🚀 go-pugleaf

I am adding bionet.neuroscience, comp.ai, and sci.cognitive to this
post with the approval of Richard Carrier. I think there is material
here (especially towards the end) to which people in these various
forums can speak most cogently. The post is long, but it covers alot
of ground. The topic currently revolves around the ramifications of a
dualist versus reductionist (Identity Hypothesis) explanation for
"mind". I had posted an original question "Is it all just a bunch of
chemicals? And if so, where did the ability to 'abstract', amoung
other mental abilities, come from?" Thanks for any thoughts on this
subject. There is a another thread "Re: Just Chemicals - Logic" in
sci.philosophy which treats this topic from a "logic" standpoint (or
it would if I were more knowledgable re "logic" as a discipline and
study). I'd welcome your participation therein as well. I decided (for
now) to keep that thread there since it deals with the issue with
logic as opposed to attempting to actually address the
neurophysiological, biochemical, and information-science aspects as I
hope will be the case in this thread.  -JB
==================== begin post ===========================
Thanx for the opportunity to kick the tires on this a bit.

hermlin@aol.com wrote:

>In article <5a46h9$bjf@nnrp1.farm.idt.net>, mvcs@gramercy.ios.com wrote:

>(1) References

>>Please fill me in on...

>...Dennett..._Consciousness Explained_. You do not appear to have read it....

On order.

>(2) Logical Objections to Dennett's "Reductionist" Explanation

>>How did a purely physical system (even if operating in dynamic
>>space and time) ever "think up" abstractions?

>How does a slab of etched silicone with electrons moving in deterministic
>paths play a game of chess? ....

Please consider carefully the ramifications of this analogy. You may
change your analogy, but I wish you to not abandon an answer. The
analogy is clearly in my favor. Computers can do nothing without
programs. And programs only happen when created by people. In your
analogy, I would say that the computer is the brain, the program is
the mind (person) and the programmer is the Creator of the person.

Analogies where computers are used to represent the mind/brain are
generally poor for most purposes since computers are digital and the
brain is analog. The brain is programmed to a great extent via
physical alteration and time-dynamic operation of neurophysiological
components. I would like to say more on this later, but now I'd like a
different analogy in support of your point since this one allows me to
claim (unfairly, IMO) that you've just prooved mind/brain duality.

>(3) You Can't Have an Illusion if You Have an Identity

I do not agree with this statement. If it is OK, I'd rather state it:

You Can't Perceive a Mental Abstraction if You Have an Identity

This may also have problems as a statement, but it is more general
than and inclusive of "illusion". Which is the reason I said:

>>But I guess they are not real concepts after all... merely
>>illusions of ideas... not real ideas themselves (and certainly not
>>endued with any external reality outside the minds that conceived
>>them). 

If you think about it, an illusion is a real concept of sorts. My
point was that there is "one that perceives". So, IMO people who focus
on the thought instead of the thinker and believe that a mechanistic
explanation for the thought ipso facto "mechanizes" (explains in
purely mechanistic terms) the thinker are incorrect. Clearly, both
perception and perceiver are realities. Your thoughts are solicited.

>Now, what is a "real" idea that a mechanical process would be an illusion
>of?  Before settling on an answer, examine every word in your definition
>of "real idea" -- if every single word can be replaced with descriptions
>of mechanical processes, then you have confirmed my position.

Delete the word "real" for now. My assumption is that some/many/all
ideas ("mental perceptions" is more inclusive, so I'd like to
substitute that for the word "idea") are distinguishable from the
chemical reactions which support or are associated with them. In the
same way that a signal is contained in a carrier wave, so too has been
my assumption that some/many/all "mental perceptions" find expression
via neurophysiological chemical reaction vehicles. I posit that some
mental perceptions utilize time-dynamic states of neurophysiological
processes, and not the physical processes themselves. 

