🚀 go-pugleaf

In <1992Dec31.223517.18578@iti.org> aws@iti.org (Allen W. Sherzer) writes:

>In article <C04M9F.58D.1@cs.cmu.edu> roberts@cmr.ncsl.nist.gov (John Roberts) writes:

>>Allen generally takes projected "worst-case" cost estimates for DC
>>and multiplies them by two or more in making his calculations, which
>>I think shows he is aware of the problem. 

>Actually, I doubled the estimates I have seen. They are more likely to
>be the reasonable estimates and not 'worst-case' estimates.


>>I should make one additional point regarding Allen's calculations - they
>>don't include the large opportunity cost if the Shuttle program should
>>be cancelled before DC is fully operational 

>I con't follow this. It seems to me that if Shuttle is cancled it could
>more than double the market for DC flights. This could roughly cut DC
>costs in half.

Opportunity costs have little to do with the costs of DC in the
scenario given, Allen.  Opportunity cost is an economics term used to
describe the things given up because a choice is made.  The large
opportunity cost being described is NOT being able to do certain
things for a number of years if we scrap the Shuttle before DC is
ready to replace it.

As an example, one of the 'opportunity costs' of scrapping our prior
capability before the Shuttle was ready was the loss of Skylab
(because we had made a choice that left us with no ability to reboost
it). 

-- 
"Insisting on perfect safety is for people who don't have the balls to live
 in the real world."   -- Mary Shafer, NASA Ames Dryden
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Fred.McCall@dseg.ti.com - I don't speak for others and they don't speak for me.