🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <fbq96l124l2@news2.newsguy.com>, Nate Nagel wrote:
> techman41973@yahoo.com wrote:
>> Recently, I was driving home from Portland, OR back to California. I
>> was driving at night and a copy hidden on the side nabbed me with a
>> laser gun going 85 (speed limit was 65). It pisses me off especially
>> when so many drivers were still passing me and apparently were getting
>> away with it. The cop was extremely polite and told me I was on audio
>> and video surveilance. I don't recall wether I admited any wrongdoing
>> on tape.  The ticket is $240, which is shocking considering that a
>> 20mph over limit in my home town (an expensive area of CA) is cheaper
>> even in a residential area. I don't have the time to drive all the way
>> back to Oregon and fight this.
>> I would like to know what my options are.
>> Is there any way to fight this remotely to get a reduction in fines,
>> or to get an extention on paying the fine? Looking for hear from
>> others with similar experiences.
>> Thanks
>> 
> 
> You got pulled over not because you were the fastest driver on the road 
> but because you had out of state plates and likely the other cars around 
> you didn't.  The reason is simple, you don't want to drive back from CA 
> for a court appearance.  There's a lesson in here somewhere.

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2007/gmu-outofstate.pdf

Political Economy at Any Speed: What Determines Traffic Citations?
Michael Makowsky
Department of Economics
George Mason University
Thomas Stratmann
Department of Economics
George Mason University
January 2007

In this paper we study the political economy determinants of traffic 
fines. Speeding tickets are not only determined by the speed of the 
offender, but by incentives faced by police officers and their vote 
maximizing principals. Our model predicts that police officers issue 
higher fines when drivers have a higher opportunity cost of contesting a 
ticket, and when drivers do not reside in the community where they are 
stopped. The model also predicts that local officers are more likely to 
issue a ticket when legal limits prevent the local government from 
increasing revenues though other instruments such as property taxes. We 
find support for the hypotheses. The farther the residence of a driver 
from the municipality where the ticket could be contested, the higher is 
the likelihood of a speeding fine, and the larger the amount of the fine. 
The probability of a fine issued by a local officer is higher in towns 
when constraints on increasing property taxes are binding, the property 
tax base is lower, and the town is more dependent on revenues from 
tourism. For state troopers, who are not employed by the local, but the 
state government, we do not find evidence that the likelihood traffic 
fines varies with town characteristics. Finally, personal 
characteristics, such as gender and race are among the determinants of 
traffic fines.

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