🚀 go-pugleaf

Stevan Harnad writes,
> ... the symbol grounding problem for this enterprise is empirical and
> methodological. It isn't and never has been philosophical.

Let's look at the following statement from a methodological point of view.

You wrote,
> ... what goes on inside a simulation is just meaningless
> symbol crunching. The only way to ground symbols is in the real world.

What did you mean?  If you're saying that an AI system running in a
simulation is totally meaningless, then I'll argue that you're flat wrong.

I get a feeling that you only meant 'meaningless' in the philosophical
sense.  In that case, my question stands: why make philosophical arguments
if you really mean to discuss methodological issues?  And would you re-state
the methodological case you were trying to make?  I couldn't hear it for
the noise.

   ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
  /// Marc Ringuette /// Carnegie Mellon University, Comp. Sci. Dept. ///
 /// mnr@cs.cmu.edu /// Pittsburgh, PA 15213.  Phone 412-268-3728(w) ///
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