🚀 go-pugleaf

Subject: Re: Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 1995 - text
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,alt.war,bit.listserv.disarm-l
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Organization: der.Hoelle.Rache
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Andrew Cott (cott@ll.mit.edu) wrote:
: In article <3rahj1$p6k@news.cais.com>, birdhaex@cais3.cais.com says...

: >I would not argue that we would be happy about Saddam having nukes.  What 
: >I am arguing is that the utility of those nukes for Saddam vis-a-vis the 
: >U.S. is _extremely_ small.  

: Not true, in my opinion.  Look at the respect Nort Korea is suddenly 
: getting.  All they have is the potential for nuclear warheads on existing 
: short range missiles that threaten South Korea and Japan.  

Well, I don't think either of us is going to "convert" the other here, so 
I'll confine my post to just a couple of short comments.  As to DPRK, 
"respect" isn't quite what I'd call it.  But this does raise the 
"extended deterrence" issue and may be fodder for another thread when we 
are all not quite so busy . . .

: Saddam Hussein was persuing a nuclear capability around the time of the Gulf 
: War *and after*.  What do you suppose he was thinking?  (What do we suppose 
: he is thinking now?)

Probably that they haven't done a hellva lot of good (economy shattered, 
sanctions in effect, Kuwait liberated).

: >Well, gee, what an opportunity.  If Saddam nuked us _anywhere_, I would
: >most likely drop one on Bagdad (or wherever Saddam was).  If my intell 
: >was good enough, I'd also go after any facilities used to make them with 
: >conventional weapons.

: Once you are forced into brinksmanship, you've already lost your advantage. 
: Why should we just allow our strength to degrade to the point where we must 
: start a *new* cold war with another nation?  

It would not be a cold war.  It would be a very, very, short hot war.

: Also, I must restate that Hussein needn't have a nuclear warhead on an ICBM 
: to gain significant leverage over the United States and the rest of the 
: world.  If a working TMD system is created, we could field one in Kuwait 
: that would protect the entire world from Iraqi rockets (either real or on 
: the drawing board).  

This is a different issue, though.  We all perhaps are a bit guilty of 
combining TMD and BMD arguments.  In my mind, TMD is for the 
battlefield.  If, however, you feel safer because during peacetime a few 
systems were set up in New Jersey, I don't think that would "hurt," but I 
can't imagine against what threat (other than some terrorist on boat with 
a SLCM; but that is really pretty remote) it would protect us.  Anything 
intercontinetal is going out of the atmosphere first, and would likely be 
beyond the pale for such systems.  And, if it IS an ICBM, then the issues 
I've pointend out hold, IMHO.

: >And one deals with that, again, by making sure Saddam knows that if you 
: >use it, YOU lose everything.  BMD is not necessary to communicate that 
: >thought.

: No, no, no!  Will you threaten to bomb him for merely *having* a rocket?  
: Will you undertake a military action on Iraqi home soil in order to maintain 
: your diplomatic superiority?  Do you know where all the rockets are?  Is 
: there a rocket that you can't find, or is he just making it up?  Is it even 
: *in* Iraq?  When do you mobilize our rocket forces?  How often do you end up 
: going through this?  Is that Presidential pension really worth the 
: headaches?

No.  If he was developing nukes, then I would not oppose covert action to 
"assess" that situation.  No need for bluster there.  Simple, very firm, 
messages to Saddam that he loses all if he rolls one out to launch is enough.

: Yeah, this is the major point I'm trying to make.  Maybe I should sum up my 
: position here, in hopes of clarifying it simultaneously (well, it's worth a 
: shot ;-):

[ACs summation deleted]

Well, from my perspective, nuclear weapons have changed the way leaders 
must think about the use of force.  The ability to concentrate so much 
destructive power within suchg a short time frame changes the calculus 
that _any_ leader must make before using them.  While miscalculation and 
"accidents" can indeed happen, the nature of nuclear weapons distills 
policy making for the Qaddafis and Husseins (as well as the Clintons and 
the Yeltsins) to its essence: will the potential costs of the use of 
these weapons be outweighed by the gain?  Regardless of "culture" or 
doctrine, I believe that the answer is obvious as well as universal.  For 
that reason, BMD does not appear to me to be a wise use of scarce 
resources.  We cannot prepare for _all_ *possibilites*; rather, we should 
prepare for likely _probabilities_.  Take my share for BMD and put it in 
intelligence resources, so that we might prevent the McVeighs or their 
international kin from repeating the WTC or OKC.

End of sermon, please exit by the side doors . . .

--
David Birdsey | "Don't rejoice in Victory. For while you've killed the
              |  Beast, the bitch that bore him is in heat again." 
                                                      -Bertholt Brecht
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