Article View: can.org.cips
Article #6Re: Proxy Voting by Society Members
From: Walter Roberson
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 1999 00:00
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 1999 00:00
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In article <19990220.073541.17986@sol.sun.csd.unb.ca>,
Ken Chapman <chapmank@cips.ca> wrote:
:As you know, the procedures for the SGM were approved by the National Board.
:
:Article IV of the Constitution says in part that "The Society shall be
:structured so as to have a National Board of Directors whose primary function
:shall be to establish policies and priorities of the Society."
:Article VIII goes on to say that "The National Board shall meet ... to deal with
:the orderly conduct of business properly brought before the meeting."
There are several implications to this answer:
1) That the policies governing the proxy votes and general conduct at
the forthcoming SGM were decided at an official meeting of the National
Board, rather than being decided outside the framework of a meeting by
people who happen to be on the National Board. That is, it isn't a
*policy* until it is decided at a National Board meeting. Which
National Board meeting were the policies regarding the forthcoming SGM
decided at, and are the minutes of that meeting available? (And were
those proposed policies "properly brought before" that National Board
meeting) ?
2) That the National Board is free to create any policy (that is legal
under Canadian law) at a National Board meeting, by simple majority, to
the extent that the policy does not definitely conflict with the
Constitution of CIPS, and these policies need not have any reference to
precedent in CIPS or to common practice in industry, and need not be
guided even in spirit by established democratic procedures such as
Roberts Rules of Order. Thus, the National Board *could have* limited
Steve to (say) 15 seconds while allowing Board members to speak for an
hour apiece. The National Board did not put in such disparate
limitations, but isn't it true, Ken, that the National Board *could
have* done so?
Isn't it the case that if the National Board -had- instituted a policy
like that with respect to the forthcoming SGM, that the members would
have had to call a different SGM (#2) to direct the National Board to
amend the terms under which the forthcoming SGM (#1) were to be held
under -- and that the National Board would be free to set the policies
for the conduct of SGM #2, and so on, potentially recursing
indefinitely until the next National Board election?
In other words, is there not the -potential- for the National Board to
substantially redefine the rules? If there is, then is not the National
Board left open to the *appearance* that it is manipulating the rules
for its own ends? Usually, serious democratic institutions codify their
operating procedures (e.g. by adopting Roberts Rules of Order or
similar) so as to reduce the potential for hypothetical corrupt leaders
to take control away from the membership. Conversely, at times when the
direction of the leadership is under question, -any- change in policy
that the leaders undertake tends to be viewed as evidence of
corruption, *especially* when no codified rules are in place.
:The board has by its actions fulfilled its governance responsibility in full
:compliance with the Constitution. It has provided a process for the SGM whereby
:the full society membership can participate in this important decision.
Ken, you have to realize that in the situation before you, literal compliance
with the Constitution of CIPS is not enough. The nub of the SGM is not
really whether Steve is or is not reinstated: the nub is the membership's
view of the National Board. Where does the membership feel that the
National Board is positioned on the axis of
open democracy primarily for the benefit of members
^
|
v
closed elite hidden in democratic form but primarily for its own benefit
Whenever this is under significant consideration, a truly democratic
leadership tends to react by being inclusive, confident that when a
widest practical membership has had an opportunity to examine a fair
and balanced presentation of the interpretation on both sides, that the
majority of people will consider the actions of the leadership to be
reasonable under the circumstances -- perhaps not perfect, but
reasonable -- and so confirm the decision. On the other hand, closed
elites tend to react by making it difficult for people to be informed
and participate, perhaps feeling a need to Control, perhaps counting on
people not to be upset about things that don't know about.
Thus, actions of inclusion tend to be interpreted as evidence of open
democracy, and actions of exclusion tend to be interpreted as evidence
of closed circles.
If, then, the National Board wants to be thought of as open and
democratic, then it would be advised to act openly and inclusively. It
would, for example, allow Real-Audio broadcasts of the proceedings to
those who cannot be physically present. [If legal liability is a
concern, allow each participant to choose whether or not to have their
presentation broadcast.] It would freely discuss reasons why it decided
to handle proxies the way it did, instead of just saying that it was
"in full compliance with the Constitution". It would open wide
discussions on what it can do to avoid the -appearance- of being closed
and selfish, and on how best to change the CIPS Constitution to avoid
the *possibility* that a hypothetical corrupt future leadership could
play a game of "Heads I win, Tails you lose" with the membership. And
it would stand up at the SGM and say "We recognize this as being a
crisis of trust and confidence in how we work democratically on behalf
of the membership, and here are some of our plans on how we intend to
regain that trust."
Regardless of whether dismissing Steve was or was not In The Best
Interests Of The Membership, the National Board must address the issue
that the way it went about it and the way it has publicly handled the
SGM so far, have had the -appearance- of being closed and
undemocratic. If the National Board does not make some visible
changes, people are going to be left with that perception long after
the actual SGM, and that perception is going to lead to continued
crises until it is healed.
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X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit X-Google-Thread: f56b1,61c58ec96ab56b69 X-Google-Attributes: gidf56b1,public From: roberson@ibd.nrc.ca (Walter Roberson) Subject: Re: Proxy Voting by Society Members Date: 1999/02/20 Message-ID: <7an3q0$gjr$1@canopus.cc.umanitoba.ca> X-Deja-AN: 446488088 References: <19990220.073541.17986@sol.sun.csd.unb.ca> X-Complaints-To: Postmaster@cc.umanitoba.ca X-Trace: canopus.cc.umanitoba.ca 919540352 17019 192.70.172.132 (20 Feb 1999 19:52:32 GMT) Organization: National Research Council Canada NNTP-Posting-Date: 20 Feb 1999 19:52:32 GMT Newsgroups: can.org.cips