🚀 go-pugleaf

RetroBBS NetNews Server

Inspired by RockSolid Light RIP Retro Guy

Article View: fa.analytic-philosophy
Article #5

Re: [analytic] Re: The Terms of the Puzzle

#5
From: Peter Brawley
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 18:32
263 lines
12560 bytes
On 2012-09-20 12:54 PM, larry_tapper wrote:
>
> --- In analytic@yahoogroups.com <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com>, 
> Peter Brawley <peter.brawley@...> wrote:
> >
> > On 2012-09-19 9:34 PM, larry_tapper wrote:
> > >
> > > PB> I'll bet you my 2nd car no experiment will demonstrate
> > > propositional thinking in the squirrel in the next decade.
> > >
> > > PB,
> > >
> > > It certainly won't happen if nobody is willing to define
> > > "propositional thinking". In my previous post, I asked you what you
> > > meant by that, and you didn't really answer that question.
> > >
> >
> > You asked for (& got) examples of evidence that confirms propositional
> > thought in a animal that doesn't have language.
> >
> > The ordinary meaning of propositional thought is logical thought,
>
> PB,
>
> Oh, this probably goes a long way toward explaining the apparent lack 
> of communication here. In philosophy. the use of the term 
> 'propositional' just means pertaining to or involving propositions. 
> Logical competence has little or nothing to do with it, except maybe 
> for whatever minimal competence would be required to grasp the most 
> elemantary propositions.
>
> Thus a simple feline observation like "There's some animal making 
> noise outside" would count as a proposition, and if it can accurately 
> be said that my cat Peachy is thinking that thought, then ipso facto 
> she has a propositional belief. It's really as simple as that. As 
> noted in my previous post, if you want to dispute that account, the 
> way to do it is to question the accuracy of "Peachy believes that 
> there's some animal making noise outside", because propositionality 
> follows trivially from that.
>
> That's what's wrong with your original example, "The cat knows that 
> the squirrel is in the tree". If that statement is true, the cat's 
> knowledge is propositional by definition.
>

Propositional for philosophy, not for psychology, interesting.

>
> PB> roughly what Piaget called formal operational thought. Prob'ly for
> > animals you'd want to add in the previous stage, concrete operational
> > thought, ability to do arithmetic & concrete logic.
>
> I hope you realize that if your criterion for propositional thinking 
> in humans is formal operational thought, then it follows that few 
> children under the age of 9 or 10 are capable of propositional 
> thinking, according to Piaget.
>

So I started with formal operational thought but didn't end there.