It is to this which my current interest is mostly directed. *Some*
mental perceptions, IMO, have or could have a high degree of
mechanical connection. Others perceptions have less or perhaps no
connection to mechanical or time-dynamic neurophysiological states. I
desire to know how much of this has been investigated, what sorts of
taxonomies exist for whatever has been learned, etc.

"Mental perceptions" is also a better term to use because I am
addressing more than mere consciousness in my "just chemicals" posts.
I did not allow segregation into consciousness and "all else" (such as
a conscience, sense-of-guilt and that-which-feels-guilty, sense of
morality and ethics, devotion, committment, etc.) when I first posted.
I do not agree that settling all-matters-conscious settles all-
matters-mind.

>But If you can identify a single word in your definition

Yes I can. I do not know how valid my definition is, however. But, I
do not think that a definition of consciousness should be considered
invalid simply because it includes an aspect, no matter how small,
which is not related to or supported by a mechanical process.

IMO the trivial answer to your challenge, however, is merely to say
that "human consciousness" includes "human cognition" (as opposed to,
eg, "machine consciousness and cognition" of computers and TVs and
electronic or biological systems which can not possibly have capacity
for self-awareness of the human kind), neither of which is understood
well enough to demonstrate that a mechanical process is causal to
human awareness. Thus, "human awareness" can not now be, with
certainty and credibility, substituted with a description of a
mechanical process.

> that cannot be
>replaced with a description of a mechanical process, you will have refuted
>my position.  This may sound easier than it is: "cannot" is not equivalent
>to "is not," a vital distinction.

I have an understanding of *my* distinction between these words. I do
not, however, assume that there *is* a mechanical cause to
consciousness and any inability to demonstrate that cause is because
technology *can* not now show the mechanism. What about you?

I think there are those who substitute a Rube Goldberg explanation for
all mental perception and call that an adequate representation. If the
Rube Goldberg contraption is overly complex, it will serve more to
obfuscate than enlighten. I think I can phrase propositions (it may
take me awhile) that require a Rube Goldberg type explanation from
reductionists.... either that, or a denial that there is anything to
explain whatever, or a contention that the explanations already given
explain everything even if "they" do not so explain (which amounts to
a denial that there is anything to explain). And these Rube Goldberg
explanations (the few I've seen offered so far) are claimed as supreme
via application of Occam's Razor arguments. But I disagree with many
reductionist's contention as to which view and set of definitions
offer the simpler explanation.

E.g., you've a house with a living room, one wall of which has a
sliding glass door. It is open to catch the evening breeze. A robber
comes in the door while you are not looking. There are some papers on
the bar next to the window. The robber knocks them off, catching your
attention (you've gone to the kitchen to get some snacks). The robber
hides quickly and you come back into the room. You see the papers and
the swaying drapes at the window. You interpret the scene as a causal
event which includes open door, breeze, loose papers, and gravity.
Simple. But the robber is still in your house. The true system is thus
composed of
door-night-robber-opportunity-valuables-stealth-accident-loose
papers-gravity. It is a more complex explanation than
door-breeze-papers-gravity, but it is also more correct.

In this example (which is "common" to human experience.... how many
times do we see a scene and interpret it as simply "X" when it is
actually very complex?), application of Occam's Razor is likely to get
you dead, and not because the robber's name is Occam. Same type of
idea as "The Turing Test" in AI. I think both may have their proper
application, but they ought not to be elevated to maxims, especially
when misapplied. Clearly, the definition of the scene in your house
*CAN* be interpreted the way you so understand it.... but it *IS* not
a correct interpretation.

Let me put it this way: I say there's a robber in your house, that I
was following him, and that I saw him go into the back part of your
house. You say there is no robber in your house. You have a video of
the scene in the house as you see it. I point to the scattered papers
as evidence that someone is in your house. You say, "If you can
identify a single word in your observation of the scene in my house
that cannot be replaced with a description of a mechanical process,
you will have refuted my position." I say, "Where shall I send the
funeral flowers?"

