🚀 go-pugleaf

 Found in The News, an English language paper in Mexico City, on June 15, 1991
 Copied w/o permission,but the writer surely won't mind his ideas spreading...


                   Generals Santa Anna And Schwarzkopf
             Commentary by Richard Seid, The News Columnist

When Mexican General Antonia Lopez de Santa Anna crossed the Rio Bravo (or Rio
Grande) to attack the Alamo in 1836, he was carrying out a well-defined 
objective but not a very well thought out national policy. 
  The well-defined part was to punish rebellious settlers, recapture land
held by the insurgents and to insure that such territory would remain part of
Mexico.
  At the battle of the Alamo, of course, Santa Anna had an enormous military
edge: 4,000 troops against 180-odd defenders. The result was predictable,
after 10 days of siege, all the rebels (or heroes) were killed and Santa Anna
had won a victory for Mexico.
  Mexican national policy, however, failed to recognize the danger of trying
to hold territory where their nationals were outnumbered 4 to 1. Hindsight
shows that Mexican national policy might have been better served if the
government had let Texas go and concentrated its efforts on saving (by popula=
ting) the rest of its northern territories - especially California.
  Mexico's national policy at the time was not so thoughtful. What it should
have been was totally undermined by Santa Anna. The Texans of the region rose
up to defeat him at the battle of San Jacinto; eventually, the United States
annexed Texas and as a result of the Mexican-American War Mexico was forced to
sell her northern territories, including California, to the victors.
  By acting hastily in the first instance, Mexico lost any chance it might
have had to preserve its influence over a major part of the North American
continent. Temporarily, at least.

                            Fast Forward To 1990

  When U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf went to the Middle East, he also had a
well-defined objective to remove the Iraqis from Kuwait and restore the
legitimate government of that country.
  Like Santa Anna, Schwarzkopf had an overwhelming force. Forget all the hype
about Iraq having the fourth largest army in the world. Naturally, the U.S.
military wanted the public to believe that they were facing real opposition.
They weren't. In modern warfare, without an airforce and with no cover such
as the jungles of Vietnam, the Iraqis were simply sitting ducks.
  The fact that the consumption of alcohol was not allowed during Desert
Shield and Desert Storm probably saved more U.S. soldiers lives than were lost
in the battle. And to say that 99.9 percent of the U.S. service men who
served in the conflict were "valiant" or "heroes" is a mockery of those terms.
A 12-year-old at summer camp faces more danger.
  Nor is it unpatriotic to say that the typical gigantic welcome parade is a
bit cynical; a "wargasm" designed to obscure the fact that the true national
policies of the United States (as distinguished from the narrowly defined
objective) were as far or farther from being realized than before last August.
  As Santa Anna found out, a huge military victory doesn't mean much if the
policies of the country are not being furthered.
  Is Saddam any less a tyrant in his own land? Are Kuwait or Saudi Arabia any
more democratic? Are the Israelis and Arabs any closer to a settlement? Have
any Western hostages been freed? Does the Arab-in-the-street hat the United
States any less? Were the consequences of 500 oil wells on fire taken into
account? Really now, what glad tidings are we celebrating?
  No, Santa Anna was no Schwarzkopf, militarily. But aside from the perhaps 
temporary destruction of Iraqi military influence in the area (clearly not
within the United Nations mandate), what did Gen. Schwarzkopf (and President
Bush) accomplish?
  A U.S. Embassy official here told me this week - as his only justification -
that the U.S. psyche needed the lift given by the one-sided military victory.
Is the U.S. psyche that fragile? Poor people.