PB

-----

>
> LT
>
> >
> > So for an animal, minimally, propositional thought should demonstrate
> > logical operations; propositional knowledge should demonstrate the
> > animal manipulating pics or whatever logically, as in the sea-lion and
> > macaque numerosity experiments.
> >
> > PB
> >
> > -----
> >
> > >
> > > LT
> > >
> > > --- In analytic@yahoogroups.com 
> <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com> <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com>,
> > > Peter Brawley <peter.brawley@> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On 2012-09-19 8:21 PM, walto wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > --- In analytic@yahoogroups.com 
> <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com>
> > > <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com> 
> <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com>,
> > > > > Peter Brawley <peter.brawley@> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On 2012-09-19 3:34 PM, walto wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > --- In analytic@yahoogroups.com 
> <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com>
> > > <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com>
> > > > > <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com>
> > > <mailto:analytic%40yahoogroups.com>,
> > > > > > > Peter Brawley <peter.brawley@> wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > On 2012-09-19 2:00 PM, larry_tapper wrote:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > PB> Seems likely the cat is using images. 
> Propositionally? No
> > > > > > > evidence
> > > > > > > > > cats can do that.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > PB,
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > You still haven't really spelled out what *you* mean 
> by an
> > > animal
> > > > > > > > > "using images propositionally". And it can hardly be
> > > something
> > > > > you've
> > > > > > > > > thought about for years, because as of a couple of 
> days ago
> > > > > you were
> > > > > > > > > insisting that propositional thinking is impossible 
> without
> > > > > language.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > That was a sloppy mistake.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > So was my remark that some animals have nonpropositional
> > > language; I
> > > > > > > > meant to say nonpropositional thought.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Instead of just saying they don't have language, I should've
> > > > > said (i)
> > > > > > > > cats don't have language, (ii) unlike some primates 
> there's no
> > > > > evidence
> > > > > > > > cats can acquire any language skills, and (iii) unlike those
> > > > > primates
> > > > > > > > and perhaps some other animals, cats show no other 
> evidence of
> > > > > > > > propositional capacity.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Your inference about "a couple of days ago" is incorrect,
> > > primate
> > > > > > > > nonlinguistic propositional intelligence has been known for
> > > many
> > > > > years,
> > > > > > > > I've been trying to get up-to-date on this quickly growing
> > > field
> > > > > for a
> > > > > > > > couple of years.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > So far, your explanation has been along the lines of: you
> > > > > know, like
> > > > > > > > > the sea lion's icons or the macaque's numerosity. OK, now
> > > we're
> > > > > > > > > getting somewhere, but ... like the sea lion and the 
> macaque
> > > > > in what
> > > > > > > > > way, exactly?
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > What interests you about that?
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > This branch of the thread began with an instance of
> > > > > non-propositional
> > > > > > > > knowledge of a physical fact. Do you claim that's physically
> > > > > > > impossible,
> > > > > > > > or just that evolution is such that it absolutely never 
> occurs
> > > > > anywhere
> > > > > > > > in the animal kingdom, and if so what's the evidence for 
> that?
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I think there's a problem with the notion of 
> "non-propositional
> > > > > > > knowledge of a physical fact." I could see how someone might
> > > maintain
> > > > > > > that something could have non-propositional knowledge of 
> things
> > > > > (i.e.,
> > > > > > > some sort of acquaintance with them), but it seems to me that
> > > > > > > "knowledge of a fact" requires some sort of ordering of
> > > constituents.
> > > > > > > E.g., knowing/believing/deciding that a squirrel is in a 
> tree is a
> > > > > > > different from knowing/believing/deciding that a tree is in a
> > > > > squirrel.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > That's a distinction that's meaningful only in a mind with 
> language.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > I don't see that. You say this cat knows there's a squirrel in 
> that
> > > > > tree. Surely you don't think that the cat knows there's a tree 
> in the
> > > > > squirrel. Thus, there's a distinction that meaningful with 
> respect to
> > > > > this cat, whether it knows language or not.
> > > > >
> > > > > > > If some cat really knows that a squirrel is in that tree 
> (and I
> > > > > > > personally have my doubts about that ascription), it seems to
> > > me that
> > > > > > > it would have to have propositional knowledge.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > So when the squirrel remembers where he stored the nuts, you'd
> > > say he's
> > > > > > thinking propositionally?
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > That's a good question: I don't know.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > I'll bet you my 2nd car no experiment will demonstrate propositional
> > > > thinking in the squirrel in the next decade.
> > > >
> > > > PB
> > > >
> > > > -----
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > W
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> >
>
> 



------------------------------------

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/analytic/
Yahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/analytic/

<*> Your email settings:
    Individual Email | Traditional

<*> To change settings online go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/analytic/join
    (Yahoo! ID required)

<*> To change settings via email:
    analytic-digest@yahoogroups.com 
    analytic-fullfeatured@yahoogroups.com

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    analytic-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
Technical Details
Message-ID: <fa.IRD+dU1Y6TpwdbG+uC1B2Dxhsok@ifi.uio.no>
Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!q11ni182487wiw.1!nntp.google.com!goblin3!goblin1!goblin.stu.neva.ru!uio.no!nntp.uio.no!.POSTED!not-for-mail
References: <fa.JhvJk4V4vNZrsBd92G10pJ5yVfA@ifi.uio.no>