All kidding aside, can you understand my point better now? This is
only an analogy and can't be carried too far. But if you watched the
scene in your house long enough and in the right manner, you'd see
evidence of someone foriegn to the scene who would move around and
(assuming there's nothing of interest, or the police are comming, or
somesuch) leave without a trace. Yet a person foriegn to the house
would have been in there. Sometimes the only indication that anyone
was in a house which was robbed is that something is missing. And this
is a fairly good (I think) analogy of what I am looking for. The trace
evidence which indicates that "someone" is in the nervous system yet
is external to the structure of the nervous system itself. Except the
evidence I seek would be that something may be put *IN* instead of
taken out.

Now, this anlaogy is limited: it is unfair to say that evidence of
theft is "the" proof which always shows that "human entry into houses"
is able to be evidenced since not all robbers end up stealing things,
and because robbers are there to effect robberies..... suppose there
were peeping Toms or someone who just wanted to come into a house and
look around before leaving, where the intent was to leave things
undistrubed? (I've heard of people who do this, BTW, so this is not
just a supposition on my part. They are apparently ..... how shall I
say .... somewhat mentally unbalanced, and by reason of working as
maintenance workers in apartment complexes gain entry into people's
homes for the single purpose of looking through their stuff....
period. The people have absolutely no idea they've had "visitors".)

>(4) Evolution: Genesis of Consciousness a Different Issue

>>had there not been a threat to our survival, the
>>characteristic of being able to "have" abstract thoughts might not
>>have been necessary.

>That is, in effect, the theory of natural selection.  If you disbelieve or
>disagree with this, that is a matter for another thread.

Matter closed? No error in the theory? No room for modification? It is
not a theory but an absolute fact?

I don't buy the completeness of the refusal to look into the matter.
There are far more intelligent people than I looking into this very
issue, so I think the jury is still out on this one. For example, the
ability to hold abstract thoughts (ability, not the thoughts
themselves) is an artifact of the spatio-temporal environment to which
the human nervous system is subjected during the growth of each
individual. Where the effects of evolution end, and factors in the
current enviornment (including whatever may suffice as an adequate
respresentation of what I am trying to investigate) begin is not a
settled issue, much less the assessment of whether we can account for
all the "p"s and "q"s. Otherwise, our current-day experiences would
largely be predictable from DNA, and the general
attitudes/culture/conceptual-landscape (and whatever else there is in
our makeup as humans that both distinguishes humans as humans and is
pervasive to all humans) would be obvious (in hindsight) from DNA and
environments in which creatures existed long ago.

Remember that sense of morality, committment, conscience, etc., are
included in my "just chemicals" post. A material explanation for
consciousness itself may go far towards addressing these other issues,
but these other matters are not settled (for me, anyway) by either
"appropriate" definition of terms or current reductionist explanation
of these matters.

> All the
>rhetorical questions that follow this statement betray either a lack of
>knowledge of evolution and its attendant theories,

Yes. The attendant theories. Also any attendant facts. I am more
interested right now in facts than theories, but I'll take whatever is
available.

> or a deliberate refusal
>to consider them.  I do believe every question you ask has or can be
>answered by evolution science.  But can we simplify this discussion by not
>worrying about the genesis of consciousness as much as the technical
>aspects of it?

As a matter of fact, I'd like to skip that for now. Too much to
consider at once. I've my hands full right now just trying to get a
grasp on exactly how I want to describe, and how I explain what I will
describe, in the way of "higher mind" functions.

>  The question should be: can consciousness be a process of
>a brain?  If we stick to that, genesis issues are moot.

I do not agree. I think there is a gradation of consciousness from the
very base, animalistic, sense-proximity consciousness to the more
abstract levels of consciousness. Accepting your restriction renders
"that which I want to know" about consciousness and higher-mind
non-existent.

