🚀 go-pugleaf

On Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:12:52 GMT, Dharmananda <Nil@neph.net> wrote:

>RTO Trainer wrote:
>
>> Dharmananda <Nil@neph.net> wrote in message
>> news:<2654961.IJh3aZTWvU@news.verizon.net>...
>>> RTO Trainer wrote:
>>> 
>>> > 
>>> > Overwhelming Firepower is not current doctrine.
>>> > 
>>> > 1969 to 1974 is not current.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> OK, then what do you call the doctrine by which the attack on Fallujah
>>> was fought?
>> 
>> Not that the doctrinal name tells you much.
>> 
>> MOUT.  Military Operations on Urban Terrain.
>
>
>FM 90-10  -- Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)
>
>http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army
>fm/90-10/90-10ch1.htm#s_10
>
>http://tinyurl.com/5lcq6
>
>

That's an outdated publication.

>
>CHAPTER 1
>Introduction
>
>Tactical doctrine stresses that urban combat operations are conducted only
>when required and that built-up areas are isolated and bypassed rather than
>risking a costly, time-consuming operation in this difficult environment.
>Adherence to these precepts, though valid, is becoming increasingly
>difficult as urban sprawl changes the face of the battlefield. The acronym
>MOUT (Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain) classifies those military
>actions planned and conducted on a terrain complex where manmade
>construction impacts on the tactical options available to commanders.
>Commanders must treat the elements of urban sprawl as terrain and know how
>this terrain affects the capabilities of their units and weapons. They must
>understand the advantages and disadvantages urbanization offers and its
>effects on tactical operations.
>
>Urban combat operations may be conducted in order to capitalize on the
>strategic or tactical advantages which possession or control of a
>particular urban area gives or to deny these advantages to the enemy. Major
>urban areas represent the power and wealth of a particular country in the
>form of industrial bases, transportation complexes, economic institutions,
>and political and cultural centers. The denial or capture of these centers
>may yield decisive psychological advantages that frequently determine the
>success or failure of the larger conflict. Villages and small towns will
>often be caught up in the battle because of their proximity to major
>avenues of approach or because they are astride lines of communications
>that are vital to sustaining ground combat operations.
>
>During offensive operations, commanders must seek to achieve a favorable
>mobility differential over the defender, to retain momentum, and to avoid a
>protracted and costly urban battle. Built-up areas are obstacles to
>maneuver; hence, isolation and bypass, which neutralize their value to the
>defender, are the goals of urban offensive operations.
>
>Conversely, the defender must seek to integrate the elements of urban sprawl
>into his defensive scheme to slow, block, or canalize the attacker and
>enhance weapon effectiveness.
>
>The attack or defense of a built-up area should be undertaken only when
>significant tactical or strategic advantage accrues through its seizure or
>control.
>
>Urbanization is a complex, multifaceted process influenced by many factors
>including a nation's cultural development, its economic resources, and its
>industrial capacity. Although its form varies from region to region,
>urbanization is characterized by a general pattern of changes in land usage
>and the spread of manmade features across natural terrain.
>
>Tactical terrain analysis has traditionally considered some elements of the
>urban environment such as the allocation of land to agriculture or forestry
>and the distribution of railway or road networks. However, the focus has
>been on natural terrain elements. In Europe and other urbanized areas of
>the world, increased awareness of the effects of manmade features on the
>overall tactical scheme is necessary. How urban terrain elements impact on
>operations is an important consideration in determining our tactical
>options.
>
>For the small-unit tactical commander, the physical layout of a buildup area
>and structural characteristics of its buildings are critical planning
>considerations. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of these factors
>and the combat characteristics of various types of built-up areas for
>offensive and defensive operations. For commanders at battalion level and
>above, the size of a built-up area, the support network of lines of
>communication, and the urban pattern formed by a complex of built-up areas
>assume added importance. 
>
>___________________________________________________________________
>
>Clearly the attack on Fallujah was not required by this doctrine.  There was
>something else going on here.  From what doctrine did they acquire that
>idiotic idea?
>

This is what happens when you study an old manual.

>"Urban combat operations may be conducted in order to capitalize on the
>strategic or tactical advantages which possession or control of a
>particular urban area gives or to deny these advantages to the enemy."
>
>What were the tactical and strategic advantages that resulted from the
>attack on Fallujah?  Al Zaquiri was not captured.  The insurgancy was not
>abated.  Security in Iraq did not improve.  The prospect of our boys coming
>home soon was effectively destroyed.  The validity, and also the liklihood 
>of elections in January was degraded.  Our reputation as a civilized nation
>was impunged.  

Capture of any specific individual is not an appropriate tactical or
strategic goal.

What made you think the "prospect of our boys coming home soon" was
immenent to begin with?

How does this do anything but enhance the security situation for the
upcoming elections?

Our reputation is quite intact.

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