Article View: comp.security.misc
Article #242Re: Limiting reading of passwd to slow logins
From: John F. Haugh II
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 1992 12:41
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 1992 12:41
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In article <1992Aug10.191851.4562@chg.mcd.mot.com> heiby@chg.mcd.mot.com (Ron Heiby) writes: >jfh@rpp386.lonestar.org (John F. Haugh II) writes: >>Next, you >>must track and account for all authentication failures and turn off >>any account (either permanently or for a brief period of time) that >>exceeds the allowable number of failed trials. > >This means that your system is now open to a "denial of service" >attack. In other words, although I may not be able to be nasty to you >by logging in on your system and accessing your data, I *can* prevent >you from doing so by making multiple failed login attempts on your >login id. That's correct. I think that any scheme which merely relies on failed authentication counters to protect the system is going to suffer from this deficiency. If the only thing you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail ... The approach that I prefer is one where the number of trials before an account is locked out is large enough that the attack must last for an extended period of time and STILL not have a reasonable probability of success. This differs from many systems where 3 or 5 failed trials disables the account yet still protects you against someone who is somewhat determined. >I'm sure that there are ways of mitigating this risk. For example, >you might set up your Email system to *always* present *all* address >information as first.last@host.dom.ain, while the actual login id used >is non-predictable. Some element of "denial of service" risk still >remains, though. The problem then is that the bad guy might get the login name of the user that is under attack. Using card keys which present a random ID (really random, not predictably random) would solve this problem, but then you could just get rid of the password and use that random value as authentication for the user. [ Supposing that you want to give access only to the person who physically possesses the card ... ] -- John F. Haugh II | Life's Little Instruction Book: Ma Bell: (512) 251-2151 | "#138. Learn Spanish. In a few years, UUCP: ...!cs.utexas.edu!rpp386!jfh | more than 35% of all Americans will speak Domain: jfh@rpp386.cactus.org | it as their first language."
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Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!sun-barr!cs.utexas.edu!chinacat!rpp386!jfh From: jfh@rpp386.lonestar.org (John F. Haugh II) Newsgroups: comp.security.misc Subject: Re: Limiting reading of passwd to slow logins Message-ID: <21340@rpp386.lonestar.org> Date: 12 Aug 92 12:41:02 GMT References: <1992Aug7.123815.1@vcp1.vcp.monash.edu.au> <21306@rpp386.lonestar.org> <1992Aug10.191851.4562@chg.mcd.mot.com> Reply-To: jfh@rpp386.cactus.org (John F. Haugh II) Organization: River Parishes Programming, Austin, Republic of Texas Lines: 42