >behavioural paradigms to find out "how physiology mediates
> >behaviour"...
> >And you ask : Where is the cognition in there ?
> >If terms like, attention, conscious awareness, action selection not
> >comensurable with your big picture of human cognition... well these
> >tiny little terms we try to explain are exciting enough for me.
> >And if contemporary methods in neuroscience contain too much
> >behaviourism for you... well, so be it.
> >
> >Here are short replies to the last posting... but I don't think we're
> >heading for a solution here.
> >I think we should discontinue this discussion. Please :)
> >regards
> >Robert
>
> Is this a language problem here Robert ;-)? Reading this exchange I kept
> asking myself what was going on. You began (a few posts back) by
> asserting that you were a hard nosed eliminative materialist. I saw Glen
> (who, as a radical behaviorist, is at least a "kissing cousin" in this
> respect) probing just how deep that eliminativism actually went. There
> are far too many fakes around in "cognitive neuroscience" who
> appropriate anything that looks socially desirable and just end up
> espousing a hideous pseudo-intellectual eclecticism which amounts, in my
> view,  to something far worse (logically incoherent and empirically
> unfalsifiable) than honest (but misguided) mentalism. At times (in just
> some of your responses), you seem to come close to doing just this, and
> your pleas for Glen to stop probing make it look like you just don't
> want to have your weakness exposed <g>.
>
>
> --
> David Longley

Yep, but then he studied one of that trio I mentioned elsewhere 
(Pribram).

Sadly, whilst I agree that those working in specific specialist fields 
will do as you say, there seem to be large numbers of people in 
"cognitive neuroscience" who just don't have the ability to do that or 
just don't care. This, no doubt is a function at least in part of 
multi-disciplinary mayhem where many just don't have the skills to 
critically evaluate what is actually in the methods and results sections 
of scientific papers. Yet they appear to have been educated to believe 
that they can! They read what they do just as they read popular science 
it seems to me. They think they can send students off to trawl the 
"literature's" abstracts, introductions and discussions. for ideas (I'm 
pretty sure that people like Dennett etc do just that). I think this is 
a more serious problem than many might appreciate, and it hasn't been 
helped by the expansion of science, universities and the democratization 
of the Internet in recent times.

But then...... maybe I'm just getting old. The message from many seems 
to be that they just want to have fun, "old farts" like us are just 
trying to spoil their parties! <g>.

(oddly, some of them are much older than us and should know better 
perhaps!)

