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Article #82

Re: Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 1995 - text

#82
From: Andrew Cott
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 1995 00:00
244 lines
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In article <3r7qgq$s4v@news.cais.com>, birdhaex@cais3.cais.com says...
>
>Andrew Cott (cott@ll.mit.edu) wrote:
>: In article <3r5f72$aip@news.cais.com>, birdhaex@cais2.cais.com says...
>: >He probably would not do it for the same reasons that he did not mount 
>: >chemical heads on the SCUDs launched agaisnt Israel.  
>: We were already in theater at that time.  It didn't take an Iraqi rocket 
>: scientist to realize they were in deep and sinking fast.  
>The fact that they were "in deep and sinking fast" would have provided an 
>even greater incentive to go all out, don't you think?  

No, he lives to fight again.  I'm not arguing *against* deterence, I'm just 
suggesting the SCUD example does not quite fit a BMD discussion.  

>And yet, Saddam did not, because the threat to Iraq was going to be, after 
>all was said and done, fairly minimal.  But let's address the issue of 
>broader foreign affairs.

>: >What would he gain by launching and ensuring Iraq's complete 
>: >destruction?  
>: We wouldn't do it. It's that simple.  It is quite clear to the US 
>: civilian government and our military that complete (or even widespread) 
>: destruction of Iraq would only kill thousands of innocent people who
>: don't like Hussein in the first place. The threat of massive retaliation
>: does not exist.  
>
>Why do you think we would not retaliate?  You may be confusing general
>concepts of morality with strategic thought, two very different animals. 

Well, laying waste to a country is not quite "strategic thought."  

>The pressure to respond would be enormous, not only because of public
>opinion, but because of the signal that a non-response would send.  Far
>from securing "the peace," the lack of a response would clearly send a
>message that the potential costs to other aggressors seeking to do the
>United States similar harm might not be that great.  The threat of 
>massive retailiation does indeed exist; what you are questioning is the 
>credibility of that threat.  In my opinion, that is extremely dangerous.

We're obviously talking about two different things, here.  I'm not 
suggesting we wouldn't or shouldn't respond.  I'm saying all Saddam (or 
anyone else) has to do is demonstrate his capability of dropping a warhead 
on the US and the game changes to our detriment.  

>: >The fact 
>: >that Hussein attacked Kuwait was not a failure of deterrence.  The costs 
>: >associated with such an adventure were not well laid out for him, 
>: >whereas he seemed to realize that chemwar against Israel would do far
>: >more than just invite a couple a conventional bombing raids.
>
>: "More than..."  You're going to have to be a bit more specific, for the 
>: point I am making is that it is easy to inflate our national breast and 
>: claim: "If you transgress the unwritten law (chem/bio/nuke) we will lay 
>: your country to waste."  The problem is *actually doing it*.  Are you, 
>: personally, willing to unleash our nuclear arsenal on someone (e.g. 
>: Hussein) 
>: who has just dropped some ugly substance on Manhattan that kills a few 
>: thousand people?  Are you willing to kill thousands of innocents in that 
>: country?  The hard part becomes more clear when you actually step up to 
>: the plate.
>
>What would your reaction be?  

Come on, answer the question...;-)

>By telling Saddam that we'll be angry, but 
>not inflict intolerable costs on any such adventurism, one might argue 
>you increase the likelihood of the very occurence you seek to avoid.  

Your putting words in my mouth.  You're not talking to a pacifist here, ya 
know!  

I'd certainly retaliate, but that's after the damage has been done.  I'm 
looking to deal with the *threat* of a rocket delivery system.  

>Personally, I don't want to kill anyone, but I recognize the nature of 
>the international system.  Therefore, I would rather make it clear to 
>Saddam that using WMD in New York are not in _his_ interests.  The best 
>way to do that is to ensure that he understands that the costs of such 
>actions would far outweigh any benefit.

[snip] 

>: Having a TMD system in place does not remove our option to inflict 
>: massive force.  It does make it far less likely that we would have to do 
>: it in the wake of an attack on our home soil.  A sense of detached 
>: security makes less and less sense as the days pass.  The Atlantic and
>: Pacific oceans are becoming nuisance parameters.

>But my point is having a TMD is unnecessary if your adversary understands 
>that launching will be counterproductive to his interests.

Nah, he does not *have* to launch to influence our decisions.

>: Not for long.  I do not want to sound doom-and-gloom here.  That's not my 
>: intention.  But, realistically, the bombing in OK has demonstrated it can 
>: be done.  (Strictly speaking, the World Trade Center demonstrated that 
>: first.) 
>: Once foreign organizations have the capability to inflict damage *at a 
>: distance*, the music stops and we're still standing.  

>Exactly spot on.  And TMD does not protect us from OKC-type attacks.  In 
>fact, this is how I expect an Iraq/Iran/Portugal to attack us: using such 
>means that are are difficult to trace to a country of origin.  For that 
>reason, I'd rather put the money for TMD into resources aimed at that 
>problem.

Hey, the Portugal stuff is classified! ;-)

I guess I should have been more direct in the paragraph above.  The point I 
was making is in the last sentence.  Attacks on the US will increase.  Once 
it can be done at a distance, pushing US foreign interests in desired 
directions is greatly facilitated.  

