🚀 go-pugleaf

The main reference for the "falsification" theory of science has to be
Karl Popper, _The Logic of Scientific Discovery_.  A variant point of
view can be found in Alfred Jules Ayer's book _Language, Thought, and
Logic_.  Both are classics and are required reading for anyone discussing
philosophy of science.

That much said, there are indeed problems with Popper's philosophy.
For criticisms, read the works of Imre Lakatos and Thomas Kuhn; not
that I agree with everything they say either.  In case you're interested
(probably not, but I'll say it anyway) I like the notions of Charles
Sanders Peirce the best, and I don't believe that they have received
proper attention.  He is the founder of pragmaticism, which has often
been vulgarized under the name pragmatism.  If you read criticisms
of pragmatic philosophy, be sure that Peirce's thought is being directly
addressed and not the thought of Thomas Dewey or the other, later,
pragmatic philosophers.

In a nutshell:

Lakatos: "Scientific theories float in seas of anomalies."  That is,
the explanatory power of a scientific theory is normally (at least so
far) minuscule compared to the mass of phenomena the theory attempts to
explain.

Kuhn: Paraphrased: Science is more driven by the social, economic, etc.
concerns of its practitioners than by any logic of discoveries.  Major
changes in scientific theories ("paradigm shifts") are more due to the
aging and death of old believers than to evidence, and do not usually
increase the truthfulness of theories.

Peirce: The purpose of science is to allow us better ability to
predict the behavior of the world, and to better alter it.  Scientific
theories are never complete explanations of reality, but are rather
elements in a sequence of inaccurate, but improving models.  The existence
of "absolute truth" or "absolute reality" can be argued either way, but
is essentially irrelevant to science.