🚀 go-pugleaf

--- In analytic@yahoogroups.com, Peter Brawley <peter.brawley@...> wrote:
>
> On 2012-09-19 9:34 PM, larry_tapper wrote:
> >
> > PB> I'll bet you my 2nd car no experiment will demonstrate 
> > propositional thinking in the squirrel in the next decade.
> >
> > PB,
> >
> > It certainly won't happen if nobody is willing to define 
> > "propositional thinking". In my previous post, I asked you what you 
> > meant by that, and you didn't really answer that question.
> >
> 
> You asked for (& got) examples of evidence that confirms propositional 
> thought in a animal that doesn't have language.
> 
> The ordinary meaning of propositional thought is logical thought,

PB,

Oh, this probably goes a long way toward explaining the apparent lack of communication here. In philosophy. the use of the term 'propositional' just means pertaining to or involving propositions. Logical competence has little or nothing to do with it, except maybe for whatever minimal competence would be required to grasp the most elemantary propositions.

Thus a simple feline observation like "There's some animal making noise outside" would count as a proposition, and if it can accurately be said that my cat Peachy is thinking that thought, then ipso facto she has a propositional belief. It's really as simple as that. As noted in my previous post, if you want to dispute that account, the way to do it is to question the accuracy of "Peachy believes that there's some animal making noise outside", because propositionality follows trivially from that.

That's what's wrong with your original example, "The cat knows that the squirrel is in the tree". If that statement is true, the cat's knowledge is propositional by definition.    

 
PB> roughly what Piaget called formal operational thought. Prob'ly for 
> animals you'd want to add in the previous stage, concrete operational 
> thought, ability to do arithmetic & concrete logic.

I hope you realize that if your criterion for propositional thinking in humans is formal operational thought, then it follows that few children under the age of 9 or 10 are capable of propositional thinking, according to Piaget.

LT



> 
> So for an animal, minimally, propositional thought should demonstrate 
> logical operations; propositional knowledge should demonstrate the 
> animal manipulating pics or whatever logically, as in the sea-lion and 
> macaque numerosity experiments.
> 
> PB
> 
> -----
> 
> >
> > LT
> >
> > --- In analytic@yahoogroups.com <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com>, 
> > Peter Brawley <peter.brawley@> wrote:
> > >
> > > On 2012-09-19 8:21 PM, walto wrote:
> > > >
> > > > --- In analytic@yahoogroups.com 
> > <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com> <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com>,
> > > > Peter Brawley <peter.brawley@> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On 2012-09-19 3:34 PM, walto wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > --- In analytic@yahoogroups.com 
> > <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com>
> > > > <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com> 
> > <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com>,
> > > > > > Peter Brawley <peter.brawley@> wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On 2012-09-19 2:00 PM, larry_tapper wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > PB> Seems likely the cat is using images. Propositionally? No
> > > > > > evidence
> > > > > > > > cats can do that.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > PB,
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > You still haven't really spelled out what *you* mean by an 
> > animal
> > > > > > > > "using images propositionally". And it can hardly be 
> > something
> > > > you've
> > > > > > > > thought about for years, because as of a couple of days ago
> > > > you were
> > > > > > > > insisting that propositional thinking is impossible without
> > > > language.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > That was a sloppy mistake.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > So was my remark that some animals have nonpropositional 
> > language; I
> > > > > > > meant to say nonpropositional thought.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Instead of just saying they don't have language, I should've
> > > > said (i)
> > > > > > > cats don't have language, (ii) unlike some primates there's no
> > > > evidence
> > > > > > > cats can acquire any language skills, and (iii) unlike those
> > > > primates
> > > > > > > and perhaps some other animals, cats show no other evidence of
> > > > > > > propositional capacity.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Your inference about "a couple of days ago" is incorrect, 
> > primate
> > > > > > > nonlinguistic propositional intelligence has been known for 
> > many
> > > > years,
> > > > > > > I've been trying to get up-to-date on this quickly growing 
> > field
> > > > for a
> > > > > > > couple of years.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > So far, your explanation has been along the lines of: you
> > > > know, like
> > > > > > > > the sea lion's icons or the macaque's numerosity. OK, now 
> > we're
> > > > > > > > getting somewhere, but ... like the sea lion and the macaque
> > > > in what
> > > > > > > > way, exactly?
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > What interests you about that?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > This branch of the thread began with an instance of
> > > > non-propositional
> > > > > > > knowledge of a physical fact. Do you claim that's physically
> > > > > > impossible,
> > > > > > > or just that evolution is such that it absolutely never occurs
> > > > anywhere
> > > > > > > in the animal kingdom, and if so what's the evidence for that?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I think there's a problem with the notion of "non-propositional
> > > > > > knowledge of a physical fact." I could see how someone might 
> > maintain
> > > > > > that something could have non-propositional knowledge of things
> > > > (i.e.,
> > > > > > some sort of acquaintance with them), but it seems to me that
> > > > > > "knowledge of a fact" requires some sort of ordering of 
> > constituents.
> > > > > > E.g., knowing/believing/deciding that a squirrel is in a tree is a
> > > > > > different from knowing/believing/deciding that a tree is in a
> > > > squirrel.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > That's a distinction that's meaningful only in a mind with language.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > I don't see that. You say this cat knows there's a squirrel in that
> > > > tree. Surely you don't think that the cat knows there's a tree in the
> > > > squirrel. Thus, there's a distinction that meaningful with respect to
> > > > this cat, whether it knows language or not.
> > > >
> > > > > > If some cat really knows that a squirrel is in that tree (and I
> > > > > > personally have my doubts about that ascription), it seems to 
> > me that
> > > > > > it would have to have propositional knowledge.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > So when the squirrel remembers where he stored the nuts, you'd 
> > say he's
> > > > > thinking propositionally?
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > That's a good question: I don't know.
> > > >
> > >
> > > I'll bet you my 2nd car no experiment will demonstrate propositional
> > > thinking in the squirrel in the next decade.
> > >
> > > PB
> > >
> > > -----
> > >
> > > >
> > > > W
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
> >
>