🚀 go-pugleaf

"Maximo Lachman" <di540@FreeNet.Carleton.CA> wrote in message
news:anj1j6$b1t$1@freenet9.carleton.ca...
> http://www.gulfwarvets.com/hot.htm
> FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
> 2 Oct. 2002
> Contact Person: Gary Treece
>
> VETERANS GROUP CALLS FOR
>  RUMSFELD RESIGNATION
>
>    The American Gulf War Veterans Association (AGWVA) now calls for the
>    resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In response to
>    questioning by Sen. Robert C. Byrd, (D-WV), Rumsfeld denied any
>    knowledge that the United States had shipped biological weapons to
>    Iraq during the 1980s. Rumsfeld was addressing the Armed Services
>    Committee last week, when he stated that he had "no knowledge" of any
>    such shipments and doubted that they ever occurred.
>
>    There is no disputing the evidence that the U.S. provided bacteria and
>    viruses as evidenced by Senate Report 103-900, United States Dual-Use
>    Exports To Iraq And Their Impact On the Health of The Persian Gulf War
>    Veterans, dated May 25,1994, chaired by Sen. Donald Riegle (D-MI) of
>    the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee. This Senate report
>    was available to all senators and listed among other items, Bacillus
>    Anthracis, (anthrax) Clostridium botulinum, and West Nile Fever Virus
>    as pathogens that were shipped to Iraq in the 1980s with the full
>    knowledge of the Department of Commerce and the CDC.
>
>          http://www.gulfweb.org/bigdoc/report/r_1_2.html#exports
>
>    There is no question that the Secretary of Defense must be informed
>    and up to date with information about a potential military enemy and
>    his military capabilities. Mr. Rumsfelds statements demonstrate that
>    this is clearly not the case.
>
>    If our Secretary of Defense is unaware of the sales of biological
>    materials to a country with which we are about to go to war, or if he
>    is in denial over the fact that these sales occurred, the AGWVA
>    believes that he represents a clear and present danger to the lives of
>    our military, our country, and the American people, and should be
>    considered a very serious threat to the national security. It is for
>    this reason that the AGWVA calls for his resignation and removal from
>    office.

The underlying suggestion in this tirade is that the US knowingly
contributed to biological weapons development in Iraq, instead of the
reality of the usual international supply of material for the development of
vaccines. This canard seems part of  campaign to somehow claim that the US
willingly helped development of Iraq's WMD and so undermine the impetus to
disarm Hussein of these internationally-illegal weapons.

NL

Maximo Lachman wrote:
> 
> http://www.gulfwarvets.com/hot.htm
> FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
> 2 Oct. 2002
> Contact Person: Gary Treece
> 
> VETERANS GROUP CALLS FOR
>  RUMSFELD RESIGNATION
> 
>    The American Gulf War Veterans Association (AGWVA) now calls for the
>    resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In response to
>    questioning by Sen. Robert C. Byrd, (D-WV), Rumsfeld denied any
>    knowledge that the United States had shipped biological weapons to
>    Iraq during the 1980s. Rumsfeld was addressing the Armed Services
>    Committee last week, when he stated that he had "no knowledge" of any
>    such shipments and doubted that they ever occurred.
> 
>    There is no disputing the evidence that the U.S. provided bacteria and
>    viruses as evidenced by Senate Report 103-900, United States Dual-Use
>    Exports To Iraq And Their Impact On the Health of The Persian Gulf War
>    Veterans, dated May 25,1994, chaired by Sen. Donald Riegle (D-MI) of
>    the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee. This Senate report
>    was available to all senators and listed among other items, Bacillus
>    Anthracis, (anthrax) Clostridium botulinum, and West Nile Fever Virus
>    as pathogens that were shipped to Iraq in the 1980s with the full
>    knowledge of the Department of Commerce and the CDC.
> 
>          http://www.gulfweb.org/bigdoc/report/r_1_2.html#exports
> 
>    There is no question that the Secretary of Defense must be informed
>    and up to date with information about a potential military enemy and
>    his military capabilities. Mr. Rumsfelds statements demonstrate that
>    this is clearly not the case.
> 
>    If our Secretary of Defense is unaware of the sales of biological
>    materials to a country with which we are about to go to war, or if he
>    is in denial over the fact that these sales occurred, the AGWVA
>    believes that he represents a clear and present danger to the lives of
>    our military, our country, and the American people, and should be
>    considered a very serious threat to the national security. It is for
>    this reason that the AGWVA calls for his resignation and removal from
>    office.

