🚀 go-pugleaf

[From Rick Marken (990502.1730)]

i.kurtzer (990501.1845)

> to bill, rick, and anyone else that contends that interactions
> can be understood by reference to one actor

I (and I'm pretty sure this is true for Bill too) don't contend
that interactions between control systems can be understood by
reference to one actor. A better characterization of my position
is that the controlling done by one actor can be understood with
reference to a model of that one actor. In coercion, one actor (the
coercer) controls a perception of some perceptual aspect of the
behavior of what happens to be that of another control system. The
model of the actor's controlling is the same whether he is controlling
a perception of the behavior of another control system or of
an inanimate object. The model of the controllee (whether another
control system or an inanimate system) doesn't change our
understanding of what the actor (coercer) is doing or how he's
doing it.

> What overwhelming reason either logical or empirical would
> give to say that intention ceases to inform, classify, predict,
> understand, etc..  Its seems clear to me that intention does
> make a hell of a difference in an interaction.  Why is it that
> one person makes it so and not the other, if it has to be one.
> Why is not coercion if i just feel it is?

My reason is neither logical nor empirical; it is practical.
I would have no problem agreeing with your desire to say that
it's only coercion if you feel coerced. But doing this, it seems
to me, would obviate any contribution PCT could make to
undertanding problems that arise from dealing with people by
controlling their behavior.

Look at my example of forcing A and B to read Chaucer. If it's
only coercion if the coercee feels it, then I (the person
trying to control A and B) have no way to know whether I am
coercing. The only behavioral evidence I have is that neither
kid is protesting. So I could conclude that I have done a "good"
thing; I have forced the kids to do what they wanted to do anyway.

So if the only criterion for whether or not coercion (control of
behavior) is happening is whether or not people feel coerced,
and if the only evidence I have that people feel coerced is
whether or not they are protesting, then I would conclude that
forcing A and B to read Chaucer is not coercive and, indeed,
is an effective approach to getting them to behave "properly".

In other words, if my "side" of the coercive interaction results
in no protest then I would conclude that my approach to dealing
with A & B is non-coercive and, indeed, quite good. Since I
know control theory, I might recommend this approach to other
people as a PCT approach to teaching kids the classics. I might
say "The PCT way to deal with kids who are not reading Chaucer
is to order them to read Chaucer".  But when this approach is
tried by others they _may_ be surprised to find that their
kids _do_ protest. What do you do then?

Suppose my procedure, which was non-coercive (by your definition)
when I used it on my kids (A and B) turns out to be coercive
(because it is protested) when tried on your kid (C). Now you've
got a problem; I didn't tell you what to do when it turns out
that the procedure is coercive because it never _was_ coercive when
I used it; none of my kids protested. I sold it to you as a
non-coercive way to get your kid to read the classics. But now your
kid is tantraming and tearing your Fourth Folio to shreds. So what
do you do? I believe you will abandon my procedure, concluding that
it is no better than any other pop psych approach, and that PCT,
the theory that informed it, is a crock.

On the other hand, if we define coercion my way -- as control
of behavior by force or the credible threat thereof -- then we
would see that my approach to getting the kids to read Chaucer
was coercive. The kids didn't protest -- and for all we know both
kids were dying to read about the Wife of Bath -- but we know
that what I was doing was coercive and we could have proved it by
asking one of the kids to act like she didn't want to read Chaucer
and watch to see if I correct it; and I do.

So a PCT analysis of the behavior of just _one_ actor (me) would
reveal that my approach is coercive and it would _not_ be recommended
as an approach to teaching the classics _even though it seemed to
"work" for me (my kids did read Chaucer when ordered to). My
approach would not be the recommended approach to teaching classics
based on PCT becuase it is _coercive_; it is coercive, not because
the kids protested (they didn't until we asked one to do so as a
test)  but because _I_  was not taking their intentions into account.
PCT would reveal the coerciveness of my approach -- the coerciveness
of what I (just one actor) was doing -- regardless of who I might
end up doing it to.

I could have changed my coercive approach into a non-coercive
approach very simply -- by asking the kids "would you like to
read some Chaucer" and then letting them do what they wanted
to do (in A's case, read Chaucer, in B's, go to the party). So
the difference between coercion and non-coercion is very simple
(by my definition of coercion) and, most important, it is in the
hands of the would-be coercer. If you just force people to do
what you want --even if they seem to want to do it -- then you
are being coercive. If you first _ask_  people what they want
and "respect their wants" (don't make them do what they say they
don't want to do) then you are being non-coercive.

Best

Rick
--

Richard S. Marken                 Phone or Fax:  310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates          e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/