🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <260@cartan.Berkeley.EDU> desj@brahms (David desJardins) writes:
> In article <137@uniq.UUCP> rjnoe@uniq.UUCP (Roger Noe) writes:
> >....  Once those problems are known, solutions
> >can be devised for them, within the limits of practicality (time, money,
> >available technology, so forth).
> 
>    Exactly.  In this particular case the limit is not one of money ...
> but one of time.

But is the perceived shortness of time due to unbridled eagerness to resume
launches, or is it because we've made a reasonable effort to discover previous-
ly unknown problems and to implement corrections for known problems?  Only the
latter is (in my opinion) proper justification for saying that further delay
is unwarranted.  When the point is reached where we can honestly say (not just
about the SRB joints, but about all the criticality-1 problems) that we've made
a reasonable attempt to rectify the problems we know about and that further
delay would be all out of proportion to the expected gains in safety and
functionality, then and only then will it be time to reconsider launching
again.  This is precisely what happened following the 204 fire and that's
precisely what we should be doing now.

> >....  Only one who is foolhardy would
> >choose to ignore a known problem such as with the SRBs right now and say,
> >"Sounds like an acceptable risk to me."
> 
>    This is where you are wrong.  What is foolish is to refuse to fly until
> all known problems are fixed, regardless of the cost (in time and money).

Just *who* is proposing that?  Not me.  Because to fix all known problems
either requires infinite time and money or the attitude of an ostrich.
I have neither.  What is important is that we not be reckless, that we
not take *unreasonable* risks.

> It is also hypocritical, in that other equally serious problems are being
> neglected while others get the publicity.  I think that any person who is
> knowledgeable about the shuttle would agree that if the shuttle were to be
> launched immediately, with simple precautions (e.g., not launching in arctic
> weather!), that the risk of loss due to SSME malfunction would be substan-
> tially than the risk of SRB failure.  The main engines are extremely com-
> plicated, and an internal failure which would be minor in a more ordinary
> piece of hardware could easily prove fatal inside of the SSME.  But we
> accept this (known) risk of flying the shuttle; why are the SRB risks any
> different?  In each case the only rational approach is to analyze the
> risks and benefits of a launch and determine if it is desirable.

As a matter of fact, that last sentence is where we are in agreement.  We
just have different conclusions.  The SRB problem, to use your example, is
different from the SSME situation in quite a few ways.  One way is that there's
not a lot more that can be done with the SSMEs to make them much safer, without
huge outlays in time and money.  Not true with the SRBs.  Several ideas have
come under consideration and none of them will take an incredible amount of
resources.  I had hoped (over ten years ago) that the STS would be completely
reusable, all liquid-fueled, with engines to provide power for the orbiter
vehicle to use to abort a landing, if necessary.  Expensive?  You bet.
But in the design phase, I think it would have been well worth it.  Do I
favor redesigning STS to that extent now?  Absolutely not; it's impractical.
It makes much more sense to fix the SRBs now.  As for what problems generate
publicity and receive attention by the media, I think we can trust NASA to
see that things get fixed, as long as we give them the money they need to
do the job.  I don't make a habit of second-guessing experts and telling
others how to do their jobs.

> >.... Certainly they knew that some
> >problems were unsolvable and would result in loss of orbiter and crew.
> >Those problems were undoubtedly given most careful consideration and the
> >conclusion was such problems were unlikely in the extreme.
> 
>    Nonsense.  I don't have access to internal NASA documents, but I'm sure
> that the estimated probability of mission failure was at least 10-20%.  And
> if it was at the low end of this range they were being unrealistic.

How can you say you're certain of the estimated probability of failure without
consulting experts?  Are you an aerospace risk assessment engineer?  And how
are you defining "mission failure" probability?  If you refer to the chance of
losing both orbiter and crew, you'd better check the figures.  I've worked in
aerospace, especially engineering on some very new designs, and I find it very
hard to believe that any responsible organization would insist on testing an
untried design if they calculated the probability of losing both pilot and
aircraft at one in five.  That's reckless.  If you can't reduce the chance
well below that, there's just no point in trying it, unless you were the one
who invested *all* the time, money, and talent in the project and it's only
your life at risk and therefore no one else at all has anything to lose if
you choose to be reckless.  (I am also ignoring here possibilities of risk
to innocent bystanders and the public at large, which would of course enter
into consideration in a real situation.)