In article <d44d3753e5f892015b97c43386d67041@news.teranews.com>, Glen M. 
Sizemore <gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> writes
>The best was Dr. D. The upshot of his statements on why he wouldn't discuss
>such issues was, apparently, that I had thought about my position.
>Behavioral neuroscience has inherited from psychology the notion that it is
>a waste of time to analyze the conceptual foundation of cognitive "science."
>After all, if you are spending time actually thinking about such conceptual
>foundations, then you can't be doing experiments. Everyone just knows that
>it doesn't matter what you say in the Introduction and Discussion sections
>as long as there is a Method and Results (well that is assuming that too
>much of the Method and Results sections are not infiltrated by
>interpretation).
>
>
>
>"David Longley" <David@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>news:3u5mU9FLWHqAFwfa@longley.demon.co.uk...
>> In article <85d56b27.0405161400.1eac5c3a@posting.google.com>, Robert
>> M?rtin <robertmaertin@gmx.de> writes
>> >@GS
>> >GS: Well..I don't know what you have in mind by "limitations." These
>> >technologies are ok, but what is really troublesome is that
>> >discovering
>> >which areas are transiently more active when people or animals do
>> >certain
>> >things (and defining what they ARE doing is an issue) doesn't get you
>> >anywhere, really, at least not in isolation. The problem is that we
>> >don't
>> >have a good idea how physiology mediates behavioral function. If you
>> >collected fMRI data from now 'til doomsday, you still wouldn't know.
>> >
>> >Okay. The problem about functional imaging techniques like fMRI or PET
>> >is that they measure metabolic activity indirectly and with a huge
>> >delay. They have a nice spatial and a poor temporal resolution. As you
>> >cannot do electrophysiology in humans, you have to rely on these
>> >coarse mesurements. If you are trying to correlate higher cognitive
>> >functions like speech processing with these data, then you are
>> >throwing around with big words and make big assumptions without solid
>> >ground. Those studies are generally regarded to be suspicious.
>> >We don't know how physiology mediates behaviour... If you had read
>> >what we're researching on... well what everybody is working on : this
>> >is it.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >GS: Now this is really interesting stuff. Do you know of O'Regan and
>> >Noe?
>> >They're behaviorists only they don't know it.
>> >YES. I'm familiar with their works. I'm also familiar with the
>> >successful works of Paul Bach-y-Rita. I like both. Of course tehy are
>> >behaviourists, too. But at least their theories work and Bach-y-Ritas
>> >devices work as well.
>> >
>> >GS: Well, I would have to agree. But it isn't "cognitive science;" not
>> >unless you can tell me what "cognitions" are.
>> >GS: And what, exactly, is human cognition?
>> >
>> >My God. I am interested in attentional mechanisms, conscious
>> >perception, binding, exploratory motor behaviour, visual processing,
>> >attention for action, response selection, emotions... I think whatever
>> >definition I look up on the internet... this would be quite a good
>> >share of "cognition". And if this does not suffice in your eyes...
>> >
>> >
>> >GS: Let's see...so far you have talked about behavior, and you have
>> >talked
>> >about physiology..nope...I don't see any cognitions, do you?
>> >
>> >GS: Does it have anything to do with
>> >"human behavior?"
>> >
>> >Sure thing. You can't regard the brain detached from the body.
>> >External physiological reactions go hand in hand with certain tasks.
>> >E.g. saccades, nystagmus, ANS activity. We act therefore we are. Of
>> >course you have to have a look inside the black box and predict and
>> >explain what you see.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >GS: Let me ask you this: Do we see the world, or do we see a copy (of
>> >whatever sort) of the world "in our brain?" Do you talk about storage
>> >and
>> >retrieval at all?
>> >
>> >There are retinotopic mappings of various forms to be found in the
>> >brain. However, I think that the world acts as an outside memory. I
>> >think you know the discussions. This is my opinion. No, I don't talk
>> >about storage and retrieval at all. These terms are very biased
>> >towards the good old computational metaphor of mind. But it might also
>> >be due to the fact that I'm not working on memory processes right now.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >GS: In my opinion, the cognitive "science" movement is the worst thing
>> >that
>> >ever happened to psychology, philosophy, AI, behavioral neurobiology,
>> >anthropology etc. I think it might have also been responsible for
>> >disco.
>> >
>> >Do you remember the part about "not productive". This is heading
>> >nowhere. Sry.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >GS: You're welcome. BTW, do you know the German word that translates
>> >to "the
>> >soul of the nervous system?" It starts with "R" - something like
>> >"reuchmarchsteele?"
>> >
>> >Sorry. Sounds funny... but I never heard it before and can't think of
>> >a single word describing "the
>> >soul of the nervous system". BTW: reumarch... sounds like a dutch word
>> >:)
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >. . . . . ..
>> >To make it short. You want to an explanation and a definition of
>> >cognition. You want it without behavioural experiments. These are
>> >futile because we "don't know how physiology mediates behaviour".
>> >You want cognitions... NOW ! Well... why isn't there anybody looking
>> >for cognitions ?
>> >There are people looking for attentional effects, for conscious
>> >perception, action selection, cortical plasticity, memory processes,
>> >emotions. And then they use electrophysiology, imaging techniques and
>> >behavioural paradigms to find out "how physiology mediates
>> >behaviour"...
>> >And you ask : Where is the cognition in there ?
>> >If terms like, attention, conscious awareness, action selection not
>> >comensurable with your big picture of human cognition... well these
>> >tiny little terms we try to explain are exciting enough for me.
>> >And if contemporary methods in neuroscience contain too much
>> >behaviourism for you... well, so be it.
>> >
>> >Here are short replies to the last posting... but I don't think we're
>> >heading for a solution here.
>> >I think we should discontinue this discussion. Please :)
>> >regards
>> >Robert
>>
>> Is this a language problem here Robert ;-)? Reading this exchange I kept
>> asking myself what was going on. You began (a few posts back) by
>> asserting that you were a hard nosed eliminative materialist. I saw Glen
>> (who, as a radical behaviorist, is at least a "kissing cousin" in this
>> respect) probing just how deep that eliminativism actually went. There
>> are far too many fakes around in "cognitive neuroscience" who
>> appropriate anything that looks socially desirable and just end up
>> espousing a hideous pseudo-intellectual eclecticism which amounts, in my
>> view,  to something far worse (logically incoherent and empirically
>> unfalsifiable) than honest (but misguided) mentalism. At times (in just
>> some of your responses), you seem to come close to doing just this, and
>> your pleas for Glen to stop probing make it look like you just don't
>> want to have your weakness exposed <g>.
>>
>>
>> --
>> David Longley
>
>

-- 
David Longley

In article <85d56b27.0405161400.1eac5c3a@posting.google.com>, Robert 
M?rtin <robertmaertin@gmx.de> writes