I also amend your amendment above to: can a sense of morals be reduced
completely to a mere process of a brain? A conscience? Guilt?
Self-awareness? Ability to abstract such concepts as quantum
mechanics, general relativity, mathematics, "the arts and humanities"?
And if so, why did it take so long to develope concepts of
civilization, society, language, mathematics, etc.? These recent
developments are in our "immediate past" if they are all a result of
evolutionary pressures which, relatively speaking, long ago caused
creation of a brain capable of housing these higher-mind funtions. Why
the gap in time between development of the structure and the
instantiation of the mental realities? And doesn't this gap sort of
indicate that there is a difference between mere brain and these
"higher mind" functions?

>(5) My Actual Position: How to Confirm or Refute It

>>*YOU* have defined
>>consciousness here as choice and then ascribed the attribute of a
>>"fundamental property" to your definition. 

>I defined it as consisting of choices, just as running consists of steps. 
>By "fundamental property" I mean sine qua non: you cannot have
>consciousnessness without choices, and there is nothing else required to
>have consciousness apart from the particular pattern of choices unique to
>consciousness.

A) Isn't this like the "all horses have 4 legs, therefore all 4 legged
creatures are horses" thing? If not, why not?

B) Dogs have choices. Cats have choices. Frogs have choices. Germs
have choices. All have consciousness of equivalent character and
quality? If not, then there are grades of consciousness?
Self-awareness (according to your def) is an application of
consciousness, therefore every creature or thing with consciousness
(choices) is self-aware? Or is self-awareness only an attribute which
accrues to more complex consciousness in your definitions? (BTW, at
least consciousness according to your definition [if not
self-awareness] extends down to the embronic stage of all life,
including humans.... but that will be substance for a later thread.)

> As such this is a definition, not a theory, and this its
>circularity is irrelevant.

If women are defined as "mothers with children", and mothers are
defined as "women who've had children", then how are women better
understood by this definition? For me, circularity of definition does
not enhance my understanding, and my understanding *is* very relevant.
To me, circular definitions can be an obfuscation providing the
appearance of a definition but in fact leaving out much which is
germane to a deeper understanding of that which is defined by
deflecting the attention onto a more trivial plane than that which is
defined deserves.

>  The theory is that mechanical processes can
>produce all of the kinds of choices necessary for consciousness.  

Ref my comment about dogs, cats, frogs, and germs

>To refute my theory you have to

Only if I accept your theory.

>show that there are choices that
>consciousness requires that cannot be produced by mechanistic systems.

Being conscious of the T.V. involves no choice. For an hour or more I
can "buzz out" (as if in a trance). No volition at all: only a sink
hole for whatever garbage comes across the screen. Yet I can remember
later what I have seen. This is not consciousness?

> To
>refute my definition you have to show that what we call consciousness
>entails more than choices. 

See above.

> These are not the same arguments, either in
>form or content, since the former is scientific and the later logical.

A better example of what you mean is required, or I need to wait for
your explanation of the above.

>>not a proof or adequate support for the correctness of your definition. 

>This is where you would benefit from knowing the basics of analytical
>philosophy. 

Undoubtedly.

> The first five chapters of A.J. Ayer's _Language, Truth, and
>Logic_ is a must read.

ISBN or publisher?

>Definitions do not have to be proved--theories have to be proved.  I can
>define anything any way I want, and so can you, so long as we agree that
>we are talking about the same things.  With respect to my definition of
>consciousness, the only way it can be "incorrect" is if what YOU mean by
>consciousness entails something else, and if that is the case you must
>first explain what it is you are talking about if not the same thing as I,
>and then we must both decide whether what either of us is talking about
>has anything to do with what everyone else is talking about when they ask
>the same questions we are.  