Why shouldn't solutions be persued for both the domestic terrorist threat 
*and* ICBM defense?  Are they somehow at odds?  

[snip (damn news reader)]

>: >In addition, for my money, I would rather invest funds
>: >where the _likely_ threats are going to come from;
>
>: I think you're going to have to be more specific.  The devil is in the 
>: details.  "Make it so" only flies on TV.
>
>See above, following your OKC example.

And what work should we do?  I ask because if someone wants to build a 
bomb *here* and detonate it, they can.  If they are suicidal, they can do it 
*easily*.  How do you propose to stop that?  That's a rhetorical question, 
because we are discussing two different things.  The domestic threat is 
real and nearly impossible to stop (but I'm open to suggestions).  The 
rocket threat is more powerful because one does not have to wage war to 
influence us.  TMD may be able to stop that.  I say "may" because I am fully 
aware that it's new development.  

>: > as others in this
>: >thread pointed out, a terrorist-like attack that is difficult to trace 
>: >to a specific nation is more likely the way to get at the U.S. 

>: In the current climate, I agree with that 100%.  My point is that the 
>: capability to inflict serious damage at will is increasing daily, and I 
>: fully expect to be alive when "terrorist" (for lack of a better term) 
>: countries have it. 

>I don't think there is disagreement here, but it points away from threats 
>that TMD can handle. That is the issue here, I think.

Sorry, I don't quite follow that.  Are you saying TMD should be used 
in the field but not domestically?  If not, could you rephrase?

>
>: An operational TMD system is still some years down the road; we can't put 
>: off the development work until the rockets are aimed.

>: >: If we, as a nation, are going to be active in international conflicts, 
>: >:we 
>: >: should *not* rely on sticking our nuclear forces in the face of anyone 
>: >: who disagrees with our position and has rockets that can reach the US. 
>: >: Not only is that a world noone could possibly *want* to live in, it's 
>: >: no
>: >: way a country *should* behave, full stop.  
>: >
>: >I don't think anyone on either side of this issue is suggesting we 
>: >brandish our nukes about like so many cutlasses.  The fact is, nukes 
>: >exist and I don't think there is any way to put that genie back in the 
>: >bottle.  

>: Yep, that's for sure.  But is it responsible for us to rely on that genie 
>: as our only means of defending against terrorist attacks from the air?  
>: That is what TMD hopes to deal with.  TMD does not have a prayer of 
>: putting that genie back in the bottle (though some argue that an SDI
>: system could not possibly stop a massive attack completely, yet then cry
>: out about destabilization; figure that one out...).

>Not to get into another topic, but as the number of nukes goes down SDI 
>becomes more destabilizing, because the incentive to "cheat" is increased 
>in arms control agreements.  I can point you to a good article on this 
>issue, if you like.

Yes, that is another topic, and, sure, I'd like to check it out.  

>: >Nonetheless, deterrence, which is not all that *hard* IMHO, 
>: >should work well against national actors that value their survival.

>: I haven't even gotten to the issues of martyrdom in other terrorist 
>: organizations with no capitol to bomb back to the stoneage.  

>Exactly right again.  And what do you think these folks will use, a 
>ballistic missile or a car bomb?

Initially, a car bomb.  But not forever, and my contention is the next step 
is not 50 years away.  

[snip]

>: I guess we disagree on what is likely.  I suggest putting yourself in 
>: Hussein's shoes and consider what drives his (and others of his ilk) 
>: agenda. 
>: If all we do in issues of foreign affairs is assume our adversary will 
>: behave as we would, we may as well negotiate in front of the bathroom 
>: mirror.  
>
>Precisely why I don't think he'd do it.  If I'm Saddam, I want to 1) live 
>and 2) retain copntrol of my country.  How does nuking the US help me 
>achieve these goals?

Yep, we're talking two different things.  If Saddam is "capable" of putting 
one rocket here without our being able to stop him physically, he gets alot 
more stature in the world than he deserves.  The threat of massive 
retaliation still has it's value.  But it won't stop him from persuing 
rocket delivery systems.  I feel we need both a ready arsenal and a credible 
defense in the not-too-distant future.  


>: Sorry for the length of these posts, but it's a very interesting issue >: 
>: and a surprisingly civil discussion for usenet! :-)
>               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>Don't get me started!!  That's a real pet peeve of mine.  The first group 
>that I started posting in erupted into a ridiculous flame war (a war of 
>one, 
>as everyone soon ignored the fellow's rants, even those who agreed with 
>him).  Actual discussion is far more interesting.

Yeah, that's for sure.  I think that's the best response, too.  Just discuss 
things with the rational among us!

>Or perhaps my "jerk" has deterred your "butthead"??! ;)

Mutually Assured Flaming!  Geez, I'll have to reevaluate! ;-)

>regards,
>--
>David Birdsey | "Don't rejoice in Victory. For while you've killed the
>              |  Beast, the bitch that bore him is in heat again." 
>                                                      -Bertholt Brecht
>http://turnpike.net/metro/birdhaex/index.html

Cheers,

Andy.

-- 
Andrew Cott              MIT Lincoln Laboratory              cott@ll.mit.edu
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From: cott@ll.mit.edu (Andrew Cott)
Subject: Re: Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 1995 - text
Date: 1995/06/09
Message-ID: <3ra6fv$1d5@llnews.ll.mit.edu>
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