>>@GS
>>GS: Well..I don't know what you have in mind by "limitations." These
>>technologies are ok, but what is really troublesome is that
>>discovering
>>which areas are transiently more active when people or animals do
>>certain
>>things (and defining what they ARE doing is an issue) doesn't get
you
>>anywhere, really, at least not in isolation. The problem is that we
>>don't
>>have a good idea how physiology mediates behavioral function. If you
>>collected fMRI data from now 'til doomsday, you still wouldn't know.
>>
>>Okay. The problem about functional imaging techniques like fMRI or
PET
>>is that they measure metabolic activity indirectly and with a huge
>>delay. They have a nice spatial and a poor temporal resolution. As
you
>>cannot do electrophysiology in humans, you have to rely on these
>>coarse mesurements. If you are trying to correlate higher cognitive
>>functions like speech processing with these data, then you are
>>throwing around with big words and make big assumptions without
solid
>>ground. Those studies are generally regarded to be suspicious.
>>We don't know how physiology mediates behaviour... If you had read
>>what we're researching on... well what everybody is working on :
this
>>is it.
>>
>>
>>
>>GS: Now this is really interesting stuff. Do you know of O'Regan and
>>Noe?
>>They're behaviorists only they don't know it.
>>YES. I'm familiar with their works. I'm also familiar with the
>>successful works of Paul Bach-y-Rita. I like both. Of course tehy
are
>>behaviourists, too. But at least their theories work and
Bach-y-Ritas
>>devices work as well.
>>
>>GS: Well, I would have to agree. But it isn't "cognitive science;"
not
>>unless you can tell me what "cognitions" are.
>>GS: And what, exactly, is human cognition?
>>
>>My God. I am interested in attentional mechanisms, conscious
>>perception, binding, exploratory motor behaviour, visual processing,
>>attention for action, response selection, emotions... I think
whatever
>>definition I look up on the internet... this would be quite a good
>>share of "cognition". And if this does not suffice in your eyes...
>>
>>
>>GS: Let's see...so far you have talked about behavior, and you have
>>talked
>>about physiology..nope...I don't see any cognitions, do you?
>>
>>GS: Does it have anything to do with
>>"human behavior?"
>>
>>Sure thing. You can't regard the brain detached from the body.
>>External physiological reactions go hand in hand with certain tasks.
>>E.g. saccades, nystagmus, ANS activity. We act therefore we are. Of
>>course you have to have a look inside the black box and predict and
>>explain what you see.
>>
>>
>>
>>GS: Let me ask you this: Do we see the world, or do we see a copy
(of
>>whatever sort) of the world "in our brain?" Do you talk about
storage
>>and
>>retrieval at all?
>>
>>There are retinotopic mappings of various forms to be found in the
>>brain. However, I think that the world acts as an outside memory. I
>>think you know the discussions. This is my opinion. No, I don't talk
>>about storage and retrieval at all. These terms are very biased
>>towards the good old computational metaphor of mind. But it might
also
>>be due to the fact that I'm not working on memory processes right
now.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>GS: In my opinion, the cognitive "science" movement is the worst
thing
>>that
>>ever happened to psychology, philosophy, AI, behavioral
neurobiology,
>>anthropology etc. I think it might have also been responsible for
>>disco.
>>
>>Do you remember the part about "not productive". This is heading
>>nowhere. Sry.
>>
>>
>>
>>GS: You're welcome. BTW, do you know the German word that translates
>>to "the
>>soul of the nervous system?" It starts with "R" - something like
>>"reuchmarchsteele?"
>>
>>Sorry. Sounds funny... but I never heard it before and can't think
of
>>a single word describing "the
>>soul of the nervous system". BTW: reumarch... sounds like a dutch
word
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>. . . . . ..
>>To make it short. You want to an explanation and a definition of
>>cognition. You want it without behavioural experiments. These are
>>futile because we "don't know how physiology mediates behaviour".
>>You want cognitions... NOW ! Well... why isn't there anybody looking
>>for cognitions ?
>>There are people looking for attentional effects, for conscious
>>perception, action selection, cortical plasticity, memory processes,
>>emotions. And then they use electrophysiology, imaging techniques
and
>>behavioural paradigms to find out "how physiology mediates
>>behaviour"...
>>And you ask : Where is the cognition in there ?
>>If terms like, attention, conscious awareness, action selection not
>>comensurable with your big picture of human cognition... well these
>>tiny little terms we try to explain are exciting enough for me.
>>And if contemporary methods in neuroscience contain too much
>>behaviourism for you... well, so be it.
>>
>>Here are short replies to the last posting... but I don't think
we're
>>heading for a solution here.
>>I think we should discontinue this discussion. Please 
>>regards
>>Robert


Is this a language problem here Robert ? Reading this exchange I kept 
asking myself what was going on. You began (a few posts back) by 
asserting that you were a hard nosed eliminative materialist. I saw
Glen
(who, as a radical behaviorist, is at least a "kissing cousin" in this
respect) probing just how deep that eliminativism actually went. There
are far too many fakes around in "cognitive neuroscience" who 
appropriate anything that looks socially desirable and just end up 
espousing a hideous pseudo-intellectual eclecticism which amounts, in
my
view,  to something far worse (logically incoherent and empirically 
unfalsifiable) than honest (but misguided) mentalism. At times (in
just
some of your responses), you seem to come close to doing just this,
and
your pleas for Glen to stop probing make it look like you just don't 
want to have your weakness exposed <g>.


I'm sorry. So Glen does not mean the term "behaviourist" to be an
insult ?
I thought he was intimidating O'Regan and A Noe... which I admire.
And that makes many of his questions clearer to me. 
Yes... might have been a language problem...
So : Glen critizises that I claim to do cognitive science and be able
to explain "cognition"
 even though I do only behavioural experiments combined with
neuroscience.
You think it's an utopian idea to look for such an ill-defined and
powerful thing like "cognition" ?

I thought by asking "where is cognition" you wanted to show how futile
it is to make neuropsychological experiments not aiming at the
explanation of the big picture of "higher cognitive functions".
I thought you were being sarcastic when you called O'Regan and Noe
behaviourists and when you alluded to behavioural components of
experiments.

Okay. If this is the case, I do agree. Then this has been a
misunderstanding from my side.
Very Sorry about this.

Did I get it right this time ?

