🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <137@uniq.UUCP> rjnoe@uniq.UUCP (Roger Noe) writes:
>Because there is a *known* problem which poses a serious hazard to flying
>the shuttle.  A problem of this magnitude cannot go ignored....  The most
>rational philosophy is to seek out and identify all the problems and
>potential problems we can find.  Once those problems are known, solutions
>can be devised for them, within the limits of practicality (time, money,
>available technology, so forth).

   Exactly.  In this particular case the limit is not one of money -- the
cost of SRB redesign is amply justified by the resulting increase in launch
reliability -- but one of time.

>Once this is done what remains are problems for which perfect solutions have
>not been found and unknown problems.

   The SRB problem falls into the former category.  There is no perfect
solution (i.e., one which would be ready to fly tomorrow).

>[...] there's always going to be some risk, but at some point we have to
>decide if we're going to assume that risk.  Only one who is foolhardy would
>choose to ignore a known problem such as with the SRBs right now and say,
>"Sounds like an acceptable risk to me."

   This is where you are wrong.  What is foolish is to refuse to fly until
all known problems are fixed, regardless of the cost (in time and money).
It is also hypocritical, in that other equally serious problems are being
neglected while others get the publicity.  I think that any person who is
knowledgeable about the shuttle would agree that if the shuttle were to be
launched immediately, with simple precautions (e.g., not launching in arctic
weather!), that the risk of loss due to SSME malfunction would be substan-
tially than the risk of SRB failure.  The main engines are extremely com-
plicated, and an internal failure which would be minor in a more ordinary
piece of hardware could easily prove fatal inside of the SSME.  But we
accept this (known) risk of flying the shuttle; why are the SRB risks any
different?  In each case the only rational approach is to analyze the
risks and benefits of a launch and determine if it is desirable.

>Young and Crippen (and all the other astronauts who could have been chosen
>as the first two shuttle crew) believed they understood what could go wrong
>and what could be done about such problems.  Certainly they knew that some
>problems were unsolvable and would result in loss of orbiter and crew.
>Those problems were undoubtedly given most careful consideration and the
>conclusion was such problems were unlikely in the extreme.

   Nonsense.  I don't have access to internal NASA documents, but I'm sure
that the estimated probability of mission failure was at least 10-20%.  And
if it was at the low end of this range they were being unrealistic.
   The risk now, after 25 flights, is *much* less.

>The risk was deemed to be acceptable.  Had they known about this SRB mis-
>feature I would hope that they would have said the risk is unacceptable;
>let's do something about this problem first, then we'll fly.

   Why would you hope this?

>And that's what the astronauts seem to be saying now.

   As I have said, I find this impossible to believe.  Henry has quoted
sources which say otherwise.

>>    Finally, if the astronauts we have aren't willing to fly, then we
>> should be training some who are (whether or not shuttle flights are to
>> be resumed).
>
>Seriously, there is a big difference between bravery and stupidity.
>I think the astronauts who say they want to continue flying after the
>SRBs are fixed display a great deal of courage.

   Are you joking?  Why would anyone become an astronaut who is not willing
to accept the risks?
   The point is that the astronauts were willing to accept much greater
risks on the early flights, so why are lesser risks suddenly too much to
accept?

>I wouldn't want to fly with anyone so reckless as to propose resuming launch
>of shuttles without attempting to understand and fix the SRB problem.

   The problem *is* understood, and a large part of the fix is not flying in
certain conditions and taking certain precautions.
   *I* wouldn't want to fly with someone so irrational as to demand that
certain risks be reduced while other, larger risks remain.  Nor with someone
so irrational as to be willing to fly with a 10% unknown risk but not with
a 1% known risk.

>It's not that I don't think the goal is worth risking lives.  Quite the
>contrary, I do think the risk is worthwhile and I'm willing to take that
>risk personally.  But flying the shuttle now, without fixing the SRBs (at
>least!) first, is unconscionable.  Should the tragedy repeat itself, the
>result would be a waste of human life.  I cannot condone such a waste....

   I have this feeling that we are never going to understand each other.
I can't understand how you can worry so much about a few lives while millions
die every year whom you could have saved by giving them some food.  Or while
thousands are killed with weapons paid for by your tax dollars.  Or while
thousands of accident victims could be saved by an investment in trauma
centers.  If your desire is to save lives, it makes a lot more sense to
invest your dollars and time in those things than to worry about making the
shuttle safe.
   It seems instead that your interest is in saving a few *particular* lives.
And if you value the possible preservation of those particular lives more
than the benefits of resuming shuttle launches, then I can note that you are
being irrational, but I don't see how I can change your mind.

   -- David desJardins