🚀 go-pugleaf

tetraethylleadREMOVETHIS@yahoo.com (Brent P) wrote:

> In article <fbq96l124l2@news2.newsguy.com>, Nate Nagel wrote:
>> techman41973@yahoo.com wrote:
>>> Recently, I was driving home from Portland, OR back to California. I
>>> was driving at night and a copy hidden on the side nabbed me with a
>>> laser gun going 85 (speed limit was 65). It pisses me off especially
>>> when so many drivers were still passing me and apparently were
>>> getting away with it. The cop was extremely polite and told me I was
>>> on audio and video surveilance. I don't recall wether I admited any
>>> wrongdoing on tape.  The ticket is $240, which is shocking
>>> considering that a 20mph over limit in my home town (an expensive
>>> area of CA) is cheaper even in a residential area. I don't have the
>>> time to drive all the way back to Oregon and fight this.
>>> I would like to know what my options are.
>>> Is there any way to fight this remotely to get a reduction in fines,
>>> or to get an extention on paying the fine? Looking for hear from
>>> others with similar experiences.
>>> Thanks
>>> 
>> 
>> You got pulled over not because you were the fastest driver on the
>> road but because you had out of state plates and likely the other
>> cars around you didn't.  The reason is simple, you don't want to
>> drive back from CA for a court appearance.  There's a lesson in here
>> somewhere. 
> 
> http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2007/gmu-outofstate.pdf
> 
> Political Economy at Any Speed: What Determines Traffic Citations?
> Michael Makowsky
> Department of Economics
> George Mason University
> Thomas Stratmann
> Department of Economics
> George Mason University
> January 2007
> 
> In this paper we study the political economy determinants of traffic 
> fines. Speeding tickets are not only determined by the speed of the 
> offender, but by incentives faced by police officers and their vote 
> maximizing principals.

What is a "vote maximizing principal"

> Our model predicts that police officers issue 
> higher fines when drivers have a higher opportunity cost of contesting
> a ticket, and when drivers do not reside in the community where they
> are stopped. The model also predicts that local officers are more
> likely to issue a ticket when legal limits prevent the local
> government from increasing revenues though other instruments such as
> property taxes. We find support for the hypotheses. The farther the
> residence of a driver from the municipality where the ticket could be
> contested, the higher is the likelihood of a speeding fine, and the
> larger the amount of the fine. The probability of a fine issued by a
> local officer is higher in towns when constraints on increasing
> property taxes are binding, the property tax base is lower, and the
> town is more dependent on revenues from tourism. For state troopers,
> who are not employed by the local, but the state government, we do not
> find evidence that the likelihood traffic fines varies with town
> characteristics. 

Were states with financial troubles studied?

> Finally, personal characteristics, such as gender and
> race are among the determinants of traffic fines.
> 
> <...>
> 
> 
>