> >....  Had they known about this SRB mis-
> >feature I would hope that they would have said the risk is unacceptable;
> >let's do something about this problem first, then we'll fly.
> 
>    Why would you hope this?

Obviously, to prevent an accident.  While it is ironic that it took an event
such as 51-L to get a 40 per cent increase in the NASA budget, I hardly look
upon this turn of events as very positive [sarcasm].  We are making the best of
an adverse situation, or we would be had we more presidential direction.  (I
used to say that the thing this country's space program lacked most was money;
now I think that our lack of strategic goals has overtaken even this.)  But
I see nothing desirable in taking unnecessary risks and then rationalizing any
accidents that do occur as the "cost of doing business" or as ways of getting
the public's attention and their money.  (I can just see it now - a novel that
claims an internal NASA conspiracy to blow up a shuttle and kill seven people
just to get some attention and more funding.  It's not even funny, and it could
very well happen.  The novel, that is.)

> >And that's what the astronauts seem to be saying now.
> 
>    As I have said, I find this impossible to believe.  Henry has quoted
> sources which say otherwise.

Certainly there is a range of opinions within the astronaut corps.  It does
consist of over eighty individuals.  I wish I knew some astronauts personally
so I could ask them what the consensus of opinion is, if there is one.  Failing
that, about all we can do is rely on the public statements of astronauts and
assume they are somewhat representative of the others.  John Young, Bob Crippen
and Sally Ride have all been outspoken in this area.  A number of other astro-
nauts have also made public comments on the subject.  These have been published
in newspapers, news magazines, and "Aviation Week" (which some people say is
more of a gossip column than a trade news magazine :-).  I have yet to read
one attributed statement by a flight-status astronaut that any group of them
believes that launches should resume immediately.

> >In article <207@cartan.Berkeley.EDU>, desj@brahms (David desJardins) writes:
> >...
> > >    Finally, if the astronauts we have aren't willing to fly, then we
> > > should be training some who are (whether or not shuttle flights are to
> > > be resumed).
> >
> >... there is a big difference between bravery and stupidity.
> >I think the astronauts who say they want to continue flying after the
> >SRBs are fixed display a great deal of courage.
> 
>    Are you joking?  Why would anyone become an astronaut who is not willing
> to accept the risks?

Depends what risks you mean.  There are risks that can't be avoided because of
our imperfect knowledge.  There are risks that can be lessened or circumvented
entirely through the application of technology, patience, and rational thought.
There are risks about which little can be done because of our limitations as
human beings.  There are risks about which we choose to do little or nothing
out of practical considerations.  I think anyone who would be an astronaut must
accept these risks.  This does not include risks of which we are aware and
about which we do nothing because we're in a hurry.  To accept such risks is
not courageous, it's temerarious.  Perhaps you've heard the saying, "There are
old pilots and there are bold pilots, but there are no old, bold pilots."

>    The point is that the astronauts were willing to accept much greater
> risks on the early flights, so why are lesser risks suddenly too much to
> accept?

I disagree with your assessment that the first shuttle flights were
riskier than is flying now with the problems the STS is known to have.
The SRBs, in particular, were among the elements with what was perceived
to be the lowest chance of failure.  Taking this as true meant that the
complete lack of a redundant system was acceptable.  The first two minutes
of a shuttle mission are anomalous; the lack of fail-redundancy is odd enough
but the SRBs at this point aren't even fail-safe!  You can lose two SSMEs
and still have ditching capability but if even one SRB malfunctions at this
point, that's "game over!"  (For those of you who saw "Aliens.")  The problem
existed on STS-1, but it wasn't until 51-L that it was commonly known.  And
that makes all the difference.

> >I wouldn't want to fly with anyone so reckless as to propose resuming launch
> >of shuttles without attempting to understand and fix the SRB problem.
> 
>    The problem *is* understood, and a large part of the fix is not flying in
> certain conditions and taking certain precautions.

