Article View: comp.security.misc
Article #404Re: Covert channel
From: Mark Rowe
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 1992 21:19
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 1992 21:19
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3043 bytes
In article <FAIGIN.92Aug17115056@soldan.aero.org> Daniel P. Faigin writes: >On Mon, 17 Aug 1992 17:51:23 GMT, mark@hpcvxmsr.cv.hp.com (Mark Rowe) said: >> It is true that properly implemented MAC would prevent the use of my >> example. That does not in any way prevent this from being an example >> of a covert channel, it's simply a covert channel that can be eliminated >> by MAC. > > Wrong, bucko! If properly implemented access controls would close the channel, > then the channel is a *flaw*, not a covert channel. It's only a flaw if there is something to be flawed. On a C2 system there is no MAC, I would argue my example still denotes a covert channel and not a flaw in the non-existant MAC. >> MAC does not define a covert channel. > I'd agree with you on this; however, covert channels other than MAC-type ones > aren't interesting. Why would I care about a DAC covert channel, when I just > just exploit the weaknesses inherent in DAC. If what you are saying is that my example is an uninteresting covert channel then I may agree with you. >> What defines a covert >> channel is how the data is being transmitted. It is either overt or >> covert. An overt channel is a channel that transmits data in a known >> manner as intended by the system administrators. A covert channel is >> anything else. > Judging intent, however, is quite difficult. Let's take some examples here. > Suppose I have a system where I can observe contention for a system resource, > say memory. I exploit this to transmit information. That's a clear channel. > Other cases aren't so clear. Look at Unix. There are many ways I can > communicate with processes. Are signals a covert channel? Is the use of ptrace > a covert channel? Is the use of the process number address space a covert > channel? > It's not always so clear cut (alas). I agree, it is not always clear cut, but I think the wrong questions are being asked. It is not, "Is the use of XXX a covert channel?", but rather, "Was XXX intended to transmit information about YYY?". It is (as you said) this intent that is often not clear cut. That in itself is not a fault in the definition. It is often much easier to define what something is than it is to accurately identify one when it is encountered. Mark Rowe email: mark@hpcvlx.cv.hp.com Hewlett Packard voice: (503) 750-3246 Corvallis, OR FAX: (503) 750-3788
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Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!dtix!darwin.sura.net!mips!sdd.hp.com!hp-cv!hp-pcd!hpcvusn!hpcvxmsr.cv.hp.com!mark From: mark@hpcvxmsr.cv.hp.com (Mark Rowe) Newsgroups: comp.security.misc Subject: Re: Covert channel Message-ID: <1992Aug17.211906.7142@hpcvusn.cv.hp.com> Date: 17 Aug 92 21:19:06 GMT References: <71269183717599@juju.mcs.anl.gov> <61350002@otter.hpl.hp.com> <FAIGIN.92Aug17115056@soldan.aero.org> Sender: nobody@hpcvusn.cv.hp.com (Nobody - UID must be 99999) Reply-To: mark@hpcvlx.cv.hp.com Organization: UDT-CV (ITO) Lines: 49 Nntp-Posting-Host: hpcvxmsr.cv.hp.com