🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Dec18.003427.2149@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>The point is that there is no *necessity* that our sensations be
>equivalent, and indeed, that there is no way of telling if they
>*are*.  There is simply *no* objective, scientific way for you
>to address my claim that what you see as a sensation of red I
>see as a sensation of blue.  This is the problem... 

I have no problem with this.

>*No* popular account of consciousness (assuming dualism isn't popular)
>gives a causal role to it.  Functionalism certainly doesn't - there is
>no reason to ascribe "consciousness" to certain functional arrangements
>except for sake of discursive simplicity (i.e., "intentional stance").
>*Nobody* who's a materialist has a clue how consciousness could have
>causal efficacy.  (This may be all the worse for materialism, but
>that's another story...)

Well if it has no causal consequences why on earth would we want to believe
there is such a thing?

Danny.