🚀 go-pugleaf

Androcles, sorry to have offered more than was really necessary. The
OP addressed what he called "postscientistm", and I asked him for a
definition of it for three reasons: a) due to ignorance, the term was
unfamiliar to me, b) it was not obvious how a list of quotations can
provide a definition, c) I found it philosophically puzzling.

Unfortunately, I ventured to help the OP out by offering a conventional
definition of scientism as a counter for his "postscientism". I was not
defending that term nor any position here, but merely trying to
facilitate a response in terms of terminology and concepts that are
conventional.

In the course of my doing that, you raised questions about my
presuppositions, and although that was off topic because I was not
defending a position and merely asking a question, I ventured to reply.

"Androcles" <Headmaster@Hogwarts.physics> writes:

> However, I was trying to ascertain your meaning for "natural" science
> in relation to the conventional meanings of "natural" and "science",
> and so I don't understand how your questions, however reasonable they
> may be in themselves, are relevant.

All I did was to report what I took to be the conventional distinction
between natural and social science. I'm not defending that distinction
nor do I agree with it, but I told you that already. I'm not obliged to
parse an expression (such as what is natural or scientific about natural
science) which I find problematic to begin with.

> My question should have been and still is: Haines, what do you mean by
> "the categories and axioms of natural science" and "knowledge"?
> Indeed, what do you mean by "natural" science?

Since I don't happen to think much of this natural/social science
distinction, your question reduces simply to, what do I mean by
categories, axioms and knowledge. If I don't embrace the expression
"natural science", how can I define the relation of axioms to it, as
opposed to the axioms of social science or science in general? Therefore
I can only seek to define axioms and knowledge in general, and I thought
I had done that to some extent:

> > An axiom is a statement that is presumed to be true...

I'm just using a conventional, although simplified, definition. If you
have problems with the conventional definition, you have to say what
they are.

> > Conceptual categories are a product of both culture and the powers
> > of the mind, and the former means they are not impervious to
> > criticism, although because our communication depends on them...

True, I'm explaining categories rather than define them because I
assumed the meaning of the word was transparent: classes of the objects
of knowledge or thought. Again, I'm not defending the notion conceptual
categories, and if you have problems with it (as well you may), you have
to say what they are so that I can figure out if I agree with you or
not. 

> > I would simply mean by knowledge statements about the world that
> > have truth value in that they correspond in some fashion with the
> > world.

It seems I've here defined the term as it is conventionally understood.

Were I to explain what _I_ would mean by such a term as knowledge, it
would indeed end being the book that you don't want. When I asked a
question of the OP, it was quite proper that I employed conventional
terms with conventional meanings. For me to have imposed my own terms or
meanings in that context would only have discouraged a reply. That you
and I may feel that these terms are problematic seems irrelevant in that
context.

>> Keep in mind the point of my comment. The author had offered a very
>> long list of quotations that seemed on the whole to suggest that our
>> categories and presumptions are all subject to criticism.
>
> I would agree with him.

But that's not my point. A list of quotations does not define what
"postscientism" means. The issue is not that our categories and
presuppositions are subject to criticism, but whether there is something
that might justifiably be called "postscientistic".

I get the feeling that you agree with the OP and that you are being
defensive. However, since the OP's position has not been defined, your
defense is so far vacuous. I was not challenging his position so much as
asking what it was. You should not belabor me for asking for a
definition or clarification, and if you were to see this simple request
as an attack, that would unfortunately say a lot.

If on the other hand, your aim is to be critical, the target of your
criticism must be explicitly stated or at least conventionally
understood. I employed some conventional terms and meanings because that
is a precondition of dialog, but that does not mean I defend their
adequacy otherwise. It is unwise to use unconventional terms or concepts
when asking a question because one removes ground for understanding the
question and for a reply to be functional in relation to it.

> The name "Einstein" is constantly paraded in films, TV quiz shows, pop
> science magazines, newspapers etc., as though he were holy instead of
> the greatest huckster since Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, and Saul of
> Tarsus.