This is irresponsible garbage. It has already been widely reported in
the news how Iraq took advantage of its access to the normal supplies of
bacteriological cultures for ordinary medical and pharmaceutical
research and abused the privileges. Note how the news story cites the
dual use of the bacteriological cultures. This is nothing more than
misrepresenting the statements of Rumsfeld and others to make false
implications for prejudiced political purposes.

Dallas Patterson
nye@fidalgo.net

"D. Patterson" <nye@fidalgo.net> wrote in message
news:3D9D0F26.405CE2B6@fidalgo.net...
> Maximo Lachman wrote:
> >
> > http://www.gulfwarvets.com/hot.htm
> > FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
> > 2 Oct. 2002
> > Contact Person: Gary Treece
> >
> > VETERANS GROUP CALLS FOR
> >  RUMSFELD RESIGNATION
> >
> >    The American Gulf War Veterans Association (AGWVA) now calls for the
> >    resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In response to
> >    questioning by Sen. Robert C. Byrd, (D-WV), Rumsfeld denied any
> >    knowledge that the United States had shipped biological weapons to
> >    Iraq during the 1980s. Rumsfeld was addressing the Armed Services
> >    Committee last week, when he stated that he had "no knowledge" of any
> >    such shipments and doubted that they ever occurred.
> >
> >    There is no disputing the evidence that the U.S. provided bacteria
and
> >    viruses as evidenced by Senate Report 103-900, United States Dual-Use
> >    Exports To Iraq And Their Impact On the Health of The Persian Gulf
War
> >    Veterans, dated May 25,1994, chaired by Sen. Donald Riegle (D-MI) of
> >    the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee. This Senate report
> >    was available to all senators and listed among other items, Bacillus
> >    Anthracis, (anthrax) Clostridium botulinum, and West Nile Fever Virus
> >    as pathogens that were shipped to Iraq in the 1980s with the full
> >    knowledge of the Department of Commerce and the CDC.
> >
> >          http://www.gulfweb.org/bigdoc/report/r_1_2.html#exports
> >
> >    There is no question that the Secretary of Defense must be informed
> >    and up to date with information about a potential military enemy and
> >    his military capabilities. Mr. Rumsfelds statements demonstrate that
> >    this is clearly not the case.
> >
> >    If our Secretary of Defense is unaware of the sales of biological
> >    materials to a country with which we are about to go to war, or if he
> >    is in denial over the fact that these sales occurred, the AGWVA
> >    believes that he represents a clear and present danger to the lives
of
> >    our military, our country, and the American people, and should be
> >    considered a very serious threat to the national security. It is for
> >    this reason that the AGWVA calls for his resignation and removal from
> >    office.
>
> This is irresponsible garbage. It has already been widely reported in
> the news how Iraq took advantage of its access to the normal supplies of
> bacteriological cultures for ordinary medical and pharmaceutical
> research and abused the privileges. Note how the news story cites the
> dual use of the bacteriological cultures. This is nothing more than
> misrepresenting the statements of Rumsfeld and others to make false
> implications for prejudiced political purposes.
>
> Dallas Patterson
> nye@fidalgo.net

Of course if the US had not supplied these cultures, these propagandists
would be screaming "Half a million dead babies because US denies Iraq
vaccines".