In article <85d56b27.0405171036.199dd941@posting.google.com>, Robert 
M?rtin <robertmaertin@gmx.de> writes
>In article <85d56b27.0405161400.1eac5c3a@posting.google.com>, Robert
>M?rtin <robertmaertin@gmx.de> writes
>
>>>@GS
>>>GS: Well..I don't know what you have in mind by "limitations." These
>>>technologies are ok, but what is really troublesome is that
>>>discovering
>>>which areas are transiently more active when people or animals do
>>>certain
>>>things (and defining what they ARE doing is an issue) doesn't get
>you
>>>anywhere, really, at least not in isolation. The problem is that we
>>>don't
>>>have a good idea how physiology mediates behavioral function. If you
>>>collected fMRI data from now 'til doomsday, you still wouldn't know.
>>>
>>>Okay. The problem about functional imaging techniques like fMRI or
>PET
>>>is that they measure metabolic activity indirectly and with a huge
>>>delay. They have a nice spatial and a poor temporal resolution. As
>you
>>>cannot do electrophysiology in humans, you have to rely on these
>>>coarse mesurements. If you are trying to correlate higher cognitive
>>>functions like speech processing with these data, then you are
>>>throwing around with big words and make big assumptions without
>solid
>>>ground. Those studies are generally regarded to be suspicious.
>>>We don't know how physiology mediates behaviour... If you had read
>>>what we're researching on... well what everybody is working on :
>this
>>>is it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>GS: Now this is really interesting stuff. Do you know of O'Regan and
>>>Noe?
>>>They're behaviorists only they don't know it.
>>>YES. I'm familiar with their works. I'm also familiar with the
>>>successful works of Paul Bach-y-Rita. I like both. Of course tehy
>are
>>>behaviourists, too. But at least their theories work and
>Bach-y-Ritas
>>>devices work as well.
>>>
>>>GS: Well, I would have to agree. But it isn't "cognitive science;"
>not
>>>unless you can tell me what "cognitions" are.
>>>GS: And what, exactly, is human cognition?
>>>
>>>My God. I am interested in attentional mechanisms, conscious
>>>perception, binding, exploratory motor behaviour, visual processing,
>>>attention for action, response selection, emotions... I think
>whatever
>>>definition I look up on the internet... this would be quite a good
>>>share of "cognition". And if this does not suffice in your eyes...
>>>
>>>
>>>GS: Let's see...so far you have talked about behavior, and you have
>>>talked
>>>about physiology..nope...I don't see any cognitions, do you?
>>>
>>>GS: Does it have anything to do with
>>>"human behavior?"
>>>
>>>Sure thing. You can't regard the brain detached from the body.
>>>External physiological reactions go hand in hand with certain tasks.
>>>E.g. saccades, nystagmus, ANS activity. We act therefore we are. Of
>>>course you have to have a look inside the black box and predict and
>>>explain what you see.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>GS: Let me ask you this: Do we see the world, or do we see a copy
>(of
>>>whatever sort) of the world "in our brain?" Do you talk about
>storage
>>>and
>>>retrieval at all?
>>>
>>>There are retinotopic mappings of various forms to be found in the
>>>brain. However, I think that the world acts as an outside memory. I
>>>think you know the discussions. This is my opinion. No, I don't talk
>>>about storage and retrieval at all. These terms are very biased
>>>towards the good old computational metaphor of mind. But it might
>also
>>>be due to the fact that I'm not working on memory processes right
>now.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>GS: In my opinion, the cognitive "science" movement is the worst
>thing
>>>that
>>>ever happened to psychology, philosophy, AI, behavioral
>neurobiology,
>>>anthropology etc. I think it might have also been responsible for
>>>disco.
>>>
>>>Do you remember the part about "not productive". This is heading
>>>nowhere. Sry.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>GS: You're welcome. BTW, do you know the German word that translates
>>>to "the
>>>soul of the nervous system?" It starts with "R" - something like
>>>"reuchmarchsteele?"
>>>
>>>Sorry. Sounds funny... but I never heard it before and can't think
>of
>>>a single word describing "the
>>>soul of the nervous system". BTW: reumarch... sounds like a dutch
>word
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>. . . . . ..
>>>To make it short. You want to an explanation and a definition of
>>>cognition. You want it without behavioural experiments. These are
>>>futile because we "don't know how physiology mediates behaviour".
>>>You want cognitions... NOW ! Well... why isn't there anybody looking
>>>for cognitions ?
>>>There are people looking for attentional effects, for conscious
>>>perception, action selection, cortical plasticity, memory processes,
>>>emotions. And then they use electrophysiology, imaging techniques
>and
>>>behavioural paradigms to find out "how physiology mediates
>>>behaviour"...
>>>And you ask : Where is the cognition in there ?
>>>If terms like, attention, conscious awareness, action selection not
>>>comensurable with your big picture of human cognition... well these
>>>tiny little terms we try to explain are exciting enough for me.
>>>And if contemporary methods in neuroscience contain too much
>>>behaviourism for you... well, so be it.
>>>
>>>Here are short replies to the last posting... but I don't think
>we're
>>>heading for a solution here.
>>>I think we should discontinue this discussion. Please
>>>regards
>>>Robert
>

<Longley Writes:>
>
>Is this a language problem here Robert ? Reading this exchange I kept
>asking myself what was going on. You began (a few posts back) by
>asserting that you were a hard nosed eliminative materialist. I saw
>Glen
>(who, as a radical behaviorist, is at least a "kissing cousin" in this
>respect) probing just how deep that eliminativism actually went. There
>are far too many fakes around in "cognitive neuroscience" who
>appropriate anything that looks socially desirable and just end up
>espousing a hideous pseudo-intellectual eclecticism which amounts, in
>my
>view,  to something far worse (logically incoherent and empirically
>unfalsifiable) than honest (but misguided) mentalism. At times (in
>just
>some of your responses), you seem to come close to doing just this,
>and
>your pleas for Glen to stop probing make it look like you just don't
>want to have your weakness exposed <g>.
>


<Martin Writes:>
>
>I'm sorry. So Glen does not mean the term "behaviourist" to be an
>insult ?
>I thought he was intimidating O'Regan and A Noe... which I admire.
>And that makes many of his questions clearer to me.
>Yes... might have been a language problem...
>So : Glen critizises that I claim to do cognitive science and be able
>to explain "cognition"
> even though I do only behavioural experiments combined with
>neuroscience.
>You think it's an utopian idea to look for such an ill-defined and
>powerful thing like "cognition" ?
>
>I thought by asking "where is cognition" you wanted to show how futile
>it is to make neuropsychological experiments not aiming at the
>explanation of the big picture of "higher cognitive functions".
>I thought you were being sarcastic when you called O'Regan and Noe
>behaviourists and when you alluded to behavioural components of
>experiments.
>
>Okay. If this is the case, I do agree. Then this has been a
>misunderstanding from my side.
>Very Sorry about this.
>
>Did I get it right this time ?