And by deciding whether what either of us is talking about (re
consciousness et al) resembles what "experts" consider as credible (I
desire *NOT* to create a disembodied universe in my head.... I want
not just the agreement of others but a solid foundation on as much
objective fact as possible), an indication of the veracity of the
definitions is obtained. In my mind, that can be "proving the
definitions". But your statement here ("Definitions do not have to be
proved") is amazing. Is this how everyone thinks and/or approaches
these matters (or matters in general)? Is this part of analytical
philosophy? I'm surprised to see such acceptance of anyone's
definition no matter what it is or how bizzare. Perhaps I am reading
too much into your statement. But I covet the response to my
amazement.

>Leave aside the latter for now,

Oh shucks. OK.

> and just address the former: when you say
>my definition of consciousness is incorrect, all you mean in effect is
>that you are talking about something else when you use the word.  So what
>are you talking about?

For example, consciousness in the absence of sense stimuli. There have
been sensory deprivation studies performed which reveal something
about the workings of the mind in absence of senses. I grew up with a
prof of sociology and Univ Pres for a dad, so I know alot about
research back in the 1960's.... but after obtaining my physics degree
I have not kept current with that or related research. I know nothing
about where that line of investigation lead.

There is consciousness in deaf babies who have yet to learn language.
There is consciousness in deaf and blind babies who have yet to learn
any communication skills whatsoever, except the most base animal-drive
related outward-directed modes of expression (which is not
communication in itself..... it requires a response, which is
forthcomming and I suppose this is a crude form of communication, but
of such different quality as to be significant when compared to
sighted and hearing persons... yet after communication skills are
learned, these people have consciousness and memory of identical
caliber and accuteness which extends to early, "pre-communication"
times).

Consciousness during sleep, either dream or deeper sleep. Sleep
deprivation studies (again, my knowledge thereof is probably out of
date) dealt with some of this as well.

When some people are in a comma, they can be aware of what is
happening around and to them, even if there is no "normal" registry of
brain activity.

People can sleep-walk and sleep-talk and a host of other types of
mental-based activities which require the working of judgement, etc.,
and yet they do not remember what has happened to them, and interviews
with people in these states indicates that "the lights are on but the
person is not home".

And then there is always dimentia and hallucinations and all sorts of
mental states where people can become either unresponsive to their
environment or unable/unwilling to respond, yet fully aware (and this
perhaps of a "different reality").

These and the others I've mentioned will be adequate, I think, as a
starting point for a "working" definition of discussion. I have others
I wish to explore, but if they are not important, I wish to continue
for the moment with just these examples.

Again, I my interest is not limited exclusively to a definition and
explanation of consciousness.

>(6) Explaining Dennett's Argument Better

>>I can just sit and experience.... no doing at all. I can just be
>>conscious and not perform any choice and not perform any action at
>>all, eh? So, what type of choice are you talking about? Choice of what
>>we say and do or something primordially more base?

>We began this thread discussing Daniel Dennett's theories.  It does not
>appear that you are familiar with them.  That's fine, but please be aware
>that I have been assuming that we were all familiar at least with his
>work, and so I have left out explanations that would not have been needed.
> 

>Dennett argues (not without precedent) that consciousness consists of
>nothing more than perceptions (the "feeling" that we are self aware, the
>"recognition" of our identity, emotions, sensations, even memories, are
>all perceptions), that computers also have perceptions (in a primordial
>sense--feelings of identity and self awareness and many other things
>humans experience being too complex for modern computers

See   http://gramercy.ios.com/~mvcs    This together with the extreme
requirement for a high degree of mental alertness during extended
periods of time in my line of work should perhaps help you understand
better my interest. I desire to "push this envelope" as far as
possible, not just for economic gain, but because I also think people
will benefit from techological use of "aware computers" in appropriate
segments of the energy industry (increased efficiency, and better
optimized operations improves conservation "at the source"). People
are unfortunately unable to hold certain awareness brainstates for
very long at key focal points of activity in our industry. A properly
structured artificial neural network system suffers no
sleep-deprivation problems.

>), and that these
>perceptions are all the product of choices.  

