🚀 go-pugleaf

It was not only businesses that supplied Iraq after *they gassed their
own people*  which we ignored at the time because they were going
after Iran for us - after Iran overthrew our own dictator the Shah.
See below.  Are these policies we should be proud of just because we
or Iraq weren't in violation of a UN resolution?  But they hate us
because we love freedom.  Get real.

Comment
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 Don't trust Bush or Blair on Iraq 
The Scott inquiry revealed the cynicism of politicians' approach

Richard Norton-Taylor
Wednesday August 21, 2002
The Guardian

Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons in the past is repeatedly
cited by the US and British governments as justification for his
removal from power now. But just what was their response to his use of
poison gas against Iranian troops and Iraqi Kurds in the 1980s? Far
from condemning his actions, they stepped up their support for
Baghdad.

One of the most damning revelations to come out of the Scott inquiry
into the arms-to-Iraq affair was the British government's secret
decision to supply Saddam with even more weapons-related equipment
after he shelled the Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988 with gas
bombs, killing an estimated 5,000 civilians and maiming thousands
more. Saddam said he had punished the Kurds for "collaboration" after
the town had been successfully attacked by Iran. The weapons were
produced with German-supplied chemicals.

At the end of the Iraq-Iran war later that year, Sir Geoffrey Howe,
the foreign secretary, drew up a paper entitled The Economic
Consequences of the Peace. There were "major opportunities for British
industry", he said. But he was terrified his plan to increase British
arms exports to Iraq, secretly agreed by the government, would be
leaked.

"It could look very cynical if so soon after expressing outrage about
the treatment of the Kurds, we adopt a more flexible approach to arms
sales," one of his officials told the Scott inquiry. The government's
decision to change its policy, but keep MPs and the public in the
dark, was even more cynical, replied Lord Scott.

As Whitehall turned a blind eye to exports to Baghdad of equipment
which ministers and officials admitted could be used to produce
chemical and nuclear weapons, Howe ordered his paper to be kept under
wraps until, in the words of Ian Blackley, a senior Foreign Office
diplomat, the "cloud had passed" - a reference to the attack on
Halabja.

This cynicism and hypocrisy was matched only by the US. Soon after the
attack, Washington approved the export to Iraq of virus cultures and a
$1bn contract to design and build a petrochemical plant the Iraqis
planned to use to produce mustard gas. And while the Reagan
administration condemned the use of chemical weapons during the
eight-year Iraq-Iran war, US officers were secretly supplying Iraqi
generals with bomb-damage assessments and detailed information on
Iranian troop deployments.

"The use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of
deep strategic concern," Walter Lang, a former senior US defence
intelligence officer, told the New York Times this week. Washington
was worried about the threat of Iran spreading its Islamic revolution
to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Ever since TE Lawrence and his admirers in Whitehall drew the map of
the modern Middle East after the first world war, the British and,
later, American approach to the region has been dictated by naked
self-interest. It is an approach which demanded a totally craven
approach towards human rights. Saudi Arabia, no respecter of these and
a past funder of Islamist extremism in Pakistan, Afghanistan and
elsewhere, remains one of Britain's biggest arms markets and a key
supplier of oil to the US.

Whatever the reasons, and there are many, for seeing the back of
Saddam, don't listen to Bush or Blair when they talk of morality,
democracy and good governance. The evidence of Lord Howe and his
officials to the Scott inquiry revealed the government's priorities.
This might be salutary to remember as the government prepares to
respond to pressure for a debate about the Bush administration's plans
to invade Iraq.

"Public opposition in this country might have been embarrassingly
vociferous, particularly in view of the use by Iraq of chemical
weapons," Scott told Howe. Howe replied that he wanted to defend
British corporate interests from "malicious commentators" and
"emotional misunderstandings". The decision to prevent MPs from
knowing about the government's shift in policy was a "perfectly
legitimate management of news", he said.

Then, the evidence against Saddam was there for all to see, but
conveniently ignored. Britain and the US were desperate to benefit
from Saddam's massive arms procurement programme. Now, we are told,
Saddam must be overthrown because he is again said to be developing
weapons of mass destruction, but we are not given the evidence.

A senior Foreign Office official told the Scott inquiry: "If there had
been an outcry [over the change in policy towards Iraq] I am not sure
it would necessarily have reflected the view of the country, only of
the number of people prepared to comment." Those words may be worth
recalling in the weeks ahead.

� Richard Norton-Taylor is the author of Truth is a Difficult Concept:
Inside the Scott Inquiry

richard.norton-taylor@guardian.co.uk 


Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2002