Partially true.  But it's premature to say we thoroughly understand what
happened to 51-L, why it happened, what similar malfunctions could occur in
future flights and how to lessen the chance that they will happen.  It was only
a few weeks ago, I think, that Morton Thiokol duplicated the joint rupture for
the first time since the accident.  You seem to agree that the shuttle should
not fly (at least) until this problem is understood and fixed, to whatever
extent is feasible.  The difference of opinion is over whether or not the
problem has yet been understood, fixed, and what the limits of feasibility are.

>    *I* wouldn't want to fly with someone so irrational as to demand that
> certain risks be reduced while other, larger risks remain.  Nor with someone
> so irrational as to be willing to fly with a 10% unknown risk but not with
> a 1% known risk.

Where do you get these ideas, David?  I'm in favor of reducing *all* major
risks, when practical and clearly beneficial to do so.  And how can you
measure the amount of unknown risk?  Rational behavior dictates doing what
is practical to reduce known risks.  You can't do much about unknown ones.

> >It's not that I don't think the goal is worth risking lives.  Quite the
> >contrary, I do think the risk is worthwhile and I'm willing to take that
> >risk personally.  But flying the shuttle now, without fixing the SRBs (at
> >least!) first, is unconscionable.  Should the tragedy repeat itself, the
> >result would be a waste of human life.  I cannot condone such a waste....
> 
>    I have this feeling that we are never going to understand each other.

How well one understands others is largely a result of how much one wants to
understand others.  I can understand precisely why you say what you say but
still disagree with your conclusions.

> I can't understand how you can worry so much about a few lives while millions
> die every year whom you could have saved by giving them some food.  Or while
> thousands are killed with weapons paid for by your tax dollars.  Or while
> thousands of accident victims could be saved by an investment in trauma
> centers.  If your desire is to save lives, it makes a lot more sense to
> invest your dollars and time in those things than to worry about making the
> shuttle safe.

This reeks of the same thinking that some people have used over the last two
decades in protest of spending money on space exploration.  "Why spend billions
on going to space when there are people starving in Berkeley, California?"
The argument is specious and has been presented and refuted too many times
already.  I think we've got better things to do with sci.space.shuttle.

>    It seems instead that your interest is in saving a few *particular* lives.

Yes!  Have you figured out *why* I am so concerned with these few particular
lives?  Because when we lose them we stand a chance of losing our space
program.  As valuable as I consider individual human lives to be, I think
the continued exploration of space is more important.  If we proceed too
quickly, if we aren't careful enough, if we WASTE human lives in an accident
that should have been avoided, then the citizens of this country just may
decide that people don't belong in space and that decision would be more of
a tragedy than the death of seven remarkable people.  The exploration of space,
especially by people, holds such promise for our species that my attitude is
that it MUST NOT be stopped.  I have my sights set on the long term and I
don't want to see that goal traded off for one or two years of shuttle
missions in the short term.  Rash actions now may do just that.

> And if you value the possible preservation of those particular lives more
> than the benefits of resuming shuttle launches, then I can note that you are
> being irrational, but I don't see how I can change your mind.
> 
>    -- David desJardins

You may have that opinion, but you should see now why I think it is more
rational to be patient, to assure the long-term continuation and expansion
of space exploration rather than resuming shuttle launches one year ahead of
the current schedule.  As for changing my mind, you have no more chance of so
doing than I do of *wanting* to change your mind or anybody else's.  I value
differences in how people think, even when I disagree strongly with their
ideas.  It is precisely this kind of dialogue which will sustain people's
interest over the long dry spell until we're back in space again.  Such
exchange of ideas will ultimately make our space program stronger and space
exploration will eventually benefit the human race far in excess of its
cost.
	Roger Noe			ihnp4!uniq!rjnoe
	Uniq Digital Technologies	(312) 879-1566
	Batavia, Illinois  60510	41:51:10 N.  88:18:25 W.
--
"While chaotic and inane ramblings abound, [USENET] is quite popular."
	Communications of the ACM, vol. 29, no. 10 (Oct. 1986), p. 958.