While people have been somewhat critical of Einstein in certain
respects, to characterize him as a "huckster" is very unconventional,
perhaps offensive, and surely in need of justification. I'm not inviting
you to do that because it would be off topic and might involve subject
matter for which I am ignorant and in no position to address.

> What kind of "knowledge" can stem from the simplistic assertion
> the speed of light from A to B is c-v,
> the speed of light from B to A is c+v,
> the "time" each way is the same?
> I would assert that such categories and presumptions are subject to 
> criticism
> and condemnation, they are not science. Rather, they are intellectual games
> and immoral actions leading to malfeasance in the world.

Wow, while I said I didn't wish to enter into an evaluation of Einstein,
this bit really puzzles me. The term "C" is a constant, and so the speed
of light from A to B and from B to A must surely be the same, regardless
of their relative velocities. That was the whole point of the
Michelson-Morley experiment and the Special Theory has been confirmed in
Newtonian terms by all experimental data that I know of. Has it ever
been disproved or seriously doubted?

You can't reject the dominant paradigm without offering evidence and
justification for some alternative. Without that, a rejection signifies
nothing. And how the Special Theory leads to "malfeasance" boggles the
imagination! What the devil are you talking about?

> Very well. I was only asking you what you meant by "natural" science
> and "knowledge" as the terms do not seem to mean anything.

But they surely _do_ mean something in conventional terms. What you
apparently intend is not that they are meaningless, but that you contest
the meanings, which is something entirely different. But so far you
don't do that and only put forward a skepticism that remains unwarranted
because you don't offer any reasons for it.

>> For example, the term postmodern does not mean that the modern world
>> has broken down, but that there's something we can define as being
>> "modern", and the definition of postmodernism differs with that
>> definition in some fundamental way. While postmodernists might insist
>> that definition is part of the problem (and hence some refuse to call
>> themselves postmodern), that can hardly be meaningful for those whose
>> aim is morally responsible action in the world rather than
>> intellectual games.
>>
> Are you suggesting Valev is immoral and/or engaging in intellectual
> games?

Who is Valev? Someone quoted by the OP? Even if he did quote him, and
even if the quote was meant to support the OP's suggestion that we live
in a postscientistic age, that does not necessarily mean Valev is
postscientistic, whatever that's supposed to mean.

In the paragraph above, I am using the term "postmodern" as merely an
example of the logic of periodization and did not say it had anything to
do with this so-called "postscientism". More specifically, if we assume
there is a development through identifiable phases, each phase must be
defined in a way that distinguishes it from the phases before and
after. If we wish to use the term "postmodern", when we are obliged to
define modern and to define postmodern in a way that reveals their
demarcation. Has the OP or you done this for "postscientism?"

The term "scientism" is ambivalent, and therefore one can't posit the
existence of a "postscientism" or criticize scientism without specifying
which meaning one has in mind. For example, some would equate scientism
with positivism, and in terms of this definition, I'd fully agree that
we live in a post-positivist era. But there are other meanings of
scientism, and in terms of at least one of them, we clearly remain
scientistic.  

Are you equating postscientism with postmodernism? This identity surely
needs to be made explicit and probably defended as well. Everyone seems
agreed that we are post-positivist, but a minority feel we are really 
postmodern. Clearly I'm not calling Valev postmodern nor criticizing him
of immorality or of playing intellectual games. That would emerge only
from an extraordinary set of logical adventures.

I should add that moral action refers to behavior that has been assigned
value in terms of social norms. The absence of a moral dimension for an
action (like brushing my teeth in the morning), does not at all imply
that the action is "immoral", which is action contrary to social
norms. Once again, we have to be alert to conventional meanings and make
explicit when we deviate from them lest there result a gross
misunderstanding as occurred here.
  
My point about moral action is that any skeptical position that goes so
far as to suggest that our knowledge has no relation to the world can
hardly assign value to action in the world. Note that for once I here
offer a proposition. If you think it relevant to the thread and deserving
of criticism, go for it.

-- 
 
       Haines Brown, KB1GRM