NL

Neville Lindsay wrote:
> 
> "D. Patterson" <nye@fidalgo.net> wrote in message
> news:3D9D0F26.405CE2B6@fidalgo.net...
> > Maximo Lachman wrote:
> > >
> > > http://www.gulfwarvets.com/hot.htm
> > > FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
> > > 2 Oct. 2002
> > > Contact Person: Gary Treece
> > >
> > > VETERANS GROUP CALLS FOR
> > >  RUMSFELD RESIGNATION
> > >
> > >    The American Gulf War Veterans Association (AGWVA) now calls for the
> > >    resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In response to
> > >    questioning by Sen. Robert C. Byrd, (D-WV), Rumsfeld denied any
> > >    knowledge that the United States had shipped biological weapons to
> > >    Iraq during the 1980s. Rumsfeld was addressing the Armed Services
> > >    Committee last week, when he stated that he had "no knowledge" of any
> > >    such shipments and doubted that they ever occurred.
> > >
> > >    There is no disputing the evidence that the U.S. provided bacteria
> and
> > >    viruses as evidenced by Senate Report 103-900, United States Dual-Use
> > >    Exports To Iraq And Their Impact On the Health of The Persian Gulf
> War
> > >    Veterans, dated May 25,1994, chaired by Sen. Donald Riegle (D-MI) of
> > >    the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee. This Senate report
> > >    was available to all senators and listed among other items, Bacillus
> > >    Anthracis, (anthrax) Clostridium botulinum, and West Nile Fever Virus
> > >    as pathogens that were shipped to Iraq in the 1980s with the full
> > >    knowledge of the Department of Commerce and the CDC.
> > >
> > >          http://www.gulfweb.org/bigdoc/report/r_1_2.html#exports
> > >
> > >    There is no question that the Secretary of Defense must be informed
> > >    and up to date with information about a potential military enemy and
> > >    his military capabilities. Mr. Rumsfelds statements demonstrate that
> > >    this is clearly not the case.
> > >
> > >    If our Secretary of Defense is unaware of the sales of biological
> > >    materials to a country with which we are about to go to war, or if he
> > >    is in denial over the fact that these sales occurred, the AGWVA
> > >    believes that he represents a clear and present danger to the lives
> of
> > >    our military, our country, and the American people, and should be
> > >    considered a very serious threat to the national security. It is for
> > >    this reason that the AGWVA calls for his resignation and removal from
> > >    office.
> >
> > This is irresponsible garbage. It has already been widely reported in
> > the news how Iraq took advantage of its access to the normal supplies of
> > bacteriological cultures for ordinary medical and pharmaceutical
> > research and abused the privileges. Note how the news story cites the
> > dual use of the bacteriological cultures. This is nothing more than
> > misrepresenting the statements of Rumsfeld and others to make false
> > implications for prejudiced political purposes.
> >
> > Dallas Patterson
> > nye@fidalgo.net
> 
> Of course if the US had not supplied these cultures, these propagandists
> would be screaming "Half a million dead babies because US denies Iraq
> vaccines".
> 
> NL

You've got that right, Neville.

Dallas

Bruce Girrell wrote:
> 
> On Fri, 04 Oct 2002 03:35:44 GMT, "Neville Lindsay"
> <nevlin@bigpond.net.au> wrote:
> 
> >The underlying suggestion in this tirade is that the US knowingly
> >contributed to biological weapons development in Iraq, instead of the
> >reality of the usual international supply of material for the development of
> >vaccines.
> 
> Are you truly so naive that you can look at that list of materials
> that we shipped to them and not think that it would be used for
> biological weapons???
> 
> Here, try this: Order some ephedrine and hydroiodic acid from your
> local chemical supplier. After the DEA kicks in your door, explain to
> them that you only planned to do some organic chemistry experiments
> and that you had no intention to make any methamphetamine. I'm sure
> that they will believe you because lots of people use these same
> chemicals for good purposes. They will believe you, right? Sure. And I
> believe you that Iraq planned to use those agents for vaccines, too.
> 
> B.G.

Having made the above accusation, are we to believe that you are now
prepared to demonstrate with evidence which of those biological
materials CANNOT be used in such internationally recognized, customary,
lawful, and non-military applied sciences as healthcare, agriculture,
and industrial engineering?

Dallas Patterson
nye@fidalgo.net

"Bruce Girrell" <bigirrell@microlinetc.com> wrote in message
news:3da225fe.247594668@news.cis.dfn.de...
> On Fri, 04 Oct 2002 03:35:44 GMT, "Neville Lindsay"
> <nevlin@bigpond.net.au> wrote:
>
> >The underlying suggestion in this tirade is that the US knowingly
> >contributed to biological weapons development in Iraq, instead of the
> >reality of the usual international supply of material for the development
of
> >vaccines.
>
>
> Are you truly so naive that you can look at that list of materials
> that we shipped to them and not think that it would be used for
> biological weapons???
>
> Here, try this: Order some ephedrine and hydroiodic acid from your
> local chemical supplier. After the DEA kicks in your door, explain to
> them that you only planned to do some organic chemistry experiments
> and that you had no intention to make any methamphetamine. I'm sure
> that they will believe you because lots of people use these same
> chemicals for good purposes. They will believe you, right? Sure. And I
> believe you that Iraq planned to use those agents for vaccines, too.
>
> B.G.

So you gang up a list of imports which appear on any country's list of
imports, put some of them on the _same_ sub-list as the cultures, and hey
presto, the US government is encouraging Hussein to develop biological
weapons. Well, well, you make it entirely clear where you are coming from,
and the weight we can put on your allegations. You are not naive, but an
obvious propagandist.

NL

On Fri, 04 Oct 2002 03:35:44 GMT, "Neville Lindsay"
<nevlin@bigpond.net.au> wrote:

>The underlying suggestion in this tirade is that the US knowingly
>contributed to biological weapons development in Iraq, instead of the
>reality of the usual international supply of material for the development of
>vaccines. 


Are you truly so naive that you can look at that list of materials
that we shipped to them and not think that it would be used for
biological weapons???

Here, try this: Order some ephedrine and hydroiodic acid from your
local chemical supplier. After the DEA kicks in your door, explain to
them that you only planned to do some organic chemistry experiments
and that you had no intention to make any methamphetamine. I'm sure
that they will believe you because lots of people use these same
chemicals for good purposes. They will believe you, right? Sure. And I
believe you that Iraq planned to use those agents for vaccines, too.

B.G.

Bruce Girrell wrote:
> 
> On Mon, 07 Oct 2002 15:52:56 -0700, "D. Patterson" <nye@fidalgo.net>
> wrote:
> 
> >Having made the above accusation, are we to believe that you are now
> >prepared to demonstrate with evidence which of those biological
> >materials CANNOT be used in such internationally recognized, customary,
> >lawful, and non-military applied sciences as healthcare, agriculture,
> >and industrial engineering?
> 
> As I tried to demonstrate in my example, the fact that an agent CAN be
> use legally does not necessarily mean the someone that you give it to
> has intentions to use it legally. Ephedrine certainly has legal uses.
> Hydroiodic acid certainly has valid industrial uses. Yet, possession
> of these substances is considered by the DEA as proof that you intend
> to manufacture methamphetamine.
> 
> So, given that our own scientists have yet to develop a vaccine for
> aerosol anthrax, do you feel that we somehow felt that the Iraqis
> would be able to develop one on their own? How many other cases of
> anthrax were the Iraqis facing per year that it warranted shipping
> such a dangerous agent to them at that time?
> 
> I remain unconvinced that their intention was to use this for vaccine
> research. I challenge you instead to prove that their intent was
> valid. Just as I would have to prove to the DEA that I had a true need
> for certain drug precursors, it would seem that the onus would be on
> the Iraqis (and hence you, since you're siding with them) to prove
> that they really had a valid need for these agents. It seems terribly
> irresponsible of us to simply be handing out this kind of material to
> anyone who asks just because they happen to have a university with a
> medical program. What was their justification for needing this? If
> they did, indeed, have an outbreak of cutaneous anthrax, couldn't we
> have supplied them with vaccine instead of the raw bacillus?
> 
> Bruce Girrell

You obviously fail to understand how dangerous biological materials are
routinely used in civilian applications in the international community.
You also fail to understand the legal and practical distinctions between
governmental and private possession of these biological materials.
Whether you want to believe it or not, there is a presumptive right
under international law for any sovereign government to possess and use
any substance it wishes, if the substance is not used to proliferate a
substance or weapon of mass destruction prohibited by international
agreement and/or international law. That is why there is a difficulty
with substances which have a dual-use capability. 

The biological materials are routinely used in research and engineering
applications for animal husbandry, veterinary science, medical science,
and industrial engineering by many nations around the world. Iraq, for
example, has or once had some of the most extensive beef production in
the Arab world. Anthrax research and pharmeceutical applications is of
vital concern to all veterinary scientists, and Iraq's applications
Anthrax research to civilian food production is no exception. Deliveries
of such dual-use substances cannot be terminated without serious
repercussions to the civilian community and an impact upon international
relations. Being a member of the United Nations and the World Health
Organization (WHO), Iraq had a presumptive right to participate in the
international exchange of biological materials for peaceful civilian
purposes. However, Iraq did not possess a right to research, develop,
possess, or deploy bacteriological weapons prohibited by international
agreements, treaties, and laws. Consequently, the international
community and the United States have faced a problem of how and when to
terminate Iraq's access to the international exchanges of biological
materials without also violating the international agreements concerning
their use for lawful civilian and governmental purposes.

Consequently, your challenge "to prove that their intent was valid" is
entirely inappropriate. Due to their mutual membership in the United
Nations and the World Health Organization, the onus was upon the United
States to prove that Iraq was using the biological materials to produce
biological weapons prohibited by international law, before the shipments
of biological material were terminated. These international agreements
exist, so that international exchanges of dangerous biological materials
can be accomplished in a timely and routine manner for humanitarian
purposes and without interference from international political disputes.
Iraq had no extraordinary legal responsibility to prove a need for the
materials, because such a need is implicit by their membership in the
United Nations and World Health Organization (WHO). Your concern about
the Iraqi research in aerosolized Anthrax is insufficient as well. There
are legitimate civilian purposes for such research. Iraq may also be
entitled to conduct military research for the purposes of developing
defensive vaccines, unless the research is also used to produce
weaponized Anthrax and Anthrax weapons. Once it was proven that Iraq did
in fact produce and deploy Anthrax weapons prohibited by international
agreements and law, the United States then had an internationally
recognized cause for terminating exchanges of biological materials for
civilian and humanitarian purposes which could also be used for the
illegal biowarfare purposes.

The United States terminated the shipments of the biological materials
once it was able to demonstrate that Iraq used those biological
materials to produce the prohibited weapons.

Since you object to the shipment of the biological materials by the
United States, you need to have the international agreements, customs,
and laws changed to relieve the United States from the obligations to
deliver biological materials imposed by those international authorities.
Otherwise, you need to demonstrate with evidence which of those
biological materials CANNOT be used in such internationally recognized,
customary, lawful, and non-military applied sciences as healthcare,
agriculture, and industrial engineering; or you must demonstrate that
Iraq is using a dual-use biological material to produce biological
weapons whose possession is prohibited by international law.

Dallas Patterson
nye@fidalgo.net

On Mon, 07 Oct 2002 15:52:56 -0700, "D. Patterson" <nye@fidalgo.net>
wrote:

>Having made the above accusation, are we to believe that you are now
>prepared to demonstrate with evidence which of those biological
>materials CANNOT be used in such internationally recognized, customary,
>lawful, and non-military applied sciences as healthcare, agriculture,
>and industrial engineering?