Show Full Headers
Complete Article Headers
X-Google-Thread: 10ecd1,540a3bc746c91d0a
X-Google-NewGroupId: yes
X-Google-Attributes: gid82410b446f,domainid0,public,usenet
X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit
Received: by 10.180.105.2 with SMTP id gi2mr799035wib.4.1348165957000;
        Thu, 20 Sep 2012 11:32:37 -0700 (PDT)
Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!q11ni182487wiw.1!nntp.google.com!goblin3!goblin1!goblin.stu.neva.ru!uio.no!nntp.uio.no!.POSTED!not-for-mail
From: Peter Brawley <peter.brawley@earthlink.net>
Newsgroups: fa.analytic-philosophy
Subject: Re: [analytic] Re: The Terms of the Puzzle
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 18:32:36 UTC
Organization: Internet mailing list
Lines: 264
Sender: analytic@yahoogroups.com
Message-ID: <fa.IRD+dU1Y6TpwdbG+uC1B2Dxhsok@ifi.uio.no>
References: <fa.JhvJk4V4vNZrsBd92G10pJ5yVfA@ifi.uio.no>
Reply-To: analytic@yahoogroups.com
NNTP-Posting-Host: mail-jess.uio.no
Mime-Version: 1.0
X-Trace: readme.uio.no 1348165956 14436 129.240.7.9 (20 Sep 2012 18:32:36 GMT)
X-Complaints-To: abuse@uio.no
NNTP-Posting-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 18:32:36 +0000 (UTC)
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:15.0) Gecko/20120907 Thunderbird/15.0.1
To: analytic@yahoogroups.com
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoogroups.com; s=lima; t=1348165948; bh=TRP/O5cg69l4wLIOxXPvmt8ZdDZeBwp8rQkXVVf3UMo=; h=Received:Received:X-Yahoo-Newman-Id:X-Sender:X-Apparently-To:X-Received:X-Received:X-Received:X-Received:Message-ID:User-Agent:To:References:In-Reply-To:X-Antivirus:X-Antivirus-Status:X-ELNK-Trace:X-Originating-IP:X-eGroups-Msg-Info:From:X-Yahoo-Profile:Sender:MIME-Version:Mailing-List:Delivered-To:List-Id:Precedence:List-Unsubscribe:Date:Subject:Reply-To:X-Yahoo-Newman-Property:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; b=MUZkbka/iLAss/d/ep/eyYevcvVnVhwR9f+ChI5BF8HPSu/dfg7LqoAxf/NuGIaFbAeCDKRZ/Ij2hanE+F5W58a0Gdf+cdh5m7ze+1957C42mBmSaUFLs38PHVhkH9+v
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=lima; d=yahoogroups.com;
 b=Lo0mexryW+fvNIQ8TgFAkDKNGdhqiNoIrfn2Fh9gedWfOonKrzk5C9PPqyeDd1fawvrXcJ/si03nduCp7Qtsiuj1ZymIWs2N2UjTvaWbR8+add2Z299eq5hiP9bgbnE5;
X-Yahoo-Newman-Id: 2681053-m39784
X-Sender: peter.brawley@earthlink.net
X-Apparently-To: analytic@yahoogroups.com
X-Received: (qmail 7038 invoked from network); 20 Sep 2012 18:32:26 -0000
X-Received: from unknown (98.137.34.44)
  by m6.grp.sp2.yahoo.com with QMQP; 20 Sep 2012 18:32:26 -0000
X-Received: from unknown (HELO elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net) (209.86.89.65)
  by mta1.grp.sp2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 20 Sep 2012 18:32:26 -0000
X-Received: from user-1120qh2.dsl.mindspring.com ([66.32.106.34] helo=[127.0.0.1])
 by elasmtp-kukur.atl.sa.earthlink.net with esmtpsa (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256)
 (Exim 4.67)
 (envelope-from <peter.brawley@earthlink.net>)
 id 1TElY1-0004Jm-Su
 for analytic@yahoogroups.com; Thu, 20 Sep 2012 14:32:26 -0400
In-Reply-To: <k3fl84+62mr@eGroups.com>
X-Antivirus: avast! (VPS 120920-0, 09/20/2012), Outbound message
X-Antivirus-Status: Clean
X-ELNK-Trace: d43912bea8fab4cdea7981bfee43b39d74bf435c0eb9d478ed5d7ba1447d5e12c940019a8b3e41d77a0692a2d83b2df9350badd9bab72f9c350badd9bab72f9c
X-Originating-IP: 209.86.89.65
X-eGroups-Msg-Info: 1:12:0:0:0
X-Yahoo-Profile: pzbrawl1937
Mailing-List: list analytic@yahoogroups.com; contact analytic-owner@yahoogroups.com
Delivered-To: mailing list analytic@yahoogroups.com
List-Id: <analytic.yahoogroups.com>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:analytic-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: groups-email-tradt-m
Original-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 13:32:41 -0500
Original-Message-Id: <505B6149.9030509@earthlink.net>
Original-References: <k3fl84+62mr@eGroups.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit