🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Jul31.154324.22928@news.media.mit.edu> minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:
>  To say that a certain object exists is like saying that it's in the
>universe.  There isn't anything wrong with that.  But then, to say
>that the @i[universe] exists is saying that the universe is inside
>itself - which makes no sense at all. 

Only if saying X exists _is the same_ as saying X is in the universe,
_and_ there is some reason why the universe cannot be said to contain
itself. Pointing at paradoxes in set theory doesn't mean much here
unless you can justify why inclusion in the set theory sense is appropriate
sense of 'inclusion'.

> And we can make the
>same statements about each of these "grades of existence":
>   --P runs inside some actual computer

Actual meaning what? What about a computer being emulated by another
computer...

>   --P runs only in the mind of its human programmer.. 

What about a mind being emulated by a computer being...

>   --P doesn't run at all, but just sits there on paper. 

Actual paper or paper in the mind of an emulated programmer?

>   --P isn't even written, but only imagined by someone. 
>   --P isn't even imagined, but merely a "possible" program, not yet even 
>conceived by anyone.

... and so on. This is not (as far as I can tell) any different from an
old idea in philosophy, the idea that you cannot tell if existence is
"real", or a dream, or a dream within a dream, .... The confusion is only
meaningful if there is a possibility of "waking up", i.e. if the simulation
can detect the simulator.

>    In each such case, if P describes some simulated universe, there
>is no way for the creatures inside that universe to know whether or
>not their universe "actually exists" as a feature inside some larger
>universe.  No answer to such a question could have any actual
>consequences -- and therefore, the attribute of existence is an
>inconsequential accessory! 

So here you exclude the possibility of waking up by postulate,

> There is no possible way to prove that our
>universe itself is anything more than a "logical possibility". 

And reach the obvious conclusion that if there is no possibility of
waking up, then it doesn't matter if it's a dream or not. Most of us
have come across this idea before:

	Row, row, row your boat
	Gently down the stream.
	Merrily, merrily, merrily, merrily
	Life is but a dream.

(I think Kubrick missed an opportunity for HAL's swan song...)

Your point seems to be:

	Since there are multiple possible explanations for the
	phenomenon normally identified as existence, and there
	may be no possibility of distinguishing between them,
	then there is no possible meaning to the term "existence".

1. That still leaves us a meaningful phenomenon.

2. To the extent that different "grades" of existence cannot be
   distinguished, they have common properties. Likewise, we can
   construct a meaning for the term existence from the common
   properties. Furthermore, it is only necessary to make the
   observation in one of the possible grades. So an entity
   endowed with one or the other kind of existence can (at least
   in principle) determine the meaning of the term existence.

3. The postulate of "no waking up" is unsupported.

>So all
>that religious garbage about "who created ..." is based on a simple
>mistake, of postulating an unnecessary entity. 

Your argument is more along the lines that the explanation of existence
is impossible or uncertain as opposed to superfluous or unnecessary. Since
the "no waking up" postulate means that (in particular) you cannot tell
the difference between different explanations of existence, it seems to
me that postulating nonexistence of God is no different than postulating
existence of God. Differentiating the two cases requires "waking up".

There is a strange ontological proof of God which obtains from your
graded existence - God certainly exists in the minds of some people,
and is also on paper, and no doubt there are ideas of God yet to be thought
of. Since God "exists" in these ways, and you claim there is no distinction
between the different kinds of existence, then how can you avoid admitting
that the existence of God is as true as the existence of anything else?

> (There is a nice
>complaint about this in Einstein's "Meaning of Relativity" book.) It
>reaches it's most ultimately stupid form in terms like, "God created
>God, of course.  Who else could have done it."

Your philosophy admits an even "stupider" answer - in order for Minsky to
deny the existence of God, he must first conceive of God, which causes
God to exist in a way Minsky cannot deny. So who created God? - Minsky!

By the way, Schodinger would agree both with your notion of existence
_and_ with the conclusion that Minsky created God. (Cf. the afterword
to his essay "What is Life?").

Later,
Andrew Mullhaupt