As I tried to demonstrate in my example, the fact that an agent CAN be
use legally does not necessarily mean the someone that you give it to
has intentions to use it legally. Ephedrine certainly has legal uses.
Hydroiodic acid certainly has valid industrial uses. Yet, possession
of these substances is considered by the DEA as proof that you intend
to manufacture methamphetamine.

So, given that our own scientists have yet to develop a vaccine for
aerosol anthrax, do you feel that we somehow felt that the Iraqis
would be able to develop one on their own? How many other cases of
anthrax were the Iraqis facing per year that it warranted shipping
such a dangerous agent to them at that time? 

I remain unconvinced that their intention was to use this for vaccine
research. I challenge you instead to prove that their intent was
valid. Just as I would have to prove to the DEA that I had a true need
for certain drug precursors, it would seem that the onus would be on
the Iraqis (and hence you, since you're siding with them) to prove
that they really had a valid need for these agents. It seems terribly
irresponsible of us to simply be handing out this kind of material to
anyone who asks just because they happen to have a university with a
medical program. What was their justification for needing this? If
they did, indeed, have an outbreak of cutaneous anthrax, couldn't we
have supplied them with vaccine instead of the raw bacillus?

Bruce Girrell

You raise interesting and seemingly valid points. And I say
"seemingly" only because I have not had time yet to research them. I
am replying at this point primarily to let you know that I have read
your response; I do not want you to think that I simply went away in a
huff. It looks as though it may take some time to look into the
information that you have put forth.

You are correct that I am not an authority on international law,
especially when it comes to exotic substances. I appreciate your
explanation.

To me it seems as though our government would have to have been
wearing blinders not to know that Saddam would misuse any stock of
such dangerous material. OTOH, from what you say, it sounds as though
they may have found themselves between a rock and a hard place, i.e.,
they may have suspected that he would misuse them but didn't see a way
around providing the material without causing an even worse
international incident. Do I have that right?

I would appreciate any references that you might have regarding the
laws that you are referring to regarding the international shipment of
these nasties. What did we agree to that would have kept us from
saying, "Wait. I know we have these agreements, but Saddam, buddy,
you're all tangled up with Iran right now. If we send you this stuff,
surely somebody over there that shouldn't have some of it is going to
end up with some and we are afraid that you might want to use it
against Iran and maybe others."?

Bruce Girrell

Bruce Girrell wrote:
> 
> You raise interesting and seemingly valid points. And I say
> "seemingly" only because I have not had time yet to research them. I
> am replying at this point primarily to let you know that I have read
> your response; I do not want you to think that I simply went away in a
> huff. It looks as though it may take some time to look into the
> information that you have put forth.
> 
> You are correct that I am not an authority on international law,
> especially when it comes to exotic substances. I appreciate your
> explanation.
> 

It should also help for you to understand that the biological materials
supplied to the Iraqi Government were not really all that exotic, except
to the extent of which they were so-called type specimans used as type
standards for scientific analysis.

In other words, the biological materials represented a previously
studied and scientifically described sample of such biological
materials. They did not represent biological materials which could not
be obtained in Iraq itself or elsewhere around the world. Anthrax,
Tularemia, E. coli, and these other biological materials can be found in
the wild and in livestock populations all around the world, and
especially in underdeveloped nations like Iraq. The difference is the
way in which samples from the different sources have been scientifically
studied and described to provide a baseline for scientific comparison to
samples which have not been collected and subjected to close study,
scrutiny, and experimentation. It is sort of like comparing an expensive
lab bred white rabbit to the a brown rabbit found in the wild. The white
rabbit is very carefully bred and studied to give scientists a known
baseline of data for comparison to variant samples from the laboratory
or from the wild.

