🚀 go-pugleaf

Thanks to those who thoughtfully responded to my previous
posting (and even to those who responded otherwise).  Here are
a couple of quotes that seem to highlight the ontological
distinctions between my perspective and several other posters.
I'm still looking for insight regarding the unflagging certainty 
of validity that so many place in logic.

] From: mcovingt@aisun3.ai.uga.edu (Michael Covington)
] 
] Someone had asserted that "logic" was a peculiarity of Western culture.
] 
] I was trying to show the absurdity of this notion by taking a practical
] example: in a situation where "Western" logic tells me that if I step out
] in front of a bus I'll be killed, would he claim that in the Far East the
] same situation is not as dangerous because "Western" logic does not apply?

] From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)
] 
] The point is that a *correct* and
] *comprehensive* normative description will _ipso facto_ have full
] descriptive adequacy.  

Logic as a model for understanding rational decision making is not
peculiar to Western civilization.  However, I don't believe that a
committment to logic as the basis for rational thought is universal.
Most people are not using logic when they make most of their everyday
decisions (as examples posted by others show).  Indeed, most
scientists appear not to use logic for much of their decision making.  
Fitness is probably the ultimate arbiter of these processes, but even 
at a fundamental level it is evident why this must be so.

Here is my perspective, for what it is worth:

The reality that each person reacts to is a reality of their own
construction and an imperfect reflection of a larger socially
constructed reality.  Logic can function in this environment only
to the extent that internal models generated to explain phenomena
in the self-generated reality can be compared with observations made 
of the self-generated reality.  Logic between two individuals becomes
comparing one reality with another: a fundamentally invalid comparison.

Yes, a correct and comprehensive normative description *would*
have full descriptive adequacy, but how could such a thing really 
exist?  Just as we can agree that on such and such page of a book an
event occurs, we can agree that such and such observation of 'reality'
conforms to some parameter or set of parameters.  What we can
never know is whether the book is fact or fiction, whether both our
fundamental assumptions regarding the nature of the phenomenon and
our observations of that phenomenon are valid.  

Thoughtful responses and criticism welcomed.

-- 
Steven D. Brewer    brewer@cs.wmich.edu     *     99brewer@lab.cc.wmich.edu
                Department of Science Studies,  Western Michigan University
"Kiu regalas per ^stonoj, tiun oni dankas per bastonoj." D-ro L.L. Zamenhof