It's all got a bit confusing that's for sure <g>

Glen certainly wouldn't use the word "behaviorist" as an insult. He is a 
Skinnerian Radical Behaviorist.

He did say that he thought O'Regan & Noe's BBS paper was a good one. The 
point was that O'Regan did not seem to fully appreciate the extent to 
which he was saying things which were basically Skinnerian (so I 
e-mailed O'Regan him and told him).

This sort of problem seems to be endemic in contemporary "Cognitive 
Science", and this is a rather important point to try to get clear. It 
is *not* a trivial, partisan, matter. There are many people out there 
who are just misleading others about the nature of Radical Behaviorism 
whilst also making quite absurd claims about what they are doing in the 
name of "cognitivism". This has led to a pernicious rise in the level of 
gibberish in neuroscience and other disciplines over the years. Beware. 
It seems to be getting worse!

This is why both Glen and I have (independently) emphasised the 
importance of conceptual analysis. Glen represents the Skinnerian 
Radical Behaviorist approach of Behavior Analysis. I (endeavour to) 
faithfully represent Quinean Evidential Behaviorism. There may be no 
fundamental difference worth noting, although you can't assume that Glen 
would endorse all that I say. Having said that, I don't think there's 
much if anything that I've seen him post that strays from the solid 
empirical evidence generated by those working in his austere field (i.e. 
you can trust him, and potentially benefit from his criticism, I would 
hope)

-- 
David Longley

Okay... As David already said... there seems to have been a littly
language problem from my side.
I thought you were using the terms Behaviourist and the allusions of
"behaviour" in a sarcastic manner.
So I concluded that you were insulting O Regan and Noe as well as well
as making fun of the techniques employed by us.
I thought you wanted answers to "what is cognition" instead of neuro -
behavioural data. I thought you were one of thos persons asking for
the whole cake at once (e.g. Explain Language and Cognition !!!!).

But instead you were critizising that the terms I use were ill-chosen
(experiments with attention, consciousness) and a bit detached from
reality.
I am sorry.
I know what you mean and I think its not a bad thing and be cautious
and leave out the big terms like consciousness and cognition when
working on neurophysiological machanisms.

To make is sound a little less boastful. Here are some terms I was
talking about de-composed :

1. I talked about experiments on the consciousness. Well. Usually all
one does is in fact work with multistable phenomena of conscious
perception. This is usually done with binocular rivalry experiments.
You may then use fMRI or electrophysiology (animals) combined with
behavioural tasks to check for the percepts (e.g. look for face
activation in ffa vs. soemthing else) to find out how one perception
may dominate the other.
Of course this is not the definition of consciousness, but that is
what I meant when talking about "research on conscious perception".
I will replace this term in the future with "binocular rivalry" or
"multistable phenomena" experiments.

2. When I mentioned attention, of course there is a huge behavioural
paradigm behind it. One may assume certain attentional effects that
have effect on subject performaance (signal enhancement or reduction
of noise). Usually one looks for a behavioural paradigm enabling us to
follow attentional loci and then looks for neural correlates which may
then be manipulated (lesion, TMS, buzzing). Okay... I shall call this
in future looking for neural correlates of attentional mechnaisms.

3. emotions. Well... let's now call it neural correlates of fear
conditioning in rats :)
   If I'm being honest, this is pretty detached form "explainign
emotions".
   Of course there is Damasio and stuff, but that's not active
research.

4. attention for action. This is a nice one, I'll keep it. What I
meant was that you do some delayed conditional tasks
and look neuronal linkages between stimuli features/categories
responsiveness and Go/NoGO/MotorPreparation/MotorExecution
specialization. These may then underly attention for action. Okay...
only an idea, but a compelling one. Then you can lesion !

Okay... perhaps that does not sound like something you may call
"Cognitive" Science. But it sure is interesting.

Concerning O Regan and Noe : I don't know what you meant that they
were behaviouralists... I am used to this term to be used as an insult
(like dualist, creationist have become insults to some).
But I love their theories on sensorimotor contingencies. I think some
of their newer publications are cool as well, but I liked the loose
framework of smc's. I have always been a fan of brain-computer devices
in clinical application (e.g. EEG-BCI at T�bingen). So Bach-y-Rita's
was known to me before I stumbled upon Regan&Noe.
One of our Professors who worked with Wolf Singer on binding by
synchronization introduced me to their ideas. Even though I was into
binding by synchronization during that time, it immediately struck me
that perhaps binding and filling in and all the hard stuff... could be
explained away. Ever since I regarded the idea of ssc's as a loose
basis for my understanding of the nervous system.
Now... what do you mean by "they are behaviourists"?


Again : sorry for the confusion. 
regards 
Robert

I did not preview the last text before posting it. I really is full of
mistakes (orthography). Please read it anyway. I want you to
understand my position. If something is unclear, please ask.
Critizise! I think it's time for me to develop a clear idea of what I
am doing and which field I belong to.

Thx.
regards
Robert

RM: Okay... As David already said... there seems to have been a littly
language problem from my side.
I thought you were using the terms Behaviourist and the allusions of
"behaviour" in a sarcastic manner.
So I concluded that you were insulting O Regan and Noe as well as well
as making fun of the techniques employed by us.
I thought you wanted answers to "what is cognition" instead of neuro -
behavioural data. I thought you were one of thos persons asking for
the whole cake at once (e.g. Explain Language and Cognition !!!!).