Consequently, the supply or non-supply of these biological materials is
much more limited in its effect upon biowarfare research than it is upon
civilian research for humanitarian purposes. The biowarfare research can
isolate its own samples of these biological materials from local
sources, because they are not necessarily interested in producing
vaccines to combat a wide variety of variants in the wild. A biowarfare
program is more interested in developing one or a few variants with
enhanced characteristics and potency, and/or developing defensive
vaccines against a limited number of enhanced variants. The use of the
type cultures from the American laboratory suppliers benefits the
biowarfare program only to the extent of which it may save some limited
time and uncertainty in the research. However, that benefit is not
necessarily critical to the ultimate success of the Iraqi biowarfare
research.

If anything, the withholding of these reference supplies of biological
materials can impede the production of vaccines for livestock herds in
Iraq. The natural sources of infections of these diseases present the
scientific community with an endless supply of variants. The laboratory
bred samples give the scientists and clinicians a tool for identifying
the wild variants and more quickly developing vaccines which can
effectively cope with the wild variants. Withholding the laboratory
samples of the diseases can impede the timely civilian development of
effective vaccines. Without the timely introduction of effective
vaccines, you can expect to see an increase in the rate of natural
infections among livestock and people inside and outside of Iraq.

> To me it seems as though our government would have to have been
> wearing blinders not to know that Saddam would misuse any stock of
> such dangerous material. OTOH, from what you say, it sounds as though
> they may have found themselves between a rock and a hard place, i.e.,
> they may have suspected that he would misuse them but didn't see a way
> around providing the material without causing an even worse
> international incident. Do I have that right?
> 

You have it partially right. You described the biological materials as
"such dangerous material." Yes, the biological materials were samples of
diseases which are dangerous when handled improperly. However, so are
countless chemicals, pharmeceuticals, and other products which are
important or even vital to the health and welfare of a civilian
population. During World War One, for example, it was vital to the war
effort for the British Royal Navy to stop merchant shipping from
importing bird guano, a natural agricultural fertilizer, from South
America and other parts of the world. Until the devleopment of chemical
plants capable of producing industrial quantities of synthetic nitrogen,
Germany had to rely upon natural sources of nitrogen to use in the
manufacture of explosives and ammunition for the war. In this example,
bird guano, an agricultural fertiler used for food production, was once
a "dangerous" dual-use and strategic material for warfare.

In our current case, it is not necessarily a good idea to allow Iraq to
have completely unfettered access to supplies of biological materials in
the United States, but Iraq's access to those supplies in the past is
not the unique and explosive problem which sensationalists have tried to
claim. Unlike Germany's need for massive supplies of bird guano in WWI,
Iraq's biowarfare did not absolutely need the non-domestic supplies of
biological materials. They could, if need be, grow their own disease
samples from local sources. Consequently, the danger inherent in the
shipments of biological material from the United States is being blown
way out proportion. A shipload of bird guano is also dangerous if you
breathe too much of it while loading, transporting, and unloading it. It
certainly is dangerous if you are under a load of it when it falls on
you. Shipping that list of biological materials to Iraq increased the
danger to the United States by very little, if at all. At worst, it may
have decreased the time period needed by the Iraqi scientists to produce
their weapons, but even that is not a certainty at all. It could very
well be that samples obtained from Moscow, Beijing, or somewhere else
were more useful in reaching their goals at an earlier date than would
otherwise have been the case. Without access to the complete records of
the Iraqi biowarfare research, it may or may not be impossible to say
what impact the American samples had upon the development schedules.

It is not so much that our government had blinders on as it is a case of
too much being made of a relatively inconsequential issue which sounds
far more dangerous than it actually could be. Ask yourself why it would
be in the interest of the U.S. Government to intentionally violate any
number of international relations and accords and unnecessarily risk
natural outbreaks of dangerous diseases within and without Iraq without
a necessarily impeding Iraq's biowarfare research and development to any
serious degree?

Also think about this for a few minutes. Even if we could assume the
Iraqi's used only the American samples as the sources for their
bio-weapons development, what makes you think that is necessarily a bad
idea?

