🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <31D86560.6BF0@fas.org>, John Pike <johnpike@fas.org> wrote:

> Thomas L. Billings wrote:
> 
> > ... effects on U.S. policy were successful when the Soviets had a VERY
> > small ballistic missile capability compared to later.  If I remember
> > correctly, there were only a few tens of operational Soviet ICBMs during
> > the Cuban Missile crisis.  A similar capability to this early Soviet
> > force, in the hands of any of the countries mentioned above, could have
> > very restrictive affects on U.S. actions.
>

> While we might argue about the details of case studies, I think that you
> are absolutely correct in identifying the key issue, namely the extent
> to which US freedom of action might be constrained in the face of the
> deterrent capabilities of potential adversaries.
> 

It is those constraints that have cost the lives of so many during the
last 50 years of cold war, as the "socialist camp" killed tens of millions
under their control.

> 
> But the fundamental question here is whether the US would be able
> to escape this deterred frame of mind by deploying a BMD system.
>

Those who don't think something is worth fighting over, whether with
clubs, rifles, tanks, or nukes will NEVER escape that frame of mind.  They
didn't really care abut how many were dying during"containment", and
wouldn't now that others will be on the liquidation lists.  The only real
question is, 'How many can they drag into a panic with them?'

> In the event that North Korea tried to grab South Korea, how many US
> casualties would it be worth for us to stop them? 

>Is there any prospect that
> any BMD system can guarantee that *NO* warheads will get through??
> Not the last time I checked.


There is NO foreign policy, pacifist, academic, militant, or rational,
that can in fact make such a perfect statement of certainty that we will
not be hit with nukes.  One of the things that a multi-layer BMD can do is
make it obviously LESS worthwhile for many countries to build those first
few nuke/missile combinations, since they would be dealt with at a very
high level of confidence.  The chances of them getting one through a 5
layer BMD system (the space-based layers are the THIN justification for
this on sci.space.policy) are piddling small with less than a hundred
warheads.  

Among other things this will do much to ameliorate the spread of panics,
such as apparently occured among Kennedy's academic advisers during the
Cuban Missile Crisis.  It will make cowardice far less repectable.


> > Strategic defenses will make it more possible for the U.S. to intervene in
> > the future in areas where opponents have nukes and the missiles to put
> > them on a U.S. or allied target.
> 
> Yes, I think that you have identified exactly what is at issue *here*, with
> far greater clarity than what passes for a political debate on this stuff
> in Washington.
> 

Thanks, that's more than I ever got out of some Oregon Peace Institute folks.


>What I would suggest is that I think
> that there is little identifiable US national interest in fighting a
> nuclear war with anyone, least of all these dinky little jerkwater countries
> like North Korea that are the current bogeymen.


What IS in the U.S. interest is in making it clear to other countries that
a fully deployed global ballistic missile defense system makes it
IMPOSSIBLE for them to fight a nuclear ballistic missile war with the
U.S.  The ONLY result would be to make themselves nuclear targets!  
Extending conventional deterrence to the nuclear/ballistic missile level
will mean fewer such militant challenges to the U.S., and to the freedoms
it is willing to defend ( I HOPE!) in the future.  That will mean fewer
U.S. casualties in general.   The academic arguements that "it cann't be
done" haven't impressed me at anytime in the last 35 years.

It is also in the interest of the U.S. to make it clear to most, and
possibly all such countries, that the U.S. defenses would defend them
against attack by 3rd country nuclear ballistic missiles.  At the moment
that would give the opponents of deploying, say, the Agni missile in
India, a lot more talking points.  The need to deterr Chinese nuclear
actions would shrink drastically.  The same goes for Pakistan, etc. 

The number of states moving into the near-nuclear club (actually, NBC-W in
general) continues to grow, and my confidence in the MTCR to do any real
good shrinks every time we hear another report from the U.N. on Iraq's
lack of compliance with it's 1991 obligations.

I'll stop now, since this is generally far beyond sci.space.policy

regards,

Tom Billings

-- 
Institute for Teleoperated Space Development
itsd1@teleport.com(Tom Billings)
ITSD's web site is at,  http://www.teleport.com/~itsd1/index.html