But instead you were critizising that the terms I use were ill-chosen
(experiments with attention, consciousness) and a bit detached from
reality.
I am sorry.
I know what you mean and I think its not a bad thing and be cautious
and leave out the big terms like consciousness and cognition when
working on neurophysiological machanisms.

To make is sound a little less boastful. Here are some terms I was
talking about de-composed :

1. I talked about experiments on the consciousness. Well. Usually all
one does is in fact work with multistable phenomena of conscious
perception. This is usually done with binocular rivalry experiments.
You may then use fMRI or electrophysiology (animals) combined with
behavioural tasks to check for the percepts (e.g. look for face
activation in ffa vs. soemthing else) to find out how one perception
may dominate the other.
Of course this is not the definition of consciousness, but that is
what I meant when talking about "research on conscious perception".
I will replace this term in the future with "binocular rivalry" or
"multistable phenomena" experiments.

2. When I mentioned attention, of course there is a huge behavioural
paradigm behind it. One may assume certain attentional effects that
have effect on subject performaance (signal enhancement or reduction
of noise). Usually one looks for a behavioural paradigm enabling us to
follow attentional loci and then looks for neural correlates which may
then be manipulated (lesion, TMS, buzzing). Okay... I shall call this
in future looking for neural correlates of attentional mechnaisms.

3. emotions. Well... let's now call it neural correlates of fear
conditioning in rats :)
   If I'm being honest, this is pretty detached form "explainign
emotions".
   Of course there is Damasio and stuff, but that's not active
research.

4. attention for action. This is a nice one, I'll keep it. What I
meant was that you do some delayed conditional tasks
and look neuronal linkages between stimuli features/categories
responsiveness and Go/NoGO/MotorPreparation/MotorExecution
specialization. These may then underly attention for action. Okay...
only an idea, but a compelling one. Then you can lesion !

Okay... perhaps that does not sound like something you may call
"Cognitive" Science. But it sure is interesting.



GS: Hi Robert,



Just a few comments on the above: all of psychology, and neurosciences that
have as their focus whole-animal behavioral preparations, manipulate the
environment and measure behavior. The ploy of non-behavioristic psychology
since the late 1940's has been to "operationalize" mental terms (like
"attention," "fear," "belief," etc. etc.). That is, one manipulates the
environment and measures behavior, but claims that one is "really"
manipulating something else, i.e., the mental "thing" that is being
"operationalized." Nothing could have been more disastrous, and the price
paid is mainstream psychology, which I do not even regard as a science -
because science is actually a balance between facts, theories and concepts;
and mainstream psychology is utterly devoid of any careful analysis of
concepts (cf Machado et al "Facts, Theories, and Concepts: The Shape of
Psychology's Epistemic Triangle). The hallmark of mainstream psychology (and
most of behavioral neuroscience) is that "any term is OK as long as there is
an operational definition." The problem is that the way mainstream
psychology partitions behavior is misguided. That is, they lump things
together that should be separate, and they classify as different things that
are similar. For example ask yourself, "What is the connection between
"attention" and "stimulus control" and "conditioned reinforcement?" or asked
another way: "What are two ways in which the term "attention" is used and
what known behavioral processes are involved?" Hint: Sometimes "attention"
merely refers to the fact that behavior may be controlled by only certain
features of some stimulus (i.e., shape rather than color etc.) and the
animal is said to "pay attention" to one aspect. On the other hand, the term
is sometimes a reference to subtle aspects of behavior that function to
enhance the behavioral effect of the stimulus. These may ultimately be
related, but one thing is certain - "attention" is all about discriminative
stimuli and conditioned reinforcers. For example, Skinner loved the
"observing procedure*" because he felt that it was essentially an
amplification, so to speak, of what the cognitive people were referring to
as "attention." But "attention" remains some mysterious "executive function"
in modern cognitive "science" but it is behavior, and it is behavior that is
easily examined. Why don't more people know this? What I'm saying is that
behavioral neurobiology should be wedded to the experimental analysis of
behavior but, instead, it has aligned itself with cognitive "science," and
has gone off in search of phlogiston and the vis-anima. People like O'Regan
and Noe are refreshing, but in the same breath that they dismiss the ghosts
of cognitive psychology they trash behaviorism or, at least, what they
perceive to be behaviorism (more on O'Regan and Noe, below).





RM: Concerning O Regan and Noe : I don't know what you meant that they
were behaviouralists... I am used to this term to be used as an insult
(like dualist, creationist have become insults to some).
But I love their theories on sensorimotor contingencies. I think some
of their newer publications are cool as well, but I liked the loose
framework of smc's. I have always been a fan of brain-computer devices
in clinical application (e.g. EEG-BCI at T�bingen). So Bach-y-Rita's
was known to me before I stumbled upon Regan&Noe.
One of our Professors who worked with Wolf Singer on binding by
synchronization introduced me to their ideas. Even though I was into
binding by synchronization during that time, it immediately struck me
that perhaps binding and filling in and all the hard stuff... could be
explained away. Ever since I regarded the idea of ssc's as a loose
basis for my understanding of the nervous system.
Now... what do you mean by "they are behaviourists"?



GS: One of the hallmarks of radical behaviorism is its stance on perceptual
behavior; that is, for behaviorists, seeing, hearing, etc. are all forms of
behavior, not reproduction and representation. This is essentially the
position taken by O'Regan and Noe, even though they sometimes obscure this
by talking about "knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies." But "knowledge"
is always behavior if it is anything and, thus, what O'Regan and Noe talk
about is behavior that has perceptual consequences. Indeed, I suggested to O
'Regan that "sensorimotor contingencies" were reinforcement contingencies,
but I never heard back from him (the email was accompanied by a quote from
Skinner that could have been written by O'Regan and Noe, and I think he
resented that, and resented the fact that I pointed out that he was
essentially a Skinnerian). It is hard to overlook that the essential
explanatory element of O&N, and radical behaviorism is that behavior has
consequences, and that such contingent relations are the basis of behavior,
including seeing, hearing, and so forth. Well, I'll cut it short for now.



