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Article #287Re: Hubble's mirror
From: John Roberts
Date: Wed, 04 Nov 1992 14:31
Date: Wed, 04 Nov 1992 14:31
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-From: dhl@mrdog.msl.com (Donald H. Locker) -Subject: Hubble's mirror -Date: 3 Nov 92 21:39:06 GMT -Organization: Chelsea MSL, Inc., Chelsea, MI -Now that I know a little about mirror-making, I'd like to hear again -how the Hubble mirror contractor messed up the figure of the main -mirror. I understand it has spherical aberration, but wonder how -[Rockwell?] managed to do that. The contractor who made the mirror was Perkin Elmer (now Hughes Danbury). The manufacture specification called for the use of two "null correctors" - a highly accurate reflective corrector, and a less accurate corrector, which I believe was based on transmission rather than reflection. The reflective corrector is designed to be set to a range of figures, so it can be used for many different mirrors. To make sure it was set correctly for the HST primary mirror, a calibration rod was provided by NIST. Two or three Perkin Elmer employees set the adjustment of the corrector, and unfortunately they used the calibration rod incorrectly, thus giving the reflective corrector the wrong setting. The reflective null corrector was used in the manufacture of the mirror and in the most precise tests, so while the final figure of the mirror matched very precisely the setting of the reflective corrector, it was the wrong figure. Tests were made (as required in the spec) using the transmission corrector, and those tests *did* show the error, but Perkin Elmer made the arbitrary decision that since the reflective corrector was so much more precise, any discrepancy must be the fault of the transmission corrector. Furthermore, they didn't bother to inform NASA of the discrepancy. (NASA only had something like a third of the number of inspectors that they would normally use for a project of this size and complexity, attributed to severe budget cuts in the project and heavy pressure from DOD to keep out of the manufacturing process.) There was an opportunity to conduct an integrated test of the finished telescope, but this was not done because of concerns that the mirror might become contaminated with organic matter and thus useless in the UV spectrum (perhaps a good thing, because UV astronomy is now one of the strongest points of HST), and because such a test could not adequately compensate for gravitational effects, etc., and thus would not have determined whether the scope was fully within specs. (It would have detected the large error present, but there was no reason to believe there would be such an error, assuming that Perkin Elmer had done their job with the previous testing. Also, I suspect that if the error *had* been detected after assembly, it might well have led to cancellation of the entire project - the time to find the error was before assembly.) Fortunately, there is considerable hope that the WF/PC II installation (which had been planned even before discovery of the error) and the addition of COSTAR will compensate for nearly all of the error, at an incremental cost of only a small fraction of the initial cost of HST. (The main loss is three years of the best measurements - HST is even now producing world-class results, but it could have been doing even better without the error. Computational deconvolution has been helping considerably, at least for bright objects. The High Speed Photometer instrument will be sacrificed for the installation of COSTAR, but it's been the least-used instrument - only employed a few times.) Other changes planned for the upcoming HST Shuttle service mission: - The European supplied solar panels that cause HST to wobble for several minutes after each day-night transition will be replaced with new panels (also from Europe, but they claim that this time they got the design right). - Some of the gyroscopes needed for the most precise attitude sensing have gone bad, thus reducing the redundancy of the system. The bad ones are scheduled to be replaced. - There *may* be a plan to replace the current control computer with a more powerful one, which would make it easier to handle complex maneuvers like compensation for wobbling. (I don't remember whether that's scheduled or not.) All of that is old news - here's something new: NASA is now seriously considering suing Hughes Danbury for failing to inform them of the errors they detected. John Roberts roberts@cmr.ncsl.nist.gov
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Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!ogicse!das-news.harvard.edu!cantaloupe.srv.cs.cmu.edu!crabapple.srv.cs.cmu.edu!roberts@cmr.ncsl.nist.gov From: roberts@cmr.ncsl.nist.gov (John Roberts) Newsgroups: sci.space Subject: Re: Hubble's mirror Message-ID: <Bx74H8.K5n.1@cs.cmu.edu> Date: 4 Nov 92 14:31:55 GMT Article-I.D.: cs.Bx74H8.K5n.1 Sender: news+@cs.cmu.edu Distribution: sci Organization: National Institute of Standards and Technology formerly National Bureau of Standards Lines: 76 Approved: bboard-news_gateway X-Added: Forwarded by Space Digest Original-Sender: isu@VACATION.VENARI.CS.CMU.EDU