The Soviets and the People's Republic of China created some very
dangerous and artificial versions of these diseases for their
bio-weapons programs. They also have their own medical research samples.
Would you rather attempt to develop new vaccines to defend against a
biological material you have already researched extensively and
developed older vaccines, or would you rather start from scratch on a
battlefield and conduct a crash development program to combat a variant
version of the biological material you have not encountered or
researched before?

This question and hypothetical example is just one of many scenarios
which have some awfully bizarre twists and turns. It illustrates to only
a very small extent why trying to second guess the people who are
actually responsible for handling the biological materials can have very
unintended consequences. Perhaps it can also illustrate why I cannot say
we are necessarily right or wrong in our understandings of U.S.
Government's handling of these biological materials. There is a certain
amount of strategy and gamesmanship inherent in the exchange of
potential disease samples common to biowarfare agents, and the
intricacies and potential secret strategies are way beyond anything the
general public is equipped or informed to handle well.

> I would appreciate any references that you might have regarding the
> laws that you are referring to regarding the international shipment of
> these nasties. What did we agree to that would have kept us from
> saying, "Wait. I know we have these agreements, but Saddam, buddy,
> you're all tangled up with Iran right now. If we send you this stuff,
> surely somebody over there that shouldn't have some of it is going to
> end up with some and we are afraid that you might want to use it
> against Iran and maybe others."?
> 
> Bruce Girrell

As much as I would like to point you directly to the relevant laws, it
is not practical to do so. It is an incredibly complex topic like most
things related to the United Nations and its international medical and
scientific matters. The best I can suggest is to become more acquainted
with the purpose, documents, treaties, and activities of such
organizations as the United Nations, World Health Organization (WHO),
Center for Disease Control (CDC), and ATCC: The Global Bioresource
Center. Compare the list of disease samples shipped to Iraq to their
descriptions on the CDC Website <www.cdc.gov>. Then look around with the
search engine and note how these diseases are so common around the
world, and note how veterinary science and medical science combats these
diseases using scientific type samples as reference tools in the
research. Once you have seen how the disease samples are used for
humanitarian purposes, visit the Federation of American Scientists
<www.fas.org> and the CIA <www.cia.gov>
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm#06> to
see how these humanitarian tools can and cannot be abused for biowarfare
purposes. Then ask yourself why the media and the politicians are making
a major POLITICAL issue out of such a routine exchange of dual-use
samples of biological materials for humanitarian use?

Dallas Patterson
nye@fidalgo.net

The following information may be helpful in understanding why the ATCC
type samples supplied to Iraq were not considered by Rumsfeld and the
U.S. Government to be "the shipment of biological weapons" as the
accusers want us to believe.

"Biological and Toxin Agents. Just because a microorganism causes a
serious disease does not make it a potential warfare agent. Of the
several hundred pathogenic microbes that directly or indirectly afflict
humans, only about 30 have been considered as likely warfare agents.
Department of the Army, U.S. Army Medical Research and development
Command, Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement: Biological
Defense Research Program, RCS DD-M (AR) 1327 (Fort Detrick, MD: USAMRDC,
1989), p. A7-2. In: Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon
Proliferation, p. 76. <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/ota/934405.pdf>."

"Certain biological supply houses also ship strains of microbial
pathogens to scientists throughout the world. For example, American Type
Culturee Collection (ATCC), a nonprofit company in Rockville, MD, acts
as a clearinghouse for research institutions around the world, shipping
each year 130,000 cultures of weakened ("attenuated") pathogens to 60
nations. While such attenuated strains are not virulent and hence could
not be directly converted into biological weapons, they would be useful
for BTW research and development and for preparing self-protective
vaccines...(Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation.
<http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/ota/934405.pdf>, p. 84."

See the full publication for further information about the inherent
problems with dual-use biological materials and biowarfare agent
proliferation.

Dallas Patterson
nye@fidalgo.net