🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <mumble>, sbrack@jupiter (Steven S. Brack) writes:
|> 	"We'll hold this club over your head, but as long as you don't
|> 	 upset us, we won't use it."  Selective enforcement of the rules
|> 	 has never been good policy, because it is too open to abuse.

There is, however, a difference between selective enforcement and
imperfect detection.  Some people do things and get away with them not
because the adminstration is selectively enforcing the rules, but
because no one in authority caught the perpetrator doing it, or can
prove that it was done by a particular person.  Sometimes it seems that
users confuse the two (selective enforcement and imperfect detection).
They see someone violating a policy, and after not seeing any action
taken against them, conclude that either the policy is not being
enforced at all, or it is being selectively enforced, when neither
situation is the case.  Why do users conclude this?  Is it because they
also assume that the sysadmins are effectively omniscient, that they
can know everything that happens on on the computer?  In other words,
do they assume perfect detection?  Sysadmins would probably agree that
omniscience on their part is a useful myth to foster amongst the users
:-), however, I fear that it may work against us by leading too quickly
to charges of selective enforcement, with its undertones of banana
republic repression of the masses while those with connections go scot
free.  (I'm sure that many sysadmins would argue (fear) that if most
users knew that detection was imperfect, wholesale "lawlessness" would
ensue.  And we control freaks know how disconcerting that would be! :-))

|>       The same rule must be applied to everyone, everytime, the same
|> 	 way.  Anything else engenders special privelege. 

I would argue that this is a noble, but unrealistic sentiment.  Not
even our civil and criminal justice system, in its purest form,
operates this way.  There are often mitigating or exacerbating
circumstances that require judgement and will alter the "breaking rule
(law) A requires punishment B" reasoning.  That is why we have judges
and juries.  This is also why the "rules" usually delineate a broad
range of punishment and do not exhaustively detail every possible
mitigating or exacerbating circumstance.  Is this special privilege?
No.  It is an understanding that human events are rarely simple, and
should not be taken in isolation.  Context is very important.  This
system, like any other, can be abused.  I would suggest that in those
instances, the correct thing to do is to get rid of the abuser, not the
system.  I recognize that in some cases, getting rid of the abuser is
difficult, even seemingly impossible.  I assert that the difficulty of
doing the right thing should not be used as an excuse to do the wrong
thing.

|> : 
|> : >start due process.  I don't see why due process can't start _after_
|> : >the rug pulling, since the perpetrator likely to keep pulling the same
|> : >stunts if the account remains in place.
|> : [...]
|> 	The same reason that persons accused of crimes should be released
|> 	on reasonable bail whenever possible.  The denial of computing
|> 	resources is a punishment, whether intended that way or not. 
|> : [...]

Here again, context is important. There are people accused of crimes
who are *not* released on bail because they are a continuing threat to
society (they would commit more crimes while out on bail), or they are
likely to flee.  The same applies to computing "crimes".  Some users
should be locked out during the due process because they are a
continuing threat to the "society" of other users and equipment.  Doing
this requires good judgement, and realistically, should be quite rare.
Frequent and heavy handed use of resource denial backed by erroneous
attitudes such as "... the perpetrator [is] likely to keep pulling the
same stunts if the account remains in place." is an error on the part
of system administrators.  We need to be careful about how we use
resource denial, because it is a powerful tool.  I think
that sysadmins/managers often ascribe more evil intent to users than
is warranted, but conversely, users ascribe the same to system
administrators.  Both groups need to consciously back away from those
attitudes.

|> Steven S. Brack        | B0 w+f s+k+c+v a!v |   sbrack@jupiter.cse.utoledo.edu
|> 2021 Roanwood Drive    \____________________/  STU0061@uoft01.utoledo.edu
|> Toledo, OH  43613-1605 /                    \    brack@uoftcse.cse.utoledo.edu 
|> +1 419 GR4 1010        |  MY OWN  OPINIONS  |   sbrack@maine.cse.utoledo.edu 

-- 
Joseph A. Watters, Jr.		jaw@owlnet.rice.edu
Deputy Director, Owlnet
Rice University
Houston, Texas