BTW, do you study retinal rivalry in nonhumans?



Cordially,

Glen



*In the OP, two schedules of reinforcement alternate (usually some VI
schedule and extinction) in the presence of a single stimulus. However,
there is a second manipulandum, and responding on it changes the stimulus to
one uniquely correlated with whatever schedule is in effect on the other one
(i.e., changes it to one stimulus if the VI schedule is in effect, and
changes it to another if extinction is currently programmed. The observing
response does not directly alter any other aspect of the contingencies.





"Robert M?rtin" <robertmaertin@gmx.de> wrote in message
news:85d56b27.0405180123.3f65609c@posting.google.com...
> Okay... As David already said... there seems to have been a littly

On Sun, 09 May 2004 16:57:11 -0500, Life2Death[SBC] wrote:

>> Suppose I can instantly make an identical copy of an adult person.

Suppose you are right.
Now, suppose you are wrong.

On Tue, 18 May 2004 12:03:32 GMT, "Glen M. Sizemore"
<gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> in sci.cognitive wrote:

>RM: 

[. . .]

>Okay... perhaps that does not sound like something you may call
>"Cognitive" Science. But it sure is interesting.

>GS: Hi Robert,

>Just a few comments on the above: all of psychology, and neurosciences that
>have as their focus whole-animal behavioral preparations, manipulate the
>environment and measure behavior. The ploy of non-behavioristic psychology
>since the late 1940's has been to "operationalize" mental terms (like
>"attention," "fear," "belief," etc. etc.). That is, one manipulates the
>environment and measures behavior, but claims that one is "really"
>manipulating something else, i.e., the mental "thing" that is being
>"operationalized."

Sure, this is a reasonable observation. Except that behaviorism does
exactly the same thing in different terms. Behaviorism operationalizes
everything measured as behavior, just using different referrents. And
neither discipline defines or explains those referrents mechanically
except by reference to other equally ambiguous terms of the same genre
with equally disastrous intellectual and scientific consequences.

>                                Nothing could have been more disastrous, and the price
>paid is mainstream psychology, which I do not even regard as a science -
>because science is actually a balance between facts, theories and concepts;
>and mainstream psychology is utterly devoid of any careful analysis of
>concepts (cf Machado et al "Facts, Theories, and Concepts: The Shape of
>Psychology's Epistemic Triangle). The hallmark of mainstream psychology (and
>most of behavioral neuroscience) is that "any term is OK as long as there is
>an operational definition." The problem is that the way mainstream
>psychology partitions behavior is misguided. That is, they lump things
>together that should be separate, and they classify as different things that
>are similar. 

Why shouldn't any term be OK for experimental purposes as long as
there is an operational definition? The real question is should the
experimental analysis of sentient behavior accept behaviorism's view
of the way behavior should be classified, lumped together, and
partitioned, or should it accept that of cognitive science? Your main
complaint seems to be that it accepts the latter and not the former.
And in the absence of any mechanical relationship for the dependency
between experimental manipulation and behavioral measurement, there is
no way to tell because all terminological references are speculative.

>                   For example ask yourself, "What is the connection between
>"attention" and "stimulus control" and "conditioned reinforcement?" or asked
>another way: "What are two ways in which the term "attention" is used and
>what known behavioral processes are involved?" Hint: Sometimes "attention"
>merely refers to the fact that behavior may be controlled by only certain
>features of some stimulus (i.e., shape rather than color etc.) and the
>animal is said to "pay attention" to one aspect. On the other hand, the term
>is sometimes a reference to subtle aspects of behavior that function to
>enhance the behavioral effect of the stimulus. These may ultimately be
>related, but one thing is certain - "attention" is all about discriminative
>stimuli and conditioned reinforcers. For example, Skinner loved the
>"observing procedure*" because he felt that it was essentially an
>amplification, so to speak, of what the cognitive people were referring to
>as "attention." But "attention" remains some mysterious "executive function"
>in modern cognitive "science" but it is behavior, and it is behavior that is
>easily examined. Why don't more people know this? What I'm saying is that
>behavioral neurobiology should be wedded to the experimental analysis of
>behavior but, instead, it has aligned itself with cognitive "science," and
>has gone off in search of phlogiston and the vis-anima. People like O'Regan
>and Noe are refreshing, but in the same breath that they dismiss the ghosts
>of cognitive psychology they trash behaviorism or, at least, what they
>perceive to be behaviorism (more on O'Regan and Noe, below).

In the end what makes the mentalist operational referrents more
palatable is that cognitive science knows the mechanical definitions
of its terminological referrents are open ended whereas behaviorists
pretend those of behaviorism are not and that behaviorism represents
the one true gospel for those engaged in the experimental analysis of
sentient behavior. That's the whole problem in a nutshell. If you or
other behaviorists want to pretend that behaviorism has all the
answers you're going to have to identify the mechanical nature of the
dependency between the independent variables of environmental
manipulation and dependent variables of behavioral measurements
explicitly. And until that is done people will choose terminological
referrents they feel describe the situation most accurately, claims
and speculative arguments to the contrary notwithstanding.

Regards - Lester

>RM:

[. . .]

>Okay... perhaps that does not sound like something you may call
>"Cognitive" Science. But it sure is interesting.