>In the computer, this is obvious in a technical sense, but when you step
>back it seems miraculous that what consists of nothing more than a box
>making choices can navigate a missile around complex terrain, recognizing
>types of terrain and predict future data accordingly, recognize a target
>by shape and color, track its movement and predict changes in its course,
>change its flight strategy purely from experience, etc.  You really must
>think about this in detail for a minute.  Put aside your cultural
>prejudice which just "assumes" this is perfectly natural and unremarkable,
>examine it with new eyes.  It will seem absurd, inexplicable, yet it is
>clearly true.

Again, visit  http://gramercy.ios.com/~mvcs    
Not only is this not amazing to me, I think that the notion of "brain
is a computer" is erroneous in the face of current neurophysiological
knowledge.

The brain is nothing like a computer in any sense. Much of what
comprises the mind is nothing like a program in any sense. Instead,
the CPU we use in our modern-day computers is more like a really
sophisticated neuron. More on this if it becomes relevant.

Most missle guidance programs are based upon models and algorithms.
There is no miracle in any of these types of programs. Only real smart
programmers and highly sophisticated programs and hardware. For the
neural based programs and hardware (eg, my products and such hardware
as found in a Scientific American article sometime in 1992 I think,
"Silicon Sees a Cat"), such tasks are not miraculous either. (And some
of the newer missle guidance systems utilize "trainable" programs
and/or hardware now, as I understand things.)

Conventional computer systems contain built-in ignorance because it is
not possible to model or parameterize *all* variables of importance
for most real-world applications. Abrupt and highly non-linear state
changes or semi-repeatable and quasi-predictable (e.g., chaotic)
parameter space changes cause these type of "hard coded" systems to
fail. Band aids are needed to recover a solution, or the system
itself, when these systems fail. I.e., external "tinkering" is
required. This could easily be claimed by dualists to lend credibility
to the notion of mind as separate from brain

Artificial neural networks (ANN software, firmware, or hardware) learn
from incomplete and noisy data. There is no need for a formal symbolic
representation of data **OR** interrelationships. They can relace the
"man in the loop" used to provide band aid fixes to failed
mathematical/logical systems, although a teacher may be needed (the
teacher does *NOT* have to be an intelligent human). These systems are
sometimes called "model-free computers". Examples of model-free
systems are human memory, human judgement, human emotions, human
reasoning based upon induction or deduction, human interpretation of
scenes, symbolic intellectualizations, etc., certain adaptive
controllers, and most intelligent controllers. For example, a frog
knows nothing of Newton's Laws of Motion, yet it is able to track and
catch a fly in flight.

>In human brains, we again have cultural prejudices in the opposite
>direction that we must put aside, and when we do so we will see the common
>ground.  If recognizing an enemy airplane by seeing and analyzing its
>shape can consist of nothing more than a choice (or, in truth, many, many
>choices), then recognizing our self-identify by "seeing" and analyzing
>memories and other video and logical inputs, etc. can consist of nothing
>more than a choice (a choice made by a brain, in the sense of a logic
>switch and register just as in a computer, not a choice like what we are
>aware of making).  

OK. I think I see where this is headed. "Choice" would be the firing
of individual neurons, eh? But this is not exactly what is meant by
choice. If Dennett is making the "neurons choose" argument, then his
whole thesis is ***WAY*** off base IMO. By "choice", I think of
deciding or prefering and then selecting between alternatives. Neurons
do not "decide" or "prefer" nor do they select between alternatives
any more than AND gates in computers. They are DRIVEN to certain
states by outside controls. Traditional wafer computers operate
deterministically. ANNs can operate deterministically or chaotically
in their dynamical behavior.

