🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Sep29.213854.26085@newshost.lanl.gov> jlg@cochiti.lanl.gov (Jim Giles) writes:
>Of course, the *really* strange thing about QM is the claim that
>a mathematical function *is* the physical object being studied.
>In any other part of science, this would seem rediculous (or,
>at the very least, uninformative).  To derive a function which
>gives a prediction for sky-light as a function of sun angle,
>horizonm angle, wavelength of light, and observer altitude
>should be possible.  To say that the sky really *is* that
>function when you're not looking up is rediculous.  For one
>thing, what does such a claim even *mean*?  Or, consider the
>following function on integers: f(i) = max(0, min(i-1, 13-i))/36.
>This is the probability of rolling `i' as the sum of two dice.
>It is rediculous to say the dice really *are* this function
>while they are rolling and that the function `collapses'
>to a given number when the dice stop rolling.

I agree completely; this is what I was trying to say about "not
identifying the model with reality," but maybe more people will
like this formulation.  Of course, the more comprehensive the model
is, the more tempting it is to identify it with reality.  The cases
you give are of such limited models that few people would make the
mistake.  When we start babbling about "Theories of Everything," 
however, it gets easier to mix things up.  

In mathematically oriented work it is useful to mix up the model
with reality some of the time, to get "into" the model.  It should
be a kind of voluntary suspension of belief, like watching a
good movie or (perhaps a better analogy) playing a good video game.