Thread View: comp.std.unix
2 messages
2 total messages
Started by Jim Kingdon
Fri, 06 Jul 1990 05:28
Re: Mandatory Access Controls in the commercial world
Author: Jim Kingdon
Date: Fri, 06 Jul 1990 05:28
Date: Fri, 06 Jul 1990 05:28
13 lines
960 bytes
960 bytes
From: kingdon@ai.mit.edu (Jim Kingdon)
Thanks for providing some technical details. But can't the level be
made a special case of the set of categories? That is, define
categories CLASSIFIED, SECRET, TOP_SECRET, etc, and give people either
{TOP_SECRET, SECRET, CLASSIFIED} or {SECRET, CLASSIFIED} or
{CLASSIFIED}. Unless I'm missing something, this provides the same
functionality and is simpler.
You might want to post a clarification (or summary of this and other
messages).
Volume-Number: Volume 20, Number 107
Re: Mandatory Access Controls in the commercial world
Author: Doug Gwyn
Date: Sun, 08 Jul 1990 04:23
Date: Sun, 08 Jul 1990 04:23
28 lines
2074 bytes
2074 bytes
From: Doug Gwyn <gwyn@smoke.brl.mil>
In article <793@longway.TIC.COM> From: kingdon@ai.mit.edu (Jim Kingdon)
>Thanks for providing some technical details. But can't the level be
>made a special case of the set of categories? That is, define
>categories CLASSIFIED, SECRET, TOP_SECRET, etc, and give people either
>{TOP_SECRET, SECRET, CLASSIFIED} or {SECRET, CLASSIFIED} or
>{CLASSIFIED}. Unless I'm missing something, this provides the same
>functionality and is simpler.
The problem is, that approach could be misadministered to give users
{TOP SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL} or other such erroneous category sets (we
call them "compartments" rather than "categories"). The intent of
the strict CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, TOP SECRET hierarchy is to rate the
relative probable level of damage to the organizational (national)
interests if the classified information were disclosed to the wrong
parties. The intent of compartments is to enforce the additional
requirement, beyond one's rated level of trustworthiness, of having
a genuine "need to know" the information. For example, even though
I might have a TOP SECRET security clearance, if I have not been
specially indoctrinated for access to "special intelligence" then
I am not allowed to access even CONFIDENTIAL SI material.
You might try to redesign such classification schemes, but these
have evolved through many decades of practical experience and seem
to be the best we've been able to devise so far.
Volume-Number: Volume 20, Number 114
Thread Navigation
This is a paginated view of messages in the thread with full content displayed inline.
Messages are displayed in chronological order, with the original post highlighted in green.
Use pagination controls to navigate through all messages in large threads.
Back to All Threads