ANN (and other artificial types) and "wetware" systems exhibit
emergant properties. You can not predict these system's dynamics or
processing results merely by looking at their structures, except for
simple "less than a dozen" neuron systems. You can tell exactly what a
computer *can* do by looking at the chipset it has. You can tell
exactly what the computer *will* do by looking at the machine
instructions. There is no set of machine instructions for the brain.
Additionally, one of the earmarks of NN systems is that their function
is defined largely by their time-dynamic properties. Turn off the
time-dynamic property and the function disappears, even if the
physical state of the NN remains identical. Kind of like a hologram.
It takes the operation of the plate plus light to produce an image.
Without the light, there is no image.

So, I am not amazed. I do not need to think about this in any more
detail. That is all I do all day long. I need some information.
Especially about how time-dynamic components of wetware systems have
been related to perception and/or behavior phenomena. Grossberg has
addressed this much over the years, but I am looking for more.

>What we otherwise might call "conscious choices" (using the distinction
>you make between passive experiencing, which nevertheless entails choices
>we have no control over, like whether to recognize a blob of colors as an
>apple, and active choosing, like whether to eat that apple) are themselves
>nothing more than sensations of having made a decision (or of deliberating
>on how to decide, which itself is just a series of decisions, just as when
>a computer deliberates).  

The "decisions" my neurons "make" when performing scene analysis has
nothing to do with the decision I make when I check myself to see if I
feel like listening to The Gordan Highlanders' latest CD. Neural-level
pattern recognition is an emergent property of the biological
substrates involved. For example, an experienment was performed on a
frog: kill the frog, remove eye and optic nerve, hook it to an
O-scope, and pass both live and photographic representations of bugs
in front of the eye. Measure the response. Lo *AND* behold, the eye
responds to the live bugs and not photos or little look-alike toys or
small chips of wood that move around like bugs.... just live bugs.
Without the frog. So, where is the "seat" for the frog's "choice" of
what to see before eating? Eye? Brain? If no frog need be present to
make this choice, is it still a frog's choice? What kind of choice is
it?

Similarly in humans, when you recognize "Aunt May" in the distance and
it turns out not be "Aunt May" when you get closer, you did not just
accidentally mistake one face for another. Usually, our nervous system
has placed "Aunt May"'s face on the head of the person we see, and
transmitted this *PACKET* of information to us. Where was this
"choice" of what to see made? Eye? Optic nerve? If an eye and retina
(see current research on the subject) are able to encode patterns from
which "symbols" are created and transmitted to the brain, and this is
called the "choice" to see someone's face on someone's head, then a
complete human is not required for this "choice" to be made. Is it
then a human "choice"? What kind of "choice" is it? 

When a person is sedated for surgery, the eye still works. The eye is
still able to recognize aspects of the scene in front of it. This is
"choice" and consciousness by Dennett's definition; and it is of the
same varacity and quality as that experienced when awake. Yet there is
something missing, isn't there? I think it is the *person* that is
missing. I'm afraid that reductionism leads to defining the person out
of the question, and this is a case in point.... if I'm correct about
Dennett's contention. I'll know more when my copy of the book arrives.

>There is a great deal of scientific evidence collected so far, and still
>being gathered, that strongly indicates that this is the case, but I am
>not arguing that yet.  My position is, in this particular, one of
>definition, not theory--I am arguing here that consciousness can be solely
>and entirely the product of choices of a certain kind, or more
>specifically that everything we attribute to consciousness as being unique
>to it can consist of just choices (and I mean "can" because we do not need
>to know if they are--for a valid definition, it is sufficient that it be
>possible to describe the unique features of consciousness solely in terms
>of logical switches and registers, regardless of whether those switches
>and registers are physical or "supernatural" in nature).

It is not possible to describe the unique features of consciousness
solely in terms of logical switches and registers. Ref my comments
above.

>I hope this helps.

It is a start.

Jeffrey L. Baldwin
Mind & Vision Computer Systems
"Intelligent Processing Systems for the Energy Industry"
Voice/Fax/Data: (281) 550-4534     (800) MVCSTLM
email: mvcs@gramercy.ios.com       73051.1316@compuserve.com
http://gramercy.ios.com/~mvcs