>GS: Hi Robert,

>Just a few comments on the above: all of psychology, and neurosciences that
>have as their focus whole-animal behavioral preparations, manipulate the
>environment and measure behavior. The ploy of non-behavioristic psychology
>since the late 1940's has been to "operationalize" mental terms (like
>"attention," "fear," "belief," etc. etc.). That is, one manipulates the
>environment and measures behavior, but claims that one is "really"
>manipulating something else, i.e., the mental "thing" that is being
>"operationalized."

LZ: Sure, this is a reasonable observation. Except that behaviorism does
exactly the same thing in different terms. Behaviorism operationalizes
everything measured as behavior, just using different referrents. And
neither discipline defines or explains those referrents mechanically
except by reference to other equally ambiguous terms of the same genre
with equally disastrous intellectual and scientific consequences.



GS: Not much of this makes any sense. Sorry. If you can say it in a way that
isn't gibberish, I might be able to respond.





Nothing could have been more disastrous, and the price
>paid is mainstream psychology, which I do not even regard as a science -
>because science is actually a balance between facts, theories and concepts;
>and mainstream psychology is utterly devoid of any careful analysis of
>concepts (cf Machado et al "Facts, Theories, and Concepts: The Shape of
>Psychology's Epistemic Triangle). The hallmark of mainstream psychology
(and
>most of behavioral neuroscience) is that "any term is OK as long as there
is
>an operational definition." The problem is that the way mainstream
>psychology partitions behavior is misguided. That is, they lump things
>together that should be separate, and they classify as different things
that
>are similar.

LZ: Why shouldn't any term be OK for experimental purposes as long as
there is an operational definition?



GS: Well, that's the million-dollar question. And you have given the
fifty-cent answer.

LZ: The real question is should the
experimental analysis of sentient behavior[.]



GS: What is ".the experimental analysis of sentient behavior?" You accuse
behaviorism of using ambiguous terms (in one of the few sentences that make
sense) and you bandy about a word like "sentient?" But, anyway, you had the
"real question" before.



LZ: [.]accept behaviorism's view
of the way behavior should be classified, lumped together, and
partitioned, or should it accept that of cognitive science?



GS: BTW, what is behaviorism's view of how behavior should be classified,
lumped together, and partitioned?



LZ: Your main
complaint seems to be that it accepts the latter and not the former.
And in the absence of any mechanical relationship for the dependency
between experimental manipulation and behavioral measurement, there is
no way to tell because all terminological references are speculative.



GS: Sorry, this is mostly gibberish again, Lester. On the one hand, you seem
to admit that there IS a relationship between experimental manipulation and
behavioral measurement. It is good that you admit this because it is exactly
what is undeniable about the hard-headed empiricism of behavior analysis.
But if you admit that there IS a relationship, then the "terminological
references" can't be all that "speculative."  But, again, like most of the
stuff you say, it is nearly incomprehensible.

>                   For example ask yourself, "What is the connection
between
>"attention" and "stimulus control" and "conditioned reinforcement?" or
asked
>another way: "What are two ways in which the term "attention" is used and
>what known behavioral processes are involved?" Hint: Sometimes "attention"
>merely refers to the fact that behavior may be controlled by only certain
>features of some stimulus (i.e., shape rather than color etc.) and the
>animal is said to "pay attention" to one aspect. On the other hand, the
term
>is sometimes a reference to subtle aspects of behavior that function to
>enhance the behavioral effect of the stimulus. These may ultimately be
>related, but one thing is certain - "attention" is all about discriminative
>stimuli and conditioned reinforcers. For example, Skinner loved the
>"observing procedure*" because he felt that it was essentially an
>amplification, so to speak, of what the cognitive people were referring to
>as "attention." But "attention" remains some mysterious "executive
function"
>in modern cognitive "science" but it is behavior, and it is behavior that
is
>easily examined. Why don't more people know this? What I'm saying is that
>behavioral neurobiology should be wedded to the experimental analysis of
>behavior but, instead, it has aligned itself with cognitive "science," and
>has gone off in search of phlogiston and the vis-anima. People like O'Regan
>and Noe are refreshing, but in the same breath that they dismiss the ghosts
>of cognitive psychology they trash behaviorism or, at least, what they
>perceive to be behaviorism (more on O'Regan and Noe, below).

LZ: In the end what makes the mentalist operational referrents more
palatable is that cognitive science knows the mechanical definitions
of its terminological referrents are open ended whereas behaviorists
pretend those of behaviorism are not and that behaviorism represents
the one true gospel for those engaged in the experimental analysis of
sentient behavior.



GS: Surprise surprise! Mostly gibberish again.



LZ: That's the whole problem in a nutshell. If you or
other behaviorists want to pretend that behaviorism has all the
answers you're going to have to identify the mechanical nature of the
dependency between the independent variables of environmental
manipulation and dependent variables of behavioral measurements
explicitly.



GS: You have said this many, many times, but that doesn't make it true (to
the extent that it is even comprehensible). Behavior analysis does NOT seem
to have to "identify the mechanical nature of the dependency between the
independent variables of environmental manipulation and dependent variables
of behavioral measurements explicitly." given that that phrase can even be
made comprehensible. Behavior analysis directly demonstrates control over
the subject matter by manipulation of independent variables. It demonstrates
relationships and allows one to predict and control behavior - at least to
some extent, and to an extent that seems mostly unrivaled in psychology.



LZ: And until that is done people will choose terminological
referrents they feel describe the situation most accurately, claims
and speculative arguments to the contrary notwithstanding.



GS: I have a different explanation as to why people choose "explanations"
couched in "mental" terms.





"Lester Zick" <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:40aa1e6e